Lessons from the 1990s

Daly reached back to the 1990s to demonstrate that the Federal Reserve is well-equipped to manage monetary policy through the coming transformation, whatever shape it takes. Daly noted that Alan Greenspan, Fed chair at the time, used disaggregated micro data to argue that “the burgeoning computer revolution would spur sustained productivity growth, allowing the economy to grow faster without putting upward pressure on prices”. Thus, the Fed could remain patient with monetary policy even as the economy boomed. Daly did not reference or contextualize the financial chaos that engulfed the late 1990s. The global economy had to survive Russian financial crisis, the Asian financial crisis, the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, and the ballooning of the tech and dot-com bubble which burst in 2000. Depending on your perspective, monetary policy played alternating roles as savior and villain in these economic calamities.

Going forward, Daly promised that the lessons of the 1990s would inform the foundation of monetary policy’s approach to AI’s impacts on the economy. “The willingness to listen to businesses, hear their ideas, use data and evidence to test them, and invite others to do the same,” Daly recounted as ways to maintain a pulse on AI-driven dynamics.

Daly pointed out that AI can deliver one-time efficiency gains by automating parts of a process. However, that productivity boost does not recur on its own. Sustained productivity growth requires broader reorganization and diffusion across industries. Thus, it is difficult to attribute recent productivity strength to AI or to assume its persistence.

I am particularly intrigued by the notion that the Fed may be slow to respond to a heating economy because of AI-driven productivity enhancements. One of my premises for ongoing sticky inflation includes an economy running hot due to fiscal stimulus and substantial investments in infrastructure and manufacturing. Daly implies that the Fed could be cautious about reacting to inflation that may prove temporary if productivity gains materialize.

Daly noted that AI investment can be inflationary in the near term with the investment required to build out capacity, while the disinflationary channel from productivity may arrive later. Accordingly, timing is central to how the Fed interprets sticky inflation alongside AI.

Thus, developments in AI increase the complexity of interpreting the Fed’s objectives and actions.

Augmentation Not Destruction

While AI could inject disinflationary (or even deflationary) forces into the economy, potential job destruction is top of mind for most workers. Job destruction would present the kind of structural economic force that the Fed typically has minimal ability to influence with monetary policy. Thus, Daly’s optimistic outlook on AI as job augmentation and creation would significantly relieve the Fed of a deeply challenging burden.

Daly’s evidence comes from employers in the San Francisco district. During the fireside chat following the introductory remarks, Daly described her team’s latest findings: “what we’re really seeing is AI replacing tasks, augmenting workers.” Daly and her team are collecting data and anecdotes directly from businesses. According to Daly, “most of those firms are saying, ‘I’m augmenting my workforce’.”

Earlier in the fireside chat, Daly made another call to history to support her optimism: “No technology ever reduces net employment. Not in the history of technologies, but it does change what that employment looks like.” Accordingly, Daly suggested that the same relationships should hold for AI. AI is changing the shape of employment first by replacing tasks within a job and next by augmenting the job itself. For Daly, the next phase for AI and the economy is not wholesale employment destruction but job creation. AI will create new jobs that we cannot imagine in this moment.

Keep Up If You Can

Daly delivered one cautionary message for workers. She warned that workers will need to engage with AI and focus on continuous (and rapid) learning. She referred to the leader of a company who had fired workers who were not able to keep pace. Fortunately, that same leader discovered the need to hire more workers because of the opportunities created by AI.

Daly also used prompt engineering as an example of a job type that emerged and faded quickly because of the changing needs and capability of AI. As a result, Daly advised workers to run as fast as they can:

“work forces need to skill in durable skills…be AI ready, be able to use AI to lift yourself in the educational space. You know, use the technologies that are out there to build your skills up because you can learn a lot fast if you train yourself to look at AI…”

In other words, translate AI into a learning advantage instead of treating AI as a threat.

