In his speech at the annual Jackson Hole confab, Powell acknowledged that “with policy in restrictive territory, the baseline outlook and the shifting balance of risks may warrant adjusting our policy stance” (emphasis mine). In normal times, with this ever so slight tweak in Powell’s inclinations and probabilities coming at the end of a long explanation of the balance of risks to inflation, employment, and the economy, this concession could be interpreted as another tease in the on-going suspense and fight over rate cuts. Instead, a stock market ever more eager for rate cuts built a temple from a single stair step and responded with one of the biggest expansions in market breadth that I have ever seen.

Maintaining high odds of a September rate cut will effectively force the Fed to cut. However, if Powell stays on message – “monetary policy is not on a preset course” – then the September rate cut could easily lead to a major disappointment. The Fed’s voting majority may not be ready to promise a sustained rate cutting cycle because inflation remains a nagging problem for the Fed.

Even before the tariff drama, trauma, and noise, inflation was proving itself sticky and stubborn. Now, core CPI (Consumer Price Index) and core PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures), the Fed’s preferred inflation measure, look like they have bottomed. Core CPI has even started heading upward largely thanks to a lift in services inflation. As a result, not only is the Fed looking to cut rates well short of its 2% (core PCE) target but also just as inflation’s downtrend is taking an extended pause.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy (Chain-Type Price Index) [PCEPILFE], retrieved from FRED; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food and Energy in U.S. City Average [CPILFESL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, August 25, 2025.

A suddenly very hot Producer Price Index (PPI) from July promises that subsequent CPI reads will not deliver inflation relief.

Moreover, tariff-driven inflation is already showing up both in the anecdotes from business leaders, earnings reports, and the Fed’s own research. Moreover, even though the Fed Funds rate is still in restrictive territory, financial conditions are not tight. In fact, financial conditions were last this loose right before the Fed belatedly started hiking rates in early 2022.

All together, these stories provide cautionary tales for rate cuts. The confidence I observe in the “rate-cutters” shows insufficient deference to the stagflationary possibilities in the economy. Powell characterized the potential as “a challenging situation” after he finished explaining how “in the near term, risks to inflation are tilted to the upside, and risks to employment to the downside”. This position between a rock and a hard place motivates me to tighten my grip on my position in Goldman Sachs Access Inflation Protected USD Bond ETF (GTIP).

A Swirl Of Claims and Counterclaims

At this point, every one has an opinion on what the Fed needs to do. I have taken note of some key interviews and speeches to portray the painful complexity of the task ahead for the Federal Reserve. Anyone who claims with confidence that the Fed should do “X” is glossing over some part of this picture.

Cleveland President Beth Hammack Leans Against A Rate Cut

Interviews like the one with Cleveland President Beth Hammack formed part of the reason the stock market got caught leaning away from Powell’s first step on the stairs of hopeful monetary policy. A day before Powell’s speech, Hammack insisted that “with the data in hand right now, if the meeting was tomorrow, I would not see a case for reducing interest rates”. She warned that her “biggest concern is that inflation has been too high for the past 4 years. And right now it has been trending in the wrong direction [see chart above]. It’s important we stay modestly restrictive to make sure inflation is brought back under control” (Hammack’s predecessor expressed similar concerns earlier in the month).

Hammack also worried that the inflationary impact of tariffs are just getting started and will continue into Q1 and Q2 of next year given the timing of contract renewals. These worries did not sound like the setup for an incrementally conciliatory Powell.

Hammack also stated that “financial conditions are broadly supportive of the economy” (consistent with the ANFCI). Moreover, she is “not hearing interest rates are a huge problem”. The builders and businesses building new plants in Hammack’s district are complaining just as much about the cost of materials and labor as they are about high interest rates. In a case for future inflationary pressures, manufacturers in the Cleveland district have been buffering price increases but cannot not sustain the hits “forever”.

I surmise Hammack will vote against a rate hike in September. Will she suddenly find herself on the dissenting side of the ledger?

Former St. Louis Fed President Jim Bullard Bolsters Candidacy As Next Fed Chair

Candidates for position of the next Fed Chair share a common trait. They think tariffs will not cause lasting inflation and support cutting rates right away. Former St. Louis Fed President Jim Bullard is a recent add to the candidate list. In a CNBC interview on August 12, Bullard insisted tariffs do not cause inflation. Tariffs are a tax and taxes do not cause inflation (a common equivalence). He pointed to data showing very muted effects and claimed that tariffs are not interrupting the longer-term trend to 2% inflation. Like other supporters of rate cuts, Bullard is looking well beyond the current swirl of data and glancing at the top of the stairs of hopeful monetary policy.

Council of Economic Advisers Chair Stephen Miran Asks “What Inflation”?

Council of Economic Advisers Chair Stephen Miran is also on the list of potential candidates to next head the Fed. Miran appeared on CNBC the same day as Bullard to discuss the economy. By narrowing his view to inflation since inauguration, Miran calculated a 1.9% annualized rate of inflation (I assume this was a reference to headline inflation). He further insisted that there “continues to be no evidence whatsoever of tariff-induced inflation”, and he implied that there will be no evidence for future impacts either. Ultimately, exporters will bear the cost of tariffs because they are the least flexible part of the supply chain; Americans will just buy elsewhere or make formerly imported goods domestically (do exporting countries doing deals understand their ultimate doom?).

When asked about the bottoming in core inflation, Miran dismissed the dynamic because tariffs are not the culprit. Miran pointed to used cars and airfares as core drivers. He went on to finger illegal immigration for boosting rents by 4-5%. Thus, net services inflation will go to zero because of the current crackdown on illegal residency.

Miran stands confidently at the top of the stairs of hopeful monetary policy. I am guessing he is a front-runner in the race for Fed Chair.

Gold Paralyzed With Indecision?

