With so much dissension and disagreement in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the minutes of recent meetings have become more revealing. The minutes from the December Fed meeting shed more light on the character of those disagreements than Powell was willing or able to share at the press conference. During that press conference, Powell emphasized consensus amid uncertainty and portrayed disagreement within the Fed as a natural consequence of a multidimensional policy environment. Read alongside those remarks, the minutes reveal a more fractious narrative, one marked by deep and structural differences that are likely to shape monetary policy well into 2026. Powell framed disagreement as technical. The minutes suggest it is structural.

A Committee Without An Anchor

As a reminder, the FOMC members displayed striking dispersion with their votes. While the nine votes in favor of a 1/4 percentage rate cut were sufficient to carry the decision, the minutes indicated that a few of the yes votes came from FOMC members who “indicated that the decision was finely balanced or that they could have supported keeping the target range unchanged”. Two votes opposed the rate cut outright and wanted to leave rates unchanged. The third opposing vote wanted a 1/2 percentage point cut. Specifically, in favor were Jerome H. Powell, Chair; John C. Williams, Vice Chair; Michael S. Barr; Michelle W. Bowman; Susan M. Collins; Lisa D. Cook; Philip N. Jefferson; Alberto G. Musalem; and Christopher J. Waller. Stephen I. Miran wanted the deeper cut. Austan D. Goolsbee and Jeffrey R. Schmid wanted no change.

Powell’s Consensus Narrative vs. the Reality in the Minutes

Powell framed the lack of unanimity as a question of risk-weighting rather than disagreement over fundamentals. “Everyone around the table agrees that inflation is too high and that we want it to come down,” he said, adding that officials also agree the labor market has softened. Where views diverge, Powell claimed, is “how do you weight those risks and what does your forecast look like,” describing the decision as a “close call” driven by the “complicated, unusual, difficult situation” tugging on the Fed’s dual mandates. Powell’s claim about inflation attitudes is particularly important given the Fed will likely spend a lot of time talking up its inflation-fighting credibility even as it cuts rates this year due to political and economic pressures.

The minutes suggest that the tension is forcing the Fed to confront a confluence of opposing economic views that resists clean consensus and raises the odds of persistent dissension. Importantly, a tension between inflation rhetoric and employment risk runs through the minutes.

Inflation: Confidence in Theory, Unease in Practice

Powell expressed confidence that inflation will continue to move lower over time. In aggregate, the minutes reflect that view. However, “a majority of participants remarked that overall inflation had been above target for some time and had not moved closer to the 2 percent objective over the past year”. The Fed’s staff reinforced these concerns by concluding that the upside risk to inflation has become more precarious given that inflation has remained above the Fed’s 2% target for four straight years. Still, some participants claimed that those upside risks have declined.

In a likely reference to the Fed’s Beige Book (which in 2025 was full of vivid descriptions of inflation pressures), the minutes reported that “some participants stated that their business contacts had reported persistent input cost pressures unrelated to tariffs”. Several of these participants in turn reported that “weaker demand limited the ability of some firms to raise prices or that business productivity gains might enable some firms to manage these cost pressures”. 

The minutes reported that “some participants highlighted the risk that elevated inflation might prove more persistent than expected”. These fears likely stem from the lingering and uncomfortable uncertainty about the ultimate impact of a fluid tariff regime. The minutes reported that a majority of participants expected disinflation in housing services to continue while a few participants also saw ongoing disinflation in core nonhousing services. As usual, this suggests the Fed finds plenty of comfort in the relatively tame long-term expectations for inflation based on survey and market data. As usual, these assessments suggest the Fed finds plenty of comfort in relatively tame long-term inflation expectations based on survey and market data.

If inflation will actually making a soft landing to the Fed’s 2% target in 2027 and 2028 as the current central tendency in the projections insists, the journey will likely continue to feature sticky inflation… and plenty of jawboning to convince financial markets the Fed will not allow tariffs, for example, to cascade into persistently high inflation. According to the minutes, “some participants noted concerns that a more prolonged period of above-target inflation could risk an increase in longer-run expectations”. Four years already seems like a prolonged period, so I am not convinced that a few more years above 2% will dissuade the Fed from continuing to cut rates to try to address weakness in the labor market.