Conclusion

Overall, Daly struck a positive tone on the current “AI Moment”. While the path forward is uncertain, Daly made the case for a kind of resilience informed by direct experience with AI. Workers need to engage with AI using a growth mindset, looking for opportunities while avoiding threats. In the meantime, the Federal Reserve will remain forward-looking and evidence-driven, monitoring whether AI’s anticipated effects are materializing in productivity, prices, and employment before adjusting policy.

The post San Francisco Fed’s Daly: AI’s Future Is Job Augmentation and Creation, Not Destruction appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Thus, Goolsbee has “put concerns about the job market aside”. His focus is on inflation.

As President of the Chicago District, Goolsbee is reacting to the observations and concerns of his Midwest constituents across Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin. He cited concerns about costs and affordability. However, the January Beige Book entry for Chicago did not describe any notable levels of concern as follows:

“Prices rose moderately on balance in late November and December and contacts expected a similar pace of growth over the next 12 months. Producer prices rose moderately. Nonlabor input costs rose moderately, with contacts highlighting higher costs for energy (particularly electricity) and raw materials. Manufacturing contacts continued to attribute some increases in raw materials prices to tariffs, while a few construction contacts reported little effect of tariffs on their operating costs. Consumer prices rose moderately, and one retail industry analyst said that to date about half of tariff-related cost increases had been passed through to consumers.”

These “moderate” observations from January are almost identical to the descriptions from the November Beige Book.

The Fed’s contacts in the Chicago district appear to support Goolsbee’s lack of concern for the labor market. They expect a slight increase in employment in the next 12 months. So far, gains in hospitality employment have compensated for further contraction in manufacturing employment. Employers are focused on replacing retirees and citing overall sufficient worker availability. In the CNBC interview, Goolsbee pointed squarely at the uncertainty driven by government policies as the source of employment weakness. The Fed cannot address this kind of uncertainty with lower interest rates; monetary policy acts in an economically cyclical way

The Fed is unable to address non-cyclical issues. Goolsbee suggests as much when he points out that “low hiring and slow firing is not what the business cycle looks like”. Instead, a business cycle features high layoffs along with low hiring.

Goolsbee’s observations and assessments clearly plant him firmly against rate cuts for the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

Goolsbee sounds about as entrenched in his position as are the most dovish members of the Fed who believe rate cuts are necessary to support the labor market. Thus, the stage remains set for growing acrimony as monetary policy moves cautiously ahead of the arrival of a new Fed Chair who presumably will be under orders to get rates much lower as a condition for the nomination. The jobs picture as outlined by Goolsbee will make such a dovish push quite difficult to explain.

So while it seems unlikely the Fed will deliver the surprise rate cut this January, I think the overall trajectory of a dovish bias for the Fed keeps expectations solid for an economy running on the hot side with policy combined with a surplus of fiscal stimulus. Thus, I continue to like the commodities portion of my shopping list for 2026.

The post The Fed’s Labor Market Divide Is Hardening Against Rate Cuts appeared first on Inflation Watch.

With so much dissension and disagreement in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the minutes of recent meetings have become more revealing. The minutes from the December Fed meeting shed more light on the character of those disagreements than Powell was willing or able to share at the press conference. During that press conference, Powell emphasized consensus amid uncertainty and portrayed disagreement within the Fed as a natural consequence of a multidimensional policy environment. Read alongside those remarks, the minutes reveal a more fractious narrative, one marked by deep and structural differences that are likely to shape monetary policy well into 2026. Powell framed disagreement as technical. The minutes suggest it is structural.