The price of gold has largely stopped responding to the back and forth in inflation-related data and opinions on monetary policy. While the SPDR Gold Trust (GLD) increased 1.1% in the wake of Powell’s first step on the stairs of hopeful monetary policy, GLD remains firmly stuck in a 4-month trading range. A technical “bearish engulfing” pattern in April continues to loom over the trading action as a top. Still, I am betting on GLD responding bullishly to the next rate cut just as it did to the last one. GLD is up 30% after initially selling off in response to what was thought to be a hawkish rate cut at the time.

I have been holding a GLD calendar call spread for the last half or so of this trading range while rolling forward the expiring short ends of the spread. I plan to convert this position to an outright call spread ahead of the September Fed meeting.

Be careful out there!

The post Powell Places His First Step On the Stairs Of Hopeful Monetary Policy appeared first on Inflation Watch.

In his latest press conference on monetary policy, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell reaffirmed the central bank’s dominant message: tariff-driven inflation must not evolve into persistent price pressure. The Fed must ensure tariffs result in no more than a one-time price shock, as has so often been advertised. The Fed is maintaining a restrictive policy stance, “modest” in Powell’s opinion, not to suppress growth unnecessarily, but to guard against the risk that a one-time shock becomes embedded in inflation expectations.

Powell described a uniquely difficult moment for the Fed and monetary policy. “This is a special situation with risks to both of the goals,” he said, referring to the Fed’s dual mandate of maximum employment (currently met) and price stability (inflation remains above target). The policy response: stay in position, gather more data, and avoid premature action. “We see our current policy stance as appropriate to guard against inflation risks,” as Powell stated in his prepared remarks.

These stances form “Powell’s promises.”

Tariff Inflation: Short-Lived or Sticky?

During the press conference, Powell made clear that the central bank does not see inflation from tariffs as systemic, but it must remain vigilant. “Higher tariffs have begun to show through more clearly to prices of some goods,” he acknowledged. While the base case remains a one-time price level shift, Powell acknowledged, “it is also possible that the inflationary effects could instead be more persistent, and that is a risk to be assessed and managed.”

That task—managing a potentially durable inflationary impulse from trade policy—is Powell’s focus, along with the majority of the Fed. The Fed is collecting evidence as companies pass costs to consumers, raising the risk that inflation expectations begin to drift. “Near-term measures of inflation expectations have moved up… on news about tariffs,” Powell noted, though longer-term expectations remain anchored for now.

In the press conference Q&A, Powell was more direct:

“A pretty reasonable base case is that this is a one-time price increase. We will make sure that’s the case.”

Policy Outlook: Restrictive, Yet Watchful

In support of its goals, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) left the federal funds rate unchanged at 4¼ to 4½ percent, and continued its balance sheet reduction plans. Powell emphasized that this positioning is intended to give the Fed space to observe, not react hastily, a message consistent with past meetings:

“For the time being, we are well positioned to learn more about the likely course of the economy and the evolving balance of risks before adjusting our policy stance.”

Although the Committee’s policy rate remains in “modestly restrictive” territory, Powell flagged a disconnect by observing that “financial conditions are accommodative.” In other words, the economy is not acting as if monetary policy is holding the economy back. (I wish Powell spent more time unpacking this apparent paradox). When a reporter pointed out weakness in the housing market, Powell reminded the audience that the Fed looks at the economy’s performance as a whole, in its totality. However, his claim that the Fed cannot impact housing supply is only partially true. High loan costs can undermine the economics of some housing projects. These loan costs usually follow the Fed funds rate.

A Measured Mandate: No Rush to Cut

Despite the slowing of inflation from its mid-2022 peak, Powell emphasized that it “remains somewhat elevated.” Core PCE inflation rose 2.7 percent over the 12 months ending in June—nearly unchanged since the start of the year. While services inflation continues to ease, goods prices are rising under tariff pressure, motivating the majority of the Fed to hold rates steady.

In response to dissenting votes from two members (Bowman and Waller, who preferred a rate cut), Powell praised the clarity of the debate:

“What you hope is that people explain their positions clearly and that’s what we had. We had one of our better meetings…This was a good meeting today.”

Powell offered high praise for this meeting—likely an effort to stave off media speculation about Fed acrimony or debilitating disagreements. Powell emphasized that “the majority of the committee is of the view inflation is above target and employment at target, so policy should be more restrictive.” He reiterated this simple formula to make the case plain. He deferred to the dissenters to make their cases in coming days.

To further underscore the majority’s case, Powell suggested that the Fed is already “looking through” goods inflation simply by not raising rates. I am sure that commentary raised at least a few eyebrows given how hawkish it sounds at a time when everyone is looking for the date rate cuts resume. Ultimately, Powell insisted that tariffs “will not turn into inflation, as we will make sure it won’t.” He also cautioned that the Fed must act “efficiently”. If the Fed cuts too soon, a resurgence of inflation would sent the Fed scrambling to raise rates again (a scenario that does not concern dissenter Waller). If the Fed waits too long, then it will allow unnecessary damage to the labor market (this is the scenario that concerns Waller most).

The Renovation Sideshow

The press of course had a questions about the tensions with President Trump and a gathering cacophony of his administration. Powell, as always, was quite dignified in his responses. However, his description of Trump’s recent (and awkward) visit the suddenly controversial renovations contained some backhanded commentary. Powell called the visit a good one, an honor. He added that it is not often a President comes by the Fed for a visit, especially to see a building. In other words, not only was Trump’s visit unusual, but also it was a bit comical. I wish the occasion allowed Powell to smile and crack more direct jokes.

A week and a half ago, the Federal Reserve posted a short video explaining the renovations. A lot of the work involves upgrades to meet government safety and security standards (like blast proof windows) and to preserve historic features. Who knew such work could create such a stir and build a case for firing a Fed Chair?

Conclusion: One Shot at Containing Price Pressure

Powell’s framing of the Fed’s challenge is both strategic and cautionary. Tariff inflation must remain a one-time shock, not a repeat offense. At the same time, the Fed cannot overlook the labor market’s fragility.

“Our obligation is to keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored and to prevent a one-time increase in the price level from becoming an ongoing inflation problem.”

With risks pressing on both sides of the mandate, the Fed’s current posture is one of active restraint—willing to move, but unwilling to guess.