Taken together, the minutes show a Fed that is far more concerned about labor-market fragility than its public messaging suggests. By incorporating that calculus, the bar for another rate cut looks lower than current market pricing implies”.

Labor Markets: Where the Fed’s Anxiety Really Shows

The FOMC sounded more unified about the employment picture. As a result, I expect in due time the Fed will give sway to cutting rates again sooner than later, as soon as January. According to the CME’s FedWatch tool, the current odds for a rate cut sit at a paltry 15% for the January 28th meeting, so I realize my perspective is an outlier. However, in a coming year that should deliver its share of outlier events, I think a January rate cut will be the least of the economic and financial surprises.

In December’s press conference, Powell acknowledged labor market softening. Powell said the Committee agreed that “the labor market has softened” and emphasized that employment faced “further risk”. However, he downplayed the urgency of the perceived deterioration. By contrast, the minutes uncovered some deeper anxieties about the employment picture and now give me further reason to believe in the high possibility for a January rate cut. For example, the minutes reported that several participants presented a case of potential signals of “greater fragility in the labor market”.

Why I am Expecting a January Rate Cut

The minutes reported that “participants generally assessed that, under appropriate monetary policy, the labor market likely would stabilize next year.” This conditional framing supports my expectation for more rate cuts than the market currently assumes. Notably, the central tendency of the Fed’s projections pegs 2025 as the peak year for unemployment. Any negative divergence from that assumption would strengthen the case for additional rate cuts.

Conclusion

The Fed as a group positions its statements for downside risks to employment and upside risks to inflation. However, the balance of its attention suggests the Fed is prepared to act as though inflation is well under control and employment is the more fragile component of the economic picture. I assume the stock market’s complete comfort with the current tensions comes from an abiding belief in the lower trajectory for interest rates. The market has already been gifted three rate cuts with the indices at or near all-time highs. The central tendency for rates in 2026 is 2.9% to 3.6%. The non-zero possibility that the Fed does not cut rates at all this year looks to me like window dressing meant to preserve the Fed’s inflation-fighting credibility.

I am betting on rate cuts to continue in January and an still positioned in the Goldman Sachs Access Inflation Protected USD Bond ETF (GTIP) as a main hedge against the stagflationary potential for more rate cuts in the face of sticky inflation. GTIP currently yields 4.2% and gained 1.9% in 2025. GTIP is down about 17% from its 2021 all-time high.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long GTIP

The post Lessons from the Fed Minutes: Why Division and Dissension Are Likely to Dominate Monetary Policy in 2026 appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Waller’s Case: Tariff-Driven Inflation Is Transitory

Just two days after Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell insisted that meaningful inflation is coming, Fed Governor Christopher J. Waller shared a nearly polar opposite narrative. Of course, given Waller may be on the short list of the President’s next pick to head the Federal Reserve, he has a built-in motivation to speak with authority in support of the administration’s claims that tariffs are not a threat to inflation. During a CNBC interview, Waller made the case for transitory and immaterial inflationary impacts from tariffs that would allow the Fed to start cutting rates as early as the July meeting. Waller explained that the Fed had paused for six months fearing inflationary impacts from tariffs that have yet to materialize. He chose to look through the ongoing uncertainty on tariff levels, timing, and frequency of change, as well as the recent Beige Book, which was full of accounts of businesses preparing for or already responding to tariff risks. Moreover, Waller claimed that only about 10% of the price index comes from imports (which made me wonder why there is any fuss over tariffs!). Instead, Waller expressed greater concern about the potential economic weakness caused by tariffs and stated he does not want to wait to cut until “we see a crash.”