A Committee Without An Anchor

As a reminder, the FOMC members displayed striking dispersion with their votes. While the nine votes in favor of a 1/4 percentage rate cut were sufficient to carry the decision, the minutes indicated that a few of the yes votes came from FOMC members who “indicated that the decision was finely balanced or that they could have supported keeping the target range unchanged”. Two votes opposed the rate cut outright and wanted to leave rates unchanged. The third opposing vote wanted a 1/2 percentage point cut. Specifically, in favor were Jerome H. Powell, Chair; John C. Williams, Vice Chair; Michael S. Barr; Michelle W. Bowman; Susan M. Collins; Lisa D. Cook; Philip N. Jefferson; Alberto G. Musalem; and Christopher J. Waller. Stephen I. Miran wanted the deeper cut. Austan D. Goolsbee and Jeffrey R. Schmid wanted no change.

Powell’s Consensus Narrative vs. the Reality in the Minutes

Powell framed the lack of unanimity as a question of risk-weighting rather than disagreement over fundamentals. “Everyone around the table agrees that inflation is too high and that we want it to come down,” he said, adding that officials also agree the labor market has softened. Where views diverge, Powell claimed, is “how do you weight those risks and what does your forecast look like,” describing the decision as a “close call” driven by the “complicated, unusual, difficult situation” tugging on the Fed’s dual mandates. Powell’s claim about inflation attitudes is particularly important given the Fed will likely spend a lot of time talking up its inflation-fighting credibility even as it cuts rates this year due to political and economic pressures.

The minutes suggest that the tension is forcing the Fed to confront a confluence of opposing economic views that resists clean consensus and raises the odds of persistent dissension. Importantly, a tension between inflation rhetoric and employment risk runs through the minutes.

Inflation: Confidence in Theory, Unease in Practice

Powell expressed confidence that inflation will continue to move lower over time. In aggregate, the minutes reflect that view. However, “a majority of participants remarked that overall inflation had been above target for some time and had not moved closer to the 2 percent objective over the past year”. The Fed’s staff reinforced these concerns by concluding that the upside risk to inflation has become more precarious given that inflation has remained above the Fed’s 2% target for four straight years. Still, some participants claimed that those upside risks have declined.

In a likely reference to the Fed’s Beige Book (which in 2025 was full of vivid descriptions of inflation pressures), the minutes reported that “some participants stated that their business contacts had reported persistent input cost pressures unrelated to tariffs”. Several of these participants in turn reported that “weaker demand limited the ability of some firms to raise prices or that business productivity gains might enable some firms to manage these cost pressures”. 

The minutes reported that “some participants highlighted the risk that elevated inflation might prove more persistent than expected”. These fears likely stem from the lingering and uncomfortable uncertainty about the ultimate impact of a fluid tariff regime. The minutes reported that a majority of participants expected disinflation in housing services to continue while a few participants also saw ongoing disinflation in core nonhousing services. As usual, this suggests the Fed finds plenty of comfort in the relatively tame long-term expectations for inflation based on survey and market data. As usual, these assessments suggest the Fed finds plenty of comfort in relatively tame long-term inflation expectations based on survey and market data.

If inflation will actually making a soft landing to the Fed’s 2% target in 2027 and 2028 as the current central tendency in the projections insists, the journey will likely continue to feature sticky inflation… and plenty of jawboning to convince financial markets the Fed will not allow tariffs, for example, to cascade into persistently high inflation. According to the minutes, “some participants noted concerns that a more prolonged period of above-target inflation could risk an increase in longer-run expectations”. Four years already seems like a prolonged period, so I am not convinced that a few more years above 2% will dissuade the Fed from continuing to cut rates to try to address weakness in the labor market.

Taken together, the minutes show a Fed that is far more concerned about labor-market fragility than its public messaging suggests. By incorporating that calculus, the bar for another rate cut looks lower than current market pricing implies”.

Labor Markets: Where the Fed’s Anxiety Really Shows

The FOMC sounded more unified about the employment picture. As a result, I expect in due time the Fed will give sway to cutting rates again sooner than later, as soon as January. According to the CME’s FedWatch tool, the current odds for a rate cut sit at a paltry 15% for the January 28th meeting, so I realize my perspective is an outlier. However, in a coming year that should deliver its share of outlier events, I think a January rate cut will be the least of the economic and financial surprises.