The post Powell’s Promises: Containing Tariff-Driven Inflation and Risks to Dual Mandate appeared first on Inflation Watch.

I faded the move in bonds as nothing about the December CPI print changed the fundamental narrative of sticky inflation and a cautious Fed or even the prospect of soaring U.S. budget deficits. I speculated on weekly SPY put options as a hedge. I fully acknowledge that the stock market has spent a year and a half or more adjusting to every hiccup and bout of angst over the inflation narrative.

The chart below demonstrates that the eye must strain hard to see a change in the profile of core CPI. We will have to wait until later this month to see whether the softer than expected core CPI also bends core PCE off its uptrend from its last trough.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy (Chain-Type Price Index) [PCEPILFE], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food and Energy in U.S. City Average [CPILFESL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; January 15, 2025.

The volatility index (VIX) well represented the stock market’s huge sigh of relief over inflation. The VIX plunged 13.9% and brought an end to the most recent uptrend.

Shelter Inflation Continues Trending Down

Shelter inflation, along with services inflation, has been a key culprit in stubbornly sticky inflation. The National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) pointed out that “the year-over-year change in the shelter index remained below 5% for a fourth straight month and posted its lowest annual gain since January 2022, suggesting a continued moderation in housing inflation.” Shelter inflation has even been on a definitive downtrend since peaking in March, 2023. Unfortunately, the current trajectory may be too slow for comfort in terms of its impact on aggregate core CPI.

Shelter inflation dropped from 7.5% in December, 2022 to 6.2% in December, 2023 and now 4.6% last December. If this nearly linear pace continues, shelter inflation will be around 3.2% next December, right around where core CPI currently sits. Thus, other components will still need to do some heavy-lifting in coming months to meaningfully push core CPI, and presumably core PCE, closer to the Fed’s 2.0% target.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Shelter in U.S. City Average [CUSR0000SAH1], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; January 16, 2025

An Oil Breakout

Oil prices are not part of the core CPI, but its recent breakout has caught my attention. A continued, persistent rise in oil prices could bleed into higher inflation expectations for consumers. Such a dynamic may further motivate the Federal Reserve to sit on its hands with monetary policy. A 3.3% gain in the United States Oil Fund (USO) sent the ETF to a 2 1/2 year high.

A Spike In Short-Term Inflation Expectations?

Every month, the New York Federal Reserve publishes a survey of consumer expectations. This survey includes various measures of inflation expectations. The 1-year median expected inflation rate for consumers stayed around 3.0% for all of 2024, consistent with the narrative of sticky inflation. However, a potentially interesting blip happened in December where the median point prediction jumped from 3.0% to 3.8%. The median point predictions are typically higher than the median expected inflation rate, but they rarely diverge and almost never by such a wide margin. The accompanying press release does not refer to this surprising 1-month behavior, but I cannot help speculating on its significance. I will be watching to see whether this point projection manages to lead the median expected inflation rate higher or whether it snaps back to the typical relationship. Either way, such a jump is surely not positive for inflation in the near-term.

The Trade

I continue to maintain a strategy of fading rallies in TLT. Going into the CPI I owned a single February TLT $85 put option “just in case” CPI produced a fresh upside surprise in inflation. Now I can accumulate TLT put options at more attractive prices. TLT’s rally stopped just short of resistance at the 20-day moving average (DMA) (the dotted line below). A breakout from there will set up even more attractive prices on a test of converging resistance between the downtrending 50DMA (the red line) and the bottom of the former trading range (the thick black line).

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long TLT put options, long SPY put options

The post A Fresh Opportunity to Fade Bonds As A Marginal Change in Inflation Ignites A Near Oversold Market appeared first on Inflation Watch.

“A strategy of repeatedly lowering the fed funds target range toward a more neutral level relies on confidence that the neutral level is materially lower than where rates are now. When I look at the available evidence, though, I see substantial signs that the neutral rate has increased in recent years, and some hints that it could be very close to where the fed funds rate is now…ces. I anticipate the FOMC will most likely need more rate cuts to finish the journey. But it’s difficult to be sure how many cuts may be needed and how soon they may need to happen.” – Navigating in shallow waters: Monetary policy strategy in a better-balanced economy, Dallas Fed President Lorie K. Logan, November 13, 2024

“Shifting from my baseline to alternative scenarios, recent information suggests to me that the risk of inflation ceasing to converge toward 2%, or moving higher, has risen, while the risk of an unwelcome deterioration in the labor market has remained unchanged or possibly fallen.” – Musalem: Remarks on Monetary Policy and the U.S. Economic Outlook, St. Louis Fed President Alberto Musalem, November 13, 2024

“While now is the time to begin dialing back the restrictiveness of monetary policy, it remains to be seen how much further interest rates will decline or where they might eventually settle.” – Longer-term Considerations for Growth and Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City President and Chief Executive Officer Jeff Schmid, November 13, 2024

All three speeches included Fedspeak for caution on the pace of rate cuts while maintaining the flexibility to follow the data. These speeches also came on the same day as the release of the October CPI data. This timely convergence of caution and circumspection is important because core CPI maintained the stabilization trend in place since a low in July (see the green line below). Meanwhile, core PCE, the Fed’s favorite indicator of inflation also looks like it is stabilizing. In other words, it seems the Fed is paying attention to stabilizing inflation patterns.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food and Energy in U.S. City Average [CPILFESL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 13, 2024. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy (Chain-Type Price Index) [PCEPILFE], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 13, 2024.

Shelter costs continue to drive the bulk of inflation. For October, shelter costs constituted 65% of the year-over-year increase in the CPI. Housing costs are in a paradoxical juncture where monetary policy could help maintain elevated housing costs no matter where interest rates go. The National Assocation of Homebuilders (NAHB) laments that high interest rates contribute to contraints on supply thourgh an expensive and difficult financing environment for construction loans. On the other hand, looser monetary policy could reignite a housing demand that strains supply further and drives up prices. For now, a surprise rebound in mortgage rates is tamping down housing demand.

A Friendly Message from Gold?