Waller also referred to a speech he gave in South Korea in early June that laid out the detailed economic case for looking through tariffs as a one-time price shock. In “The Effects of Tariffs on the Three I’s: Inflation, Inflation Persistence, and Inflation Expectations,” Waller concluded that “the economics behind a tariff increase implies it should have a transitory effect on prices—tariffs raise prices once, but those prices don’t keep going up.” This conclusion holds if tariffs are hiked all at once in a one-and-done fashion. Otherwise, this reassurance reinforces the same argument Treasury Secretary Bessent made at the beginning of the tariff drama, trauma, and noise. Assuming that long-term inflation expectations remain anchored (as they are in market-based measures and professional forecasters, not in consumer-level surveys), Waller concluded “the tariff-induced inflation will be transitory and [the Fed] should look through it when setting policy.”

Powell’s Caution: Don’t Rush the Cuts

When Powell appeared on June 24th in front of the House committee to deliver the semiannual monetary policy report before the House Financial Services Committee, he was, of course, peppered with questions about tariffs and inflation. At one juncture, Powell took the opportunity to agree with Waller with an important condition (emphasis mine): “I do agree that basically if things are a one-time increase, then you don’t respond to them. That’s the whole idea if there’s a shock to prices… generally speaking you don’t respond if you are highly confident that it will just be a one-time shock.” Powell went on to caution that this particular situation is “a complicated one,” and said the Fed must make this decision about the timing of rate cuts “with some care.” He added that the Fed has not yet reached a point of price stability, and these large tariffs “raise kind of more concern” given the economy is just a few years out from a highly inflationary environment.

Powell’s caution appears warranted. Attempts to pattern-match to past history are challenging because of the scale and magnitude of the potential tariffs. The volatile implementation of economic policy means the Fed cannot be sure that tariff hikes will be a one-time episode. So, while a coming price shock may move inflation away from target, there remains some uncertainty about whether the Fed will be able to watch inflation settle back to target.

Bowman and Daly Lend Conditional Support

Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle W. Bowman added commentary on monetary policy in a speech the day before Powell’s testimony: “Assessing the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy During and After the COVID-19 Pandemic,” at a research conference sponsored by the International Journal of Central Banking and the Czech National Bank in Prague, Czech Republic. Bowman positioned herself as supportive of imminent rate cuts, although she did not specifically target July. Instead, she outlined broad conditions supportive of rate cuts: “If inflation remains near its current level or continues to move closer to our target, or if the data show signs of weakening in labor market conditions, it would be appropriate to consider lowering the policy rate, moving it closer to a neutral setting.” Bowman shared Waller’s concerns for the economy and stated that inflation appears on a sustained downward path to the 2% target:

“As we think about the path forward, it is time to consider adjusting the policy rate… we should recognize that inflation appears to be on a sustained path toward 2 percent and that there will likely be only minimal impacts on overall core PCE inflation from changes to trade policy. We should also recognize that downside risks to our employment mandate could soon become more salient, given recent softness in spending and signs of fragility in the labor market.”

Bowman expressed reassurance in the lack of inflationary impact from tariffs to date: “It appears that any upward pressure from higher tariffs on goods prices is being offset by other factors and that the underlying trend in core PCE inflation is moving much closer to our 2 percent target than is currently apparent in the data.” While acknowledging some upside risks for inflation, Bowman emphasized that she is “not yet seeing a major concern, as some retailers seem unwilling to raise prices for essentials due to high price sensitivity among low-income consumers and as supply chains appear to be largely unaffected so far.”

On Bloomberg Surveillance, June 26, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco President Mary Daly capped the dovish commentary by leaning toward the third of three timing scenarios for inflation:

1. Delayed, tariffs will have some impact and will be more persistent.
2. Delayed but will be one-off.
3. Does not deliver the punch history suggests will come as businesses absorb costs.

Daly stated that her “modal expectation” had been for some time that the Fed would be ready to cut rates in the fall. Thus her current dovishness is consistent with prior stances. Daly acknowledged tariffs “will potentially raise inflation.” However, since the impact should dissipate over time, it should not build into inflation expectations.