In December’s press conference, Powell acknowledged labor market softening. Powell said the Committee agreed that “the labor market has softened” and emphasized that employment faced “further risk”. However, he downplayed the urgency of the perceived deterioration. By contrast, the minutes uncovered some deeper anxieties about the employment picture and now give me further reason to believe in the high possibility for a January rate cut. For example, the minutes reported that several participants presented a case of potential signals of “greater fragility in the labor market”.

Why I am Expecting a January Rate Cut

The minutes reported that “participants generally assessed that, under appropriate monetary policy, the labor market likely would stabilize next year.” This conditional framing supports my expectation for more rate cuts than the market currently assumes. Notably, the central tendency of the Fed’s projections pegs 2025 as the peak year for unemployment. Any negative divergence from that assumption would strengthen the case for additional rate cuts.

Conclusion

The Fed as a group positions its statements for downside risks to employment and upside risks to inflation. However, the balance of its attention suggests the Fed is prepared to act as though inflation is well under control and employment is the more fragile component of the economic picture. I assume the stock market’s complete comfort with the current tensions comes from an abiding belief in the lower trajectory for interest rates. The market has already been gifted three rate cuts with the indices at or near all-time highs. The central tendency for rates in 2026 is 2.9% to 3.6%. The non-zero possibility that the Fed does not cut rates at all this year looks to me like window dressing meant to preserve the Fed’s inflation-fighting credibility.

I am betting on rate cuts to continue in January and an still positioned in the Goldman Sachs Access Inflation Protected USD Bond ETF (GTIP) as a main hedge against the stagflationary potential for more rate cuts in the face of sticky inflation. GTIP currently yields 4.2% and gained 1.9% in 2025. GTIP is down about 17% from its 2021 all-time high.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long GTIP

The post Lessons from the Fed Minutes: Why Division and Dissension Are Likely to Dominate Monetary Policy in 2026 appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Still, after the dust settles on this meeting, I fully expect the Fed to stay the course with a rate cut in December. Powell’s statements belie a Fed that is both gradually (some reluctantly?) accepting the case for looking through inflationary pressures and getting incrementally more worried about the labor market.

Division Translates Into Balking

Powell acknowledged strong disagreements among the Committee members. He teased a reveal in the upcoming minutes from the meeting, but the Fed vote says plenty. Recent appointee Stephen Miran unsurprisingly wanted a 50 basis point cut in a repeat of his dissent in the September meeting. Kansas City Fed governor Jeffrey R. Schmid delivered a dissent at the other end with a vote for leaving rates unchanged. Thus, it is easy to imagine the Fed currently holds a broad enough range of opinions on the direction for monetary policy to cause a pause in December.

In response to a reporter’s question about division in the Fed, Powell pointed out that Committee members have different forecasts and different levels of risk tolerances which come through in their speeches. Most importantly, Powell revealed that “there is a feeling in some we should wait.” Since there was just one vote for waiting during the latest meeting, I assume Powell referred to waiting instead of cutting in December – a not so subtle hint that the Fed as a group may already prefer not to cut in December.

The Case for A December Cut Still Looms

However, the hesitancy to cut in December directly contradicts Powell’s assessment of the economic situation. Powell noted that the current rate is above the neutral rate (“wherever it is”). Thus, policy is technically restrictive. Importantly, Powell ascribed the cooling in the labor market and the economy to restrictive policy. So if the Fed has truly adopted the mission to focus on addressing the downside risks in the economy, the Fed must stay biased to cut rates. At this point, the Fed will have a very difficult time explaining how it can “stand by” and watch a weakening economy and labor market.