While inflation is stabilizing, gold may have topped out.

Two months ago I interpreted the strength in gold as indicative of a skepticism about the Fed’s implied victory message on inflation. That trend persisted until last week. The resolution of the U.S. presidential election generated a fresh surge in Bitcoin (BTC/USD) and presumably drained interest in gold. The SPDR Gold Trust (GLD) gapped down and lost 3.0%. I was hopeful that the 50-day moving average (DMA) (the red line below) would hold as support. As a (perma) bull on gold, I added call options to supplement my core GLD position. Today’s 1.0% loss in GLD further confirmed a 50DMA breakdown. This bearish technical signal means that I am unlikely to try new short-term trades for a while.

Source for charts: TradingView.com

The new inverse correlation between gold and Bitcoin indicates a sharp shift in preferences with Bitcoin getting an added advantage from expectations of a pro-crypto regulatory regime starting next year.

The Bond Market Remains Wary

Two months ago I claimed that the bond market acted wary about the Fed’s presumed victory over inflation. Sure enough, long-term yields have steadily risen ever since. The iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF (TLT), which goes up when long-term interest rates go down, is now trading near the bottom of a presumed horizontal trading range. My strategy to fade TLT has worked all the way down.

After TLT gapped up for some reason on the CPI news, I thought I missed my latest profit opportunity. So when TLT faded back to the previous day’s close, I counted myself fortunate and took profits on my latest round of TLT put options. TLT then went on to lose 1.0% for the day.

The U.S. dollar soars

The U.S. dollar index (DXY) has benefited from one tailwind after another. Now, the presumed tailwind comes from the boost it should get with increased tariffs that also promise to prop up inflationary pressures in the economy. Fewer dollars going overseas to buy goods tips the supply/demand balance in favor of a stronger dollar. Two months ago I decided to bet on continues strength in the British pound versus the U.S. dollar by buying shares of Invesco CurrencyShares® British Pound Sterling Trust (FXB). I took the opportunity to buy when FXB tested its uptrending 50DMA. The currency ETF has continued downward from there with little sign of an imminent rebound.

Conclusion

With the Presidential election behind us, the bets on stabilizing (or even stronger) inflation are clarified for now: long Bitcoin, long gold only after Bitcoin enthusiasm wanes somehow, long U.S. dollar, and short TLT. While I sold all my Bitcoin earlier in the day, I will continue to trade by buying dips. I am conflicted on the U.S. dollar as I stubbornly hold some dollar shorts while trading in and out of dollar longs. At some point, I will commit to a dollar long by shorting EUR/USD. Europe stands to lose in the next administration with a weaker NATO, more contentious relationships, and higher tariffs in a weakening economic backdrop.

The Federal Reserve has ahead as precarious a path as ever while it gets increasingly wary about stabilizing inflation!

Full disclosure: long GLD shares and calls, long PHYS, long FXB

The post The Federal Reserve Is Paying Attention to Stabilizing Core Inflation appeared first on Inflation Watch.

• Food prices increased around 20% from 2021 through 2023 and have changed little since. This applies both to the cereal and bakery products index and the food at home index.
• After soaring as much as 40% in the wake of the pandemic, the price of used cars and trucks have declined since late 2022.
• In the last few months new cars also dropped into negative inflation territory.
• Inflation for durable and non-durable goods has cooled significantly since the 2022 peak with durable goods in negative territory since 2023.
• In all states across the country, the change in median income required to buy a home soared from 2019 – 2023 usually in multiples of the change from 2014 – 2018. California of course tops the list: 2% from 2014 to 2018 vs 18.8% from 2019 to 2023.
• Overall hourly wages have lagged inflation since 2021.

The article also presents some stark economic realities starting with this contrast between how people feel about their own economic circumstances versus that of the country as a whole: “In the Fed’s 2023 Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking, the share of those saying they were doing ‘at least okay’ remained over 70%, lower than the 78% peak hit in 2021, but roughly where it was before the pandemic. By contrast, a dismal 22% rated the national economy ‘good’ or ‘excellent’.”

Additionally, there are important shifts in measurements of well-being:

• There is unsurprisingly a direct inverse correlation between income and the share of households self-reporting difficulty in meeting expenses. However, this share has trended upward since late 2020 for households making at least $100,000. Households below that income level have generally self-reported small improvements in the past three and a half years.
• Through the end of 2023, inflation-adjusted net wealth of Black households has fallen below levels from the start of 2019.

These data paint a picture of an economy where inflation still weighs on the minds of Americans even as certain inflation pain points have come under control. Given this environment, it is no surprise that the Fed has slow-rolled expectations for rate cuts. However, with the market now pricing in near certainty for a rate cut in September, the Fed may finally be forced to take the plunge and test out inflation expectations.

A Trade on TLT

Since 2021, the core CPI (the consumer price index) has taken the escalator up and the stairs down. Seemingly in expectation of little additional improvement in inflation, long-term bond yields seem to be settling into rangebound trading. Accordingly, I drew new presumed trendlines for the iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF (TLT) to adjust my trading rules for fading TLT.

Prior to the June 3rd breakout for TLT, I cound consistently fade TLT from the top of a downward trading channel (the dashed blue line). After the breakout, I faded TLT rallies with an expectation of tests of the previous downward channel as support. The soft CPI print for June that drove September rate cut expectations makes me think a new sideways trend is unfolding. The chart below has horizontal black lines that represent the tension and tug and pull between a slow cooling in inflation and the potential stimulative impact of a rate cut cycle ahead of any significant economic weakness.

I used the top of the trading range to twice fade TLT with put options. However, I was not patient enough to see TLT below its 20-day moving average (the black dashed line above). Thus, it is possible I will eventually move the bottom of the trading higher.

Be careful out there!

The post An Inflation Story appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Nevermind that a read hotter than consensus has little impact on the current trend. The chart below from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that even as core CPI (all items less food and energy) is flattening out a bit (the red line), the “sticky” shelter component of inflation is still hurtling downward (the purple line).