Rate Cuts, Politics, and the Fed’s Legacy

As the Fed’s debate about the impact of tariffs on inflation plays out, I am reminded that there is a larger context that influences how the Fed positions itself. The Federal Reserve was slow to respond to inflation in the throes of the pandemic, assuming that the price shock would be “transitory.” Even though he brought back the term “transitory,” even Waller revealed, “I am willing to admit that, at the time, I underappreciated how the large and sustained fiscal response would combine with highly accommodative monetary policy to overstimulate aggregate demand in an economy that quickly recovered from the early effects of the pandemic.” Waller is full steam ahead on team transitory again, while Powell continues to act like someone who still feels the scars. Powell’s caution makes even more sense in this context.

While Powell insists he is ignoring the political noise about his competence, his unwillingness to follow Presidential orders, and public ruminations about his firing or the looming presence of a shadow Fed Chair, Powell’s adamant stance sure has the appearance of someone trying to prove a point of toughness and independence. Thus, I fully expect Powell to be the “last one” to reluctantly move forward with rate cuts. I even expect his messaging at the time of the first rate cut to place responsibility squarely on the broader Fed… and to include some residual hawkishness of his own.

Overall, I lean toward Powell’s caution for all the reasons he gave to Congress. The environment remains highly uncertain, and the Fed has not yet reached its price target, even as a large price shock looms. Cutting rates in the midst of this swirling dynamic would signal a high degree of confidence in the post-shock equilibrium. Moreover, the Fed may have fundamentally different reads on the economy. For example, Daly insisted that “there are no warning signs that the economy is weakening, although progressing more slowly than before.” So if the Fed is both hampered by lower-quality data (due to federal budget cuts) and divided on the economy’s health, proceeding with rate cuts sooner rather than later seems doubly risky.

Conclusion

I will be highly surprised by a July price cut. Indeed, the CME FedWatch tool shows just a 21% chance of a cut, while September’s meeting has a 96% chance. These high odds essentially lock the Fed into cutting rates at the September meeting in order to avoid shocking the market. The messaging around that rate cut will be critical. Moreover, will the bond market get spooked and send long-term rates higher, just as it did both times the Fed cut rates last year?

The volatility index (VIX) sure looks incredibly low given the potential fireworks ahead. After breaking support from the dawn of the tariff drama, trauma, and noise, the VIX started this week right on top of that line.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: no positions

The post Powell vs. Waller: Divided Fed Faces Tariff-Driven Inflation Uncertainty appeared first on Inflation Watch.

As before, Powell laid the blame for stagflationary impacts on tariffs: “increases in tariffs this year are likely to push up prices and weigh on economic activity.” In a likely reference to a Beige book full of tariff-driven warnings on inflation, Powell also observed the following:

“…we’re beginning to see some [tariff-driven inflationary] effects, and we do expect to see more of them over coming months. We do also see price increases in some of the relevant categories…that are attributable to tariff increases. In addition we look at surveys of businesses…many companies do expect to to put all or or some or all of the effective tariffs through to the next next person in the chain and ultimately to the consumer.”

These expectations for meaningful inflation keep the Fed sitting on its hands. The median expectation for the Federal Funds rate stayed the same for 2025 at 3.9% (the current range is 4.25 to 4.5%) but nudged higher for 2026 from 3.1% to 3.4%. Even 2027 nudged higher from 3.1% to 3.4%.

A Swipe at DOGE?

Powell’s implicit critique of Federal policies did not stop with economic policy this time around. In response to a question about the Federal Reserve’s plans to cut its workforce, Powell was curiously deliberate in explaining the “professional” way to rationalize a Federal workforce:

“This is something you do very carefully, thoughtfully, and you do it respecting that we have critical missions to carry out. I’ve had a lot of experience in my prior careers with headcount reductions and things like that, and this is how you do it professionally. You do it carefully, thoughtfully with a lot of planning, and you do it over a period of time.”

I took note of Powell’s commentary because the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) has made a name for itself with swift, sudden, and often deep cuts throughout the Federal government. Powell clearly plans to leave his Chairmanship swinging.