While there remains upside risk to the Fed’s inflation mandate, Powell makes a weaker and weaker case every meeting that the Fed is truly concerned about that risk. He said plenty to indicate that the prospects for inflation are contained and even tame. Here were his main points on inflation:

• Most measures of long-run inflation expectations remain consistent with the Fed’s 2% inflation target.
• Services inflation is coming down
• Higher tariffs are pushing up inflation as one-time increase in the price level (the base case)
• The core PCE (personal consumption expenditures, the Fed’s preferred measure of inflation) without tariffs would be 2.3% or 2.4% without tariffs, not far from the 2% target.
• The tariff-driven increase in goods prices is happening within the longer-term context of goods deflation.

Thus, once the base case of a one-time effect laps the inflation readings, the Fed should be comfortably close to its target.

While Powell reiterated that the Fed is determined to make sure that the inflationary impact of tariffs is indeed a one-time increase in the price level, the overall picture painted by Powell makes inflation look well-contained. The implied upside risk from the uncertainties in tariff policy hardly seem noteworthy in Powell’s updated narrative.

On the other hand, Powell claims there is “no significant deterioration” in the economic data. While Powell pointed out that the downside risks to employment have risen, he did not express any concern for the highly publicized mass layoffs from big companies like Amazon.com (AMZN) and United Parcel Services (UPS). In response to a question about these layoffs, Powell only said that the Fed is watching these developments, and the layoffs do not yet show up in the initial claims data (of course not – these layoffs are recent announcements).

Overall, Powell sums up the labor issue as low hiring and low firing in the context of immigration policies shrinking the labor supply and a cyclical drop in the participation rate in the workforce. When asked how then will rate cuts help the job market, Powell responded that cuts will make sure the “labor market doesn’t get worse.” Upon hearing that explanation, I felt tingles of recessionary risks.

Inflation Warnings from Overseas?

While Americans are mostly focused on the inflation risks from tariffs, inflation is also proving stubbornly sticky in other major economies who are not at war with the global economy. For example, with inflation at 3.8% in the United Kingdom, the Bank of England is further away from its 2% inflation target than the Federal Reserve is from its target. In its last letter explaining the on-going inability to hit the target, the BoE reported:

“The recent increase in CPI inflation has owed largely to food prices and administered prices, including water bills and Vehicle Excise Duty. A reduction in total labour cost growth also appears to have been delayed by the increase in employer National Insurance Contributions (NICs) and pay growth in sectors with a large share of employees at or close to the National Living Wage (NLW).”

Yet, the BoE expects this year’s inflation increase to peak in September. The combination of a weakening labor market and restrictive policy is expected to help push inflation toward the 2% target next year. This is the UK version of hopeful monetary policy. The BoE just made its last rate cut in August, going from 4.25% to 4.0%. The policy rate was left unchanged in the last meeting.

Earlier this week, inflation in Australia hit its highest point in over a year. With inflation now above the Reserve Bank of Australia’s target band of 2-3%, the RBA will likely need to put a pause on its easing cycle. The Australian Bureau of Statistics identified housing, recreation and culture, and transport as the main drivers of inflationary pressures. A likely pause in easing further strengthened my case to stay long the Australian dollar (FXA).

I am now on heightened alert for sticky inflation becoming a global problem that justifies an extended run for the debasement trade.

A Pause in the Debasement Trade

As the Fed expresses hesitancy about cutting rates again in December, the debasement trade took a major pause going into the Fed meeting, perhaps in anticipation of a less dovish Fed. Given I think the Fed will feel compelled to proceed with cuts in December, I consider the pause in the debasement trade to be even more temporary than the inflationary pressure from tariffs. I have treated this sharp pullback as the buying opportunity I have (mostly) patiently waited for. When parabolic rallies finally lose steam, the pullbacks are often swift and steep. I am looking for support to hold for the SPDR Gold Shares (GLD) by the $350 level where the 50-day moving average (DMA) (the red line in the chart below) awaits testing.

Bond yields understandably spiked higher in response to the Fed’s balk on rate cuts. However, I am no longer interested in trying to fade rallies in the iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF as I now accept that the bond market’s overall trajectory is to worry much more about imminent economic weakness than lingering inflationary pressures.