With the trend still favoring the death of inflation, I think of “sticky” as a reference to people’s impatience with an inflation component taking too long to converge with the overall average inflation level. The CPI report highlighted the relative stubbornness of shelter inflation:

“The shelter index increased 0.6 percent in January, and was the largest factor in the monthly increase in the index for all items less food and energy. The index for owners’ equivalent rent rose 0.6 percent over the month, while the index for rent increased 0.4 percent. The lodging away from home index increased 1.8 percent in January…The shelter index increased 6.0 percent over the last year, accounting for over two thirds of the total 12-month increase in the all items less food and energy index.”

The bubble chart below from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics shows the outsized influence of services less energy services on total inflation (the large purple bubble). This major component includes shelter. Its relative importance of 60.9 dwarfs the relative importance of all other major components of inflation.

Given the angst directed at the shelter component of inflation, I looked at what the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) had to say about this CPI report. The industry group provided a reassuring conclusion: “the NAHB forecast expects to see shelter costs decline further in the coming months.  This is supported by real-time data from private data providers that indicate a cooling in rent growth.” So while the housing price picture is mixed with existing homes on the uptick and new homes on the downtick, overall rents should continue a cooling pace as expected.

Unfortunately for those traders and investors buying stocks and bonds in anticipation of rate cuts, this reminder of inflation’s stickiness pushed out expectations for the first rate cut from the Federal Reserve. Over-eager financial markets pushed out the first rate cut from May to June. This is a bitter pill to swallow for those who started buying stocks and bonds late last year in anticipation of a rate cut in March (because the Fed admitted to inflation’s death of course). The chart from the CME FedWatch Tool shows how the odds favoring a May rate cut immediately evaporated.

The Fizzle and Sizzle in Financial Markets

Interestingly, currency markets and the bond market have been moving counter to the rallies in the S&P 500 (SPY) and the NASDAQ (COMPX). The 2024 rally in the U.S. dollar index (DXY) has taken the index ABOVE the point where currency traders dumped the dollar in the wake of inflation’s death. The chart below from Tradingview.com shows a bullish breakout for the dollar last month above its 50-day moving average (DMA) (the red line) and a successful test of the trend line as support earlier this month.

The dollar’s rally complicates my bullish trades on the Canadian dollar but also provides my latest opportunity to fade USD/CAD (Invesco CurrencyShares Canadian Dollar Trust (FXC)) within the trading range. I am net long the U.S. dollar by being short EUR/USD (Invesco CurrencyShares Euro Currency Trust (FXE)).

Excluding a sharp countertrend rally at the end of January, iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF (TLT) has sold off most of 2024.

These trends further reinforce the notion and fear that perhaps earlier rate cut expectations were indeed premature. After the market’s pullback (the S&P 500 lost 1.4% and remains in an uptrend) will stocks also concede the point or will they return to ignoring deteriorating market breadth and other signs of caution in the stock market?

The volatility index (VIX) may have already blown off enough steam to soothe the groans of the bulls…for now. Note carefully how the VIX stopped going down this year and thus has an ever so slight uptrend going…

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: net long U.S. dollar

The post From Inflation Fizzle to Sizzle appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Inflation landed around 20% in 1947 according to the NY Times who also claimed it was the worst inflation America experienced over the past 100 years. The article did not specify the inflation measure, so for the purposes of discussion I assume the article referred to the entire Consumer Price Index (CPI). If so, then the 20% figure must have been for a particular month in 1947. The annual inflation for 1947 was 8.8% according to Investopedia, far short of the highest level over the past 100 years. Inflation the year before soared to 18.1% from 1945’s 2.2%. While it looks like the NYT selectively picked an inflation number for effect, it is clear that sentiment on inflation during this time was as dour as one should expect during a period of exceptionally high inflation. The following bullets are mostly direct quotes from the article reordered chronologically:

• In December 1947, more than 70% of adults said they would want their own wages to decline in order to bring prices down.
• In polling throughout 1947 and 1948, a majority supported reinstating wartime rationing and price controls.
• Before the conventions, voters said a plan to address high prices was the No. 1 priority they wanted in a party platform. More voters said they wanted prices to be addressed over the next four years than any other issue.
• In June, 1948, a majority of voters expected prices would be higher in six months (at election time in November, only 18% of voters expected the same).
• As late as summer 1948…adults expected prices to keep rising.

A combination of economic pressures sent inflation soaring.

Post-war supply shortages combined with the end of price controls to light a fire under inflation. The NY Times article pointed out that labor unrest following World War 2 exacerbated supply shortages. For example, the National WWII Museum in New Orleans observes: “With the end of the wartime no-strike pledge, workers across America expressed their frustration with wages and working conditions through a series of strikes that involved over 5 million people from the end of 1945 and into 1946.” Strikes hit broad swaths of the economy: mills, telephone service, meat packing, and General Electric (a major industrial employer at the time). The railroad strike of 1946 crippled large parts of the economy (the interstate highway system did not start until Eisenhower’s presidency in the 1950s). No doubt all this economic disruption helped dampen the national mood alongside the resulting price pressures.

Layer on pent-up consumer demand and the economy got hit with a perfect inflationary storm. Benefits from the GI Bill, not mentioned in the NY Times article, helped to stoke consumer demand. For example, while the country built very little housing during World War II, the GI Bill offered returning soldiers low interest, zero down payment home loans with better terms for newly built housing. Although Black servicemen were often denied benefits of the GI Bill (and thus they were often left in poverty), such incentives must have contributed to increased pricing pressures in the economy.

The NY Times article also did not consider the potential price distortion from large amounts of U.S. resources funneled into the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan kicked off in 1948, and it is plausible suppliers felt emboldened to increase prices in anticipation of the largess. Supply responses in Europe would eventually erode this pricing power.

Fast forward to today and we find parallel economic distortions putting pressure on prices. Massive fiscal and monetary stimulus stoked demand, especially for housing and related goods. Government supported pandemic savings have apparently supported on-going strength in retail spending. Wage growth has also supported robust consumer demand. While today’s labor unrest pales in comparison to post-war labor actions, the scales have tipped in favor of labor for now. Unemployment remains at historic lows, and employers have readily absorbed the rebound in the labor force participation rate. U.S. industrial policy could apply its own upward pressures on prices in the economy.