Muted Responses Include A Short-Term Bottom for the U.S. Dollar

While Powell was swinging, financial markets general yawned. The S&P 500 (SPY) did its typical post-Fed fade after erasing all of the morning’s gains. The net impact was a forgettable 0.03% loss on the day. The SPDR Gold Trust (GLD) fell 0.5% on the day as the U.S. dollar index (DXY) resumed its countertrend momentum since bottoming out at a fresh 3-year low and just below the April low. A major test is coming soon with resistance from the downtrending 50-day moving average (DMA) (the red line). I remain bearish on the U.S. dollar as long as that resistance holds.

Source: Tradingview.com

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long and short U.S. dollar currency pairs

The post Jerome Powell: Meaningful Inflation Is Coming appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Shmid warned that “while in theory, tariffs may have only temporary effects on inflation (although persistent effects on the level of prices) I would be hesitant to take too much solace from theory in this environment”. He tied recent tariff announcements to broader signs of economic stress, including “a decline in consumer sentiment and increases in near-term inflation expectations.” Schmid acknowledged that the current policy environment has become “considerably more complicated,” citing feedback from business contacts who see growing risks on both sides of the Fed’s dual mandate of maximum employment and stable prices.

Schmid’s skepticism around transitory inflation contrasts with recent remarks from Fed Chair Jerome Powell, who has leaned into a more reassuring message about the persistence of tariff-driven price pressures. In “Jerome Powell’s Fed Deftly Maneuvers Through a Stagflationary Minefield“, I admired Powell’s effectiveness in navigating a difficult policy landscape, but I also pointed out the problematic use of “transitory” to describe inflationary effects. Powell argued that “it can be the case that it’s appropriate sometimes to look through inflation if it’s going to go away quickly without action by us… and that can be the case in the case of tariff inflation.”

That assertion paralleled Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s line that tariffs are a “one-time price adjustment.” But as I wrote in “The Sleight of Hand Behind the ‘One-Time Adjustment’ and ‘Transitory’ Tariff Inflation Narrative“, for inflation to be transitory, expectations for price levels would need to revert after the initial tariff shock. Yet, “tariffs make price reversion unlikely by locking in a permanently higher cost base.” In that piece, I also pointed out how structural effects – such as wage responses, supply chain disruptions, and embedded cost pass-through behavior – make inflationary pressures from tariffs more persistent. Outcomes are also hard to anticipate as inflationary pressures cascade through the economy.

Schmid appears attuned to these systemic effects. He described “a marked increase in the upside risks around inflation along with elevated downside risks to the outlook for employment and growth,” and openly questioned the prudence of discounting these risks as fleeting. Unlike Powell, who focused on optionality and emphasized that longer-term inflation expectations remain anchored, Schmid directly acknowledged that business sentiment and price expectations are shifting in ways that could prove difficult to reverse.

Powell’s message was strategically designed to preserve policy flexibility and calm markets in the face of stagflationary fears, and in that moment, Powell succeeded. However, I remain concerned that Powell’s framing underestimates the lasting damage that tariff-related cost increases can impose on the economy. As I wrote in my critique, the idea of a “one-time adjustment” may be statistically correct but economically misleading. A new, higher price level, once established, may not simply fade away. The higher price level could reshape business behavior and household expectations for years to come.

Schmid seems to understand these risks. His closing words underscore the seriousness of the moment (emphasis mine): “With renewed price pressures likely, I am not willing to take any chances when it comes to maintaining the Fed’s credibility on inflation.” That statement signals a shift away from the complacency that defines the transitory inflation narrative on tariffs.

The Last Friendly Report on Inflation?

As the Fed slowly accepts increased inflationary risks in the future, the past provides fleeting reasons for optimism on inflation. While I have stuck by the persistent and sticky narrative on inflation, March’s CPI (Consumer Price Index) report signaled the potential start of the next leg down for core inflation…just in time for tariffs to pressure inflation upward again. From the report:

“The index for all items less food and energy rose 0.1 percent in March, following a 0.2-percent increase in February. Indexes that increased over the month include personal care, medical care, education, apparel, and new vehicles. The indexes for airline fares, motor vehicle insurance, used cars and trucks, and recreation were among the major indexes that decreased in March…

The all items less food and energy index rose 2.8 percent over the last 12 months, the smallest
12-month increase since March 2021.”