The bond market is giving the Fed a green light for rate cuts. Thus, today’s balking should gradually transition to acceptance in the coming weeks.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: short GLD put, long GLD calendar call spread, long UPS, long AMZN put spread

The post Powell Balks At the Next Step of Hopeful Monetary Policy appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Inflation landed around 20% in 1947 according to the NY Times who also claimed it was the worst inflation America experienced over the past 100 years. The article did not specify the inflation measure, so for the purposes of discussion I assume the article referred to the entire Consumer Price Index (CPI). If so, then the 20% figure must have been for a particular month in 1947. The annual inflation for 1947 was 8.8% according to Investopedia, far short of the highest level over the past 100 years. Inflation the year before soared to 18.1% from 1945’s 2.2%. While it looks like the NYT selectively picked an inflation number for effect, it is clear that sentiment on inflation during this time was as dour as one should expect during a period of exceptionally high inflation. The following bullets are mostly direct quotes from the article reordered chronologically:

• In December 1947, more than 70% of adults said they would want their own wages to decline in order to bring prices down.
• In polling throughout 1947 and 1948, a majority supported reinstating wartime rationing and price controls.
• Before the conventions, voters said a plan to address high prices was the No. 1 priority they wanted in a party platform. More voters said they wanted prices to be addressed over the next four years than any other issue.
• In June, 1948, a majority of voters expected prices would be higher in six months (at election time in November, only 18% of voters expected the same).
• As late as summer 1948…adults expected prices to keep rising.

A combination of economic pressures sent inflation soaring.

Post-war supply shortages combined with the end of price controls to light a fire under inflation. The NY Times article pointed out that labor unrest following World War 2 exacerbated supply shortages. For example, the National WWII Museum in New Orleans observes: “With the end of the wartime no-strike pledge, workers across America expressed their frustration with wages and working conditions through a series of strikes that involved over 5 million people from the end of 1945 and into 1946.” Strikes hit broad swaths of the economy: mills, telephone service, meat packing, and General Electric (a major industrial employer at the time). The railroad strike of 1946 crippled large parts of the economy (the interstate highway system did not start until Eisenhower’s presidency in the 1950s). No doubt all this economic disruption helped dampen the national mood alongside the resulting price pressures.

Layer on pent-up consumer demand and the economy got hit with a perfect inflationary storm. Benefits from the GI Bill, not mentioned in the NY Times article, helped to stoke consumer demand. For example, while the country built very little housing during World War II, the GI Bill offered returning soldiers low interest, zero down payment home loans with better terms for newly built housing. Although Black servicemen were often denied benefits of the GI Bill (and thus they were often left in poverty), such incentives must have contributed to increased pricing pressures in the economy.

The NY Times article also did not consider the potential price distortion from large amounts of U.S. resources funneled into the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan kicked off in 1948, and it is plausible suppliers felt emboldened to increase prices in anticipation of the largess. Supply responses in Europe would eventually erode this pricing power.

Fast forward to today and we find parallel economic distortions putting pressure on prices. Massive fiscal and monetary stimulus stoked demand, especially for housing and related goods. Government supported pandemic savings have apparently supported on-going strength in retail spending. Wage growth has also supported robust consumer demand. While today’s labor unrest pales in comparison to post-war labor actions, the scales have tipped in favor of labor for now. Unemployment remains at historic lows, and employers have readily absorbed the rebound in the labor force participation rate. U.S. industrial policy could apply its own upward pressures on prices in the economy.

The Federal Reserve on the Sidelines of Late 1940s Inflation

The volatile cocktail of inflationary pressures must have complicated monetary policy. Compared to today’s tornadic monetary policy response, the Fed’s rate hikes in the immediate post-war years look exceptionally timid. The Federal Reserve essentially sat on the sidelines as the economy convulsed through its inflationary pressures. From “A New Daily Federal Funds Rate Series and History of the Federal Funds Market, 1928-1954“:

Today’s deflationists would have been particularly happy with the timid Fed of the late 1940s and early 1950s! Fresh memories of the economic devastation of the Depression no doubt also slowed the hand of the Fed. The NY Times article did not delve into the role of the Fed in allowing inflation to take its course in the post war years.