The Federal Reserve on the Sidelines of Late 1940s Inflation

The volatile cocktail of inflationary pressures must have complicated monetary policy. Compared to today’s tornadic monetary policy response, the Fed’s rate hikes in the immediate post-war years look exceptionally timid. The Federal Reserve essentially sat on the sidelines as the economy convulsed through its inflationary pressures. From “A New Daily Federal Funds Rate Series and History of the Federal Funds Market, 1928-1954“:

Today’s deflationists would have been particularly happy with the timid Fed of the late 1940s and early 1950s! Fresh memories of the economic devastation of the Depression no doubt also slowed the hand of the Fed. The NY Times article did not delve into the role of the Fed in allowing inflation to take its course in the post war years.

Inflation Today

Pandemic disruptions are mostly in repair, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused its own supply disruptions. The Israel-Hamas war threatens to cause disruptions in global oil markets and shipping lanes in the Gulf. Growing tensions between China and Taiwan and increasing authoritarian control over the Chinese economy have motivated companies to leave China in search of “safer” countries for production. This transition will likely pressures prices through increased production costs and the short-term transition costs.

In other words, while financial markets celebrate the end of the Federal Reserve’s fight against inflation, there are plenty of looming inflation risks, any of which could deliver setbacks to current trends. Seventy-six years ago inflation came to a boil and then yielded through the 1950s and early 1960s. A parallel peak for today’s inflationary era would be welcome news!

The post Inflation Now, Inflation 76 Years Ago appeared first on Inflation Watch.

• The Federal Reserve had driven monetary policy to historic heights of accommodation: a 9 trillion dollar balance sheet combined with a return to zero interest rates: an easy money paradigm that itself needed to be transitory.
• The Federal Reserve instituted a risk management framework that targeted tail risks instead of an “expected” path of inflation and its resulting impact on the economy.

Moreover, Stiglitz offered two examples from the economy, autos and shelter, that do not conclusively demonstrate the Fed had no impact on inflation. Even Stiglitz’s discourse on inflation expectations is open to varying interpretations. I will tackle each of these issues one-by-one starting with auto inflation.

Auto Inflation: A Counterfactual

Stiglitz makes a big deal out of the obvious fact that the Fed could not solve chip supply problems in the auto industry by hiking interest rates. While the Fed never staked a claim to such powers, and even acknowledge its lack of such powers, this complaint is common among Fed critics who apparently wanted the Fed to leave monetary policy accommodative and lower for longer. Stiglitz pulls the rug from under the Fed by insisting “Given that its interest-rate hikes did not help resolve the chip shortages, it cannot take any credit for the disinflation in car prices.”

So now with auto prices inevitably lower, critics like Stiglitz are declaring victory on the prediction that car prices would eventually come down. Fine. How about a counterfactual? If the Fed had left rates lower for longer is it credible to believe that the path for prices would have stayed exactly the same (or improve)? I claim the answer is no. Assuming lower loan rates encourage and incentivize more borrowing (indeed this is a fundamental premise for accommodative monetary policy), then rock bottom rates would have fueled on-going and even increasing demand for cars and deepened pressures against short supply. In other words, I am claiming auto inflation would have been even worse and could have caused other cascading problems in the economy.

Even throwing away abstract counterfactual arguments, the actual data is not conclusive enough to suggest the Fed had zero (or even little) impact. The chart below juxtaposes new and used car prices with the auto inventory/sales ratio (cars and light trucks). This ratio puts demand and supply into context. While the the ratio bottomed out in late 2021, it is still nowhere close to pre-pandemic levels. Deflation/disinflation should not be this dramatic with the inventory/sales ratio still at historically low levels. I would have expected a price plunge to accompany a much faster recovery in the inventory/sales ratio. In fact, I would have expected the pendulum to at least swing above 1 again.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Used Cars and Trucks in U.S. City Average [CUSR0000SETA02], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 14, 2023. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: New Vehicles in U.S. City Average [CUUR0000SETA01], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 14, 2023. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Auto Inventory/Sales Ratio [AISRSA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 14, 2023.

In other words, while supply has been slowly normalizing, demand still outstrips supply. This is a condition for higher prices. Yet, resurgent inflation in autos is not likely specifically because high interest rates are constraining and reducing the ability and willingness to pay higher and higher prices. The rate on the 48-month auto loan was last this high in 2002.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Finance Rate on Consumer Installment Loans at Commercial Banks, New Autos 48 Month Loan [TERMCBAUTO48NS], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 14, 2023.

Finally, domestic banks have also tightened lending standards, likely further constraining the ability to pay higher prices. Lending standards tighten with tighter monetary policy as banks become more risk averse and have a higher cost of funds. This is a Fed effect. From the October, 2023 “Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices“:

“In a set of special questions, banks were asked to assess the likelihood of approving credit card and auto loan applications by borrower FICO score (or equivalent) in comparison with the beginning of the year. Significant net shares of banks reported that they were less likely to approve both credit card and auto loan applications from borrowers with FICO scores of 620. Moderate and significant net shares of banks reported that they were less likely to approve credit card loan applications and auto loan applications, respectively, from borrowers with FICO scores of 680. In contrast, a modest net share of banks reported being more likely to approve credit card applications from borrowers with FICO scores of 720, while the likelihood of approving auto loan applications to borrowers with FICO scores of 720 was basically unchanged in comparison with the beginning of the year.”

Thus, I claim the Fed deserves at least partial credit for helping to tap the brakes on demand, in the form of ability to pay, in the face of relatively tight inventories. In other words, I find it compelling to create a narrative around a Fed impact that is at least as plausible as the narrative that completely discredits the Fed.

Shelter Inflation

The dynamics of shelter inflation are complex. I grant Stiglitz the point that higher interest rates can exacerbate inflationary pressures by reducing the availability of construction loans needed to increase supply. Interestingly, Stiglitz does not reference the complementary constrain t on supply from existing home owners who refuse to move and incur the cost of mortgages more expensive than their current ones.