Inflation Today

Pandemic disruptions are mostly in repair, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused its own supply disruptions. The Israel-Hamas war threatens to cause disruptions in global oil markets and shipping lanes in the Gulf. Growing tensions between China and Taiwan and increasing authoritarian control over the Chinese economy have motivated companies to leave China in search of “safer” countries for production. This transition will likely pressures prices through increased production costs and the short-term transition costs.

In other words, while financial markets celebrate the end of the Federal Reserve’s fight against inflation, there are plenty of looming inflation risks, any of which could deliver setbacks to current trends. Seventy-six years ago inflation came to a boil and then yielded through the 1950s and early 1960s. A parallel peak for today’s inflationary era would be welcome news!

The post Inflation Now, Inflation 76 Years Ago appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Monetary Policy Question and Answer with an AI

The following question and answer with the generative AI in NotebookLM is like a poor man’s substitute for the Fed’s official Q&A session. Each section of dialogue below starts with a quote from Fed Chair Jerome Powell, followed by my question, and then NotebookLM’s response. All quotes are verbatim with some caveats on NotebookLM’s response in curly brackets.

Powell: “We are committed to achieving a stance of monetary policy that is sufficiently restrictive to bring inflation sustainably down to 2 percent over time, and to keeping policy restrictive until we are confident that inflation is on a path to that objective.”

Me: “Does Powell express any confidence that inflation is on the path to meeting its objective of 2%?”

NotebookLM: “No, Powell does not express any confidence that inflation is on the path to meeting its objective of 2%. He says that the Fed will continue to raise rates until inflation is under control, and that the two conditions that would lead the Fed to stop raising rates are (1) if inflation is on a path to the Fed’s 2% target and (2) if the labor market is continuing to broadly cool off and achieve a 4% unemployment rate. He does not say that either of these conditions are likely or happening now.” {That second condition is not directly stated in the transcript. NotebookLM must have picked this up from an external commentary. A more accurate characterization would be to drop the specific, quantified unemployment target}.

Powell: “We are attentive to recent data showing the resilience of economic growth and demand for labor. Evidence of growth persistently above potential, or that tightness in the labor market is no longer easing, could put further progress on inflation at risk and could warrant further tightening of monetary policy.”

Me: “What evidence does Powell cite to demonstrate that recent data show the resilience of economic growth and demand for labor?”

NotebookLM: “Powell cites the following evidence to demonstrate that recent data show the resilience of economic growth and demand for labor:

• GDP growth: Powell cites the strong third quarter GDP figures as evidence that the economy is continuing to expand at a strong pace.
• Employment: Powell notes that the labor market remains very strong, with job openings and labor demand still clearly remaining very strong.
• Inflation: Powell acknowledges that inflation is still high, but he argues that the recent data show that inflation is beginning to moderate.”

Powell: “As for the Committee, we are committed to achieving a stance of monetary policy that’s sufficiently restrictive to bring inflation down to 2 percent over time. And we’re not confident yet that we have achieved such a stance.”

Me: “Does the lack of confidence in achieving a sufficiently restrictive monetary policy leave open the possibility for future rate hikes?”

NotebookLM: “Yes, the lack of confidence in achieving a sufficiently restrictive monetary policy leaves open the possibility for future rate hikes.” {The rest of the response provided an incoherent timeline of Fed action}

Powell: “…the way we’re going to be going into these future meetings is to be just determining the extent of any additional further policy tightening that may be appropriate to return inflation to 2 percent over time” (Powell later reemphasized “it’s fair to say that’s the question we’re asking is, should we hike more”)

Me: This statement suggests that the Federal Reserve has a bias toward hiking rates again. What do you think? Explain your reasoning.