Anyway, I will still point out that it was soaring shelter inflation that provided the signal to the Fed that rates were overly accommodative; the episode was a rare moment in Fed history where it acknowledge an inflationary problem from shelter costs. Historically low mortgage rates stoked demand and led to a mini-mania in the housing market. Prices soared practically uncontrollably for homes. Rent soared alongside home prices. I discussed the “housing trigger” for the Fed in “The Federal Reserve Fears On-Going Inflationary Pressures from Rents” and provided more detail in “Inflationary or A Bubble – Housing Prices Help Push A Fed Driving Recession-Pricing for Home Builders.”

I also provided evidence from a home builder about the impact of the Fed on cooling housing prices in “Lennar Corporation: How the Fed Is Cooling Inflation In the Housing Market.”

In other words, the mere fact that one-year leases on rents cause a lag in disinflation is insufficient to dismiss the various ways in which rent inflation forced the Fed to hike and to maintain its hiking campaign. A counterfactual on post-pandemic housing demand and prices in the face of prolonged accommodative policy should not be controversial: we have lived it three times in the span of just one generation.

Core Inflation

Stiglitz noted the following about headline inflation:

“The pandemic-induced inflation was exacerbated further by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which caused a spike in energy and food prices. But, again, it was clear that prices could not continue to rise at such a rate, and many of us predicted that there would be disinflation — or even deflation (a decline in prices) in the case of oil. We were right. Inflation has indeed fallen dramatically in the United States and Europe.”

This was a surprising sidebar when the Fed does not set monetary policy by what happens to food and energy. Adding to the distraction, Stiglitz does not label the inflation numbers her uses to compare to the Fed’s target. For the purposes of this discussion I will assume he is referring to core PCE (personal consumption expenditure, excluding food and energy) since it matches the number he uses for September. Yet, I cannot be 100% sure since the 3.7% change in the PCE in September matches the 3.7% headline change in the CPI (consumer price index) for September. This confusion is technically important because the median PCE sits at 4.4%. Core CPI was 4.1% in September, and the October report delivered the tiniest of cooling at 4.0%.

No matter the lens, these levels and incremental declines are hardly an occasion for final victory. While the Fed has every reason to stop hiking rates and watch what happens from here, these numbers do not tell me the Fed can pack up its toys and go home. Stiglitz takes care of that concern by calling the 2% inflation target arbitrary: “There is no evidence that countries with 2% inflation do better than those with 3% inflation; what matters is that inflation is under control. That is clearly the case today.” On the surface, the logic makes sense except that the period of “Great Moderation”, where deflation was the Fed’s biggest concern, was a period where PCE stayed below 2%. We do not have experience in THIS economy with a Fed that overtly allows inflation to stay well above 3%…and the Fed is clearly in no mood to push its luck.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy (Chain-Type Price Index) [PCEPILFE], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 14, 2023.

Inflation Expectations

Stiglitz claims that the Fed also had nothing to do with controlling inflation expectations. Unlike the Fed, markets knew that inflation would naturally correct itself. Stiglitz even challenges the protest that inflation expectations remained calm specifically because of trust in the Fed: “…inflationary expectations remained tame. While some central-bank economists claim that this was due to their own forceful response, the data tell a different story. Inflation expectations were muted from early on, because markets understood that the supply-side disruptions were temporary.” Stiglitz took a debatable point and breathed unfounded certainty into it. Stiglitz focuses on the 5-year forward inflation expectation rate:

“Only after central bankers repeated over and over their fears that inflation and inflationary expectations were setting in, and that this would necessitate a long slog entailing high interest rates and unemployment, did inflationary expectations rise. (But, even then, they barely budged, reaching 2.67% for the average of the next five years in April 2021, before falling back to 2.3% a year later.)”

Yet, a different interpretation is plausible and valid regarding the stability in the 5-year forward expectation. It appears the market has a bias to expect disinflation (especially in response to shocks). Starting between 2015 and 2017, the market finally believed the Fed could hold inflation closer to 2.0%. This milestone came after persistent messaging, in different forms, from the Fed on the 2% target. It seems odd to blame the Fed for a brief spike in inflation expectations at the time the Fed started hiking rates. I find it more plausible to interpret the rapid return to previous levels as evidence the market was once again mollified over long-term prospects with a Fed clearly serious about constraining inflationary pressures.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 5-Year, 5-Year Forward Inflation Expectation Rate [T5YIFR], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 14, 2023.

Given it appears to take a lot to convince markets the Fed cannot control inflation over the “long-term”, I turned to shorter-term expectations as a more responsive indicator. It turns out that the 3-year consumer expectations peaked right as the Fed finally dropped the notion of transitory inflation in November, 2021. One-year expectations kept rising alongside inflation readings and peaked with a peak in inflation. Thus, it is very possible that the 3-year expectation more accurately reflects sensitivity to the Fed’s actions where it counts: consumers.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Survey of Consumer Expectations

I go into more detail about the mechanics of inflation expectations in “Inflation Expectations and Inflationary Psychology.”

Since short-term expectations can start to bleed into longer-term expectations for inflation, the Fed took a risk management approach when it finally got serious about inflation. Tamp down short-term expectations and remove the risk of perturbing longer-term expectations which could prove harder to control above recent historical ranges.

The Risk Management Approach to Monetary Policy

The question is not whether or not the Federal Reserve should have acted to normalize monetary policy (by picking a non-zero target). The question is how far does/did the Fed need to go. Powell made it abundantly clear that the uncertain (and unprecedented) economic environment put the Fed in a risk management framework. The Fed decided it could not manage policy to the average or expected outcomes in the economy.

For example, a year ago, during the Q&A at a Brookings Institution conference, Powell claimed that monetary policy must take into consideration tail risks and their costs. The Fed collectively had decided that the costs of high inflation outweighed the potential risks of expeditiously hiking rates. The economy has proven so resilient that economists have spent over a year and half pushing out forecasts for a recession, a recession that could have been the main transmission mechanism for monetary policy to tank prices. Now, with the market celebrating the end of rate hikes and declaring victory over inflation, the runway is clear for the soft-landing narrative. I suppose those folks who think the Fed had no influence over inflation will have to conclude that monetary policy is totally meaningless if a recession is not forthcoming!

Conclusion

The inflation debate will never end because participants often bring to the table strong assumptions about the Fed’s capabilities and over-confidence in understanding the intricacies of the post-pandemic economy.

Ultimately, I stand by my long-standing claim that the Federal Reserve acted too slowly as supported by later economic research that I covered last June in “Why Monetary Policy Was Late In Responding to the Pandemic-Era Inflation Surge.” I stake no claim on the ultimate target; I just claim that the Fed needed to start normalizing sooner given what could be known at the time about economic conditions and the massive monetary and fiscal stimulus in the economy. Stiglitz did not explicitly say that he would have preferred the Fed do nothing, but his stance implies as much and feeds the narratives that inflation was never a problem in the first place. Thus, the Fed cannot satisfy anyone, not the inflationistas like myself nor the disinflationistas like Stiglitz….and certainly not the deflationists who held sway for so long going into the pandemic.

Be careful out there!

The post Despite the Inflation Celebrations, the Case Against Team Transitory Still Stands appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Back in April, the Bank of Canada (BoC) described a goldilocks narrative on inflation. This narrative featured the annual change in the Consumer Price Index inflation (CPI) gradually returning to the 2% target at the end of 2024 with economic growth picking up alongside inflation’s downward glide path in 2024. Just two months later in June, the Bank of Canada raised concerns about stubborn inflation and on-going high excessive demand. Accordingly, the BoC took its finger off the pause button on rate hikes and wrote an insurance policy on inflation with one more rate hike. The latest stall in inflation’s trend caused market expectations of a rate hike in October to surge from 23% to 42%.

The Canadian dollar surged along with rate hike expectations. The Canadian dollar was already rallying against the U.S. dollar (USD/CAD) going into the inflation print despite the U.S. dollar’s strength against other major currencies. The chart below shows how the Invesco CurrencyShares Canadian Dollar Trust (FXC) gapped higher at the open but faded from the intraday high. While the intraday action may represent an element of sell on the news, I think the path of least resistance is higher for the Canadian dollar until some new inflation data contradicts the revival of inflation concerns. I sold a small position short on USD/CAD to take advantage of the small fade.

I am not expecting the Federal Reserve’s coming announcement on monetary policy to change the trajectory. Accordingly, I will add to my position if USD/CAD rebounds further.

Drivers of Core Inflation

Core inflation was supported by accelerating rent prices. Ironically, Statistics Canada partially blamed high mortgage rates which are of course higher thanks to the BoC’s rate hikes to fight inflation:

“Shelter prices were up 6.0% on a year-over-year basis in August, after increasing 5.1% in July. Faster growth in shelter prices was led by the rent index, which rose 6.5% year over year nationally, after a 5.5% gain in July. Among other factors, a higher interest rate environment, which may create barriers to homeownership, put upward pressure on the index.”

Presumably, the higher mortgage rates are forcing more people than usual to choose renting over buying and in turn pressuring vacancy rates. Lower vacancy rates tend to push rent prices higher.

I might next need to write about a Canadian inflation conundrum!

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: short USD/CAD

The post A Stall in Canada’s Core Inflation Narrative appeared first on Inflation Watch.

In last week’s Q4 earnings conference call, Lennar described an important chain of events that are underway. The company has been proactive in getting ahead of slowing demand and rising rates by purposely reducing margins to accommodate price reductions and incentives on a community-by-community basis. (The following housing markets are Lennar’s most problematic: Orlando, Pensacola, Northern Alabama, Austin, Phoenix, Utah, Reno, and Portland). In turn, Lennar is using its size and market dominance to force concessions from its supply chain. For example:

“We have very strong relationships with our trade partners. We have demonstrated to them that we have taken the first step by lowering sales prices to drive sales, and they understand this and understand the dynamic of labor availability as overall starts slow and they’re working closely with us to lower their prices…As with our trade partners, our land partners or sellers understand that we are maintaining volume and increasing market share while taking the first hit to our margin. They will need to work together and participate or we’ll need to move on.”

Lennar was even more direct in describing its advantage when inferring that the supply chain needs the work that Lennar can provide by keeping sales volumes flowing:

“…you really can’t underestimate the leverage that we get in working with our trade partners as things slow down across the board. People are looking for work. If we’re going to be the ones out there to do — starting homes, we’re going to get cost concessions, bringing cost concessions from our trade partners, from our land partners, and we’re just going to continue”

The industry-wide slowdown in housing starts has “sped up the availability of labor and materials for Lennar.” As a result, the company can use its dominant market position to extract lower costs out of the supply chain. Scarcity in the supply chain is easing and inflationary pressures are easing. Smaller builders are likely suffering the most from this change in dynamics.

Interestingly, LEN jumped 3.8% to a 10-month closing high in response to what was a surprisingly bullish earnings report considering the market environment. This buying was particularly impressive given the post-Fed sell-off underway in the stock market. It looked like another win for the seasonally strong period for home builder stocks. However, since then, gravity has slowly exacted its toll as interest rates have started to climb again. That post-earnings celebration is completely reversed now. The chart below marks earnings with a dashed vertical line labelled “E” in the bottom axis.

Epilogue

An irony awaits the economy on the other side of this housing reality check. With builders slowing down starts in parallel with housing demand postponed by punishing mortgage rates, an economic recovery will deliver a rush that will expose new market dysfunctions. Home prices could quickly turn around as eager buyers once again scramble for limited inventory. The major builders will continue to move slowly in adding supply to the market. The intense rationalization of the housing market will keep “normalization” out of reach in the most attractive housing markets.

In the meantime, waning inflationary pressures should at least benefit more participants than runaway inflation.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: no position

The post Lennar Corporation: How the Fed Is Cooling Inflation In the Housing Market appeared first on Inflation Watch.