NotebookLM: “Yes, Powell’s statement suggests that the Federal Reserve has a bias toward hiking rates again...However, it is important to note that Powell also said that the Fed will “be humble” in its approach to raising rates, and that it will “listen carefully” to the data. This suggests that the Fed is not committed to a specific path for rate hikes, and that it will be willing to adjust its plans if necessary.” {Rest of answer repeated incoherent timeline even after I asked for a different explanation}

Powell: “the Committee is not thinking about rate cuts right now at all. We’re not talking about rate cuts, we’re still very focused on the first question, which is; have we achieved a stance of monetary policy that’s sufficiently restrictive to bring inflation down to 2 percent over time, sustainably? That is the question we’re focusing on. The next question, as you know, will be for how long will we remain restrictive?”

Me: “How would you assess the odds of a rate cut anytime soon based on this comment and the rest of the transcript?”

NotebookLM: “The odds of a rate cut in the near future are low.

• Powell said that the Committee is not thinking about rate cuts right now at all.
• The Committee is focused on bringing inflation down to 2 percent sustainably.
• The Committee will consider a rate cut if inflation comes down and remains low for an extended period of time.

However, it is important to note that the Committee is also considering other factors, such as the strength of the economy and the labor market. If the economy slows down or the labor market weakens, the Committee may be more likely to consider a rate cut.”

I selected quotes that I thought were most likely to produce some insight into the market’s excitement over the prospects for monetary policy. So just to be thorough, I asked NotebookLM one last question: “Is there anything in this transcript that even hints at the possibility for easier monetary policy in the near future? What about prospects for an end to rate hikes? Explain your reasoning only using content from this transcript.”

NotebookLM concluded: “There is no indication in this transcript that the Fed is considering easier monetary policy or an end to rate hikes.” Its explanation was a repeat response to my previous question.

The Persistent Longing for Easier Monetary Policy

With just two months left in the year and earnings season nearing an end, eyes and prognostications turn to 2024. Year-to-date performance remains positive but the market’s three most dangerous months of the year stained market sentiment. Thus, the persistent longing for easier monetary policy is taking on a new urgency. A recent example came from Goldman Sachs (GS) in predicting a strong year for IPOs in 2024. The main reason for the optimism? Rate cuts! From the Yahoo Finance article “The ‘real IPO reopening’ is coming in 2024: Goldman Sachs“:

“Bruun’s case for IPOs to reemerge stems from a core stance repeated throughout Goldman’s 2024 outlook roundtable on Tuesday: The Federal Reserve will cut rates in 2024. And history says that’s usually an opportune time for the IPO market.

‘When expectation moves such that people are anticipating rate declines and are starting to see rates come down, that’s usually when IPOs open up,’ Bruun said.”

This kind of persistent longing for easier monetary policy is likely to pervade financial markets as the assumption of an end to rate hikes takes deeper root in market sentiment and psychology. If rate hikes have ended then, logically, rate cuts must be imminent.

Still, the Fed will also persist in doing what it can to prevent the market from getting ahead of the Fed’s desire to keep driving inflation to its 2% target. I fully expect Fed jawboning in coming weeks and months to do its best to work against the notion that easier monetary policy is on its way soon. Currently, Fed fund futures do not anticipate any more rate hikes, and the first rate cut comes in June. Both projections are the exact same as they were before the November 1st meeting. Thus this lack of change still has me scratching my head about a renewed excitement over the prospects for monetary policy. From the CME FedWatchTool (the blue boxes indicate the market’s projection for the most likely target for the Fed’s interest rate range the given meeting date in the first column):

The S&P 500

Finally, here is a close-up of the daily trading action in the S&P for perspective on the scale of the market’s recent excitement. Market breadth over this time period went parabolic. (image from TradingView.com)

The post Why the Excitement? A Q&A on Monetary Policy with Generative AI appeared first on Inflation Watch.