Notably, the shelter index was up 4.0% year-over-year.

The chart below suggests that, absent tariff inflationary pressures, core CPI would finally be on its last leg lower toward the Fed’s 2.0% target.

Ironically, this positive development in core CPI could give more confidence to policymakers in pressing forward with inflationary tariffs.

Bostic Concurs

In an interview on Marketplace, president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Raphael Bostic, appeared to concur with Schmid’s concerns:

“I think the pressures that are out there are not the best for our mandates. All the models say that the introduction to tariffs is going to put upward pressure on prices, and I’ve seen more reports of recession fears in the media and from our business contacts than I’ve heard in a year and a half or two years. And so that’s also going to put pressure on our mandate, the employment mandate, in a way that is not positive.”

Bostic’s tiny source of solace is that “the current environment today might not be the current environment tomorrow.”

Currency Correction

Typically I conclude these inflation reviews by teasing out some implications and impacts in currency markets via the U.S. dollar. This time around, there are too many tariff-related cross-currents and too much economic chaos to directly connect dots. So, instead, I take this time to describe a “currency correction” I had to make on the Canadian dollar (USD/CAD) and the Mexican peso (USD/MXN).

A month ago I explained:

“I am short USD/MXN out of a belief that economic relations with Mexico are about as bad as they can get. I could of course get proven wrong in due time. On the other hand, I am long USD/CAD because I do not think the market fully appreciates how much weaker the Canadian economy will get as it tries to match the U.S. in this economic warfare.”

I was correct for almost two weeks, but in due time I have been proven wrong. I have now closed out both trades in order to reassess my next moves. Surprisingly, the Canadian dollar has proven quite strong against the Mexican peso. The exact opposite of my expectations. That chart below shows how CAD/MXN is breaking out from an approximate triangle or wedge type pattern.

Even more importantly, USD/CAD has broken below a key support level at the same time the U.S. dollar looks poised for a fresh, major breakout against the Mexican peso. In other words, in the last 2-3 weeks, I could not have been more wrong! (Note how the 25% tariff on Canada and Mexico defined a PEAK for USD/CAD, a classic contrarian move).

While USD/CAD broke support at its 200-day moving average (DMA) (the blue line), USD/MXN HELD 200DMA support. Thus, USD/MXN looks likelyly to head even higher while USD/CAD looks likely to head even lower.

This currency correction took me by surprise. The move likely reflects the effectiveness and the robustness of Canada’s current resistance to U.S. economic warfare. Mark Carney, the new Prime Minister of Canada, has been quite clear in laying out a framework of Canadian resistance. The Governor of the Bank of Canada, Tim Macklem, has been similarly forthright in laying out the implications for monetary policy and bracing Canadians for the economic warfare ahead. Apparently, both men have, so far, succeeded in bolstering Canada’s defenses (symbolically through the Canadian dollar). The implications for inflation both here and in Canada remain to be seen as trade slows down between the two North American neighbors and former allies.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: no positions

The post Inflation Concerns Rise at the Federal Reserve Amid Tariff Unease appeared first on Inflation Watch.

As the stock market has careened into a bear market amid growing economic anxieties and uncertainties, financial markets have started to return to the old standby to save the day: interest rate cuts from the Federal Reserve. Expectations have definitively brought forward the timing for the next rate cut from July to June. The table below the chart of the market’s target probabilities for the June Fed meeting show the change in probabilities starting one month ago. The odds for the Fed maintaining its target rate range at 4.25% to 4.5% have plunged from 49.6% a month ago to 18.3% a week ago and 18.8% yesterday. While those odds moved slightly higher to 23.1% as of the time of writing, the odds for a 25 basis point cut still increased from 56.2% to 58.1% from yesterday to now.

Of course, if the market continues to roil and sink deeper into a bear market, financial markets may become too restless with a June timetable. However, as we saw last year, just the expectation for imminent rate cuts can be enough to keep spirits lifted in financial markets.

Even if the Fed wants to placate markets and play its modern role as market hero, consumer’s rising expectations for inflation should force the Fed to remain patient and measured. March’s preliminary read for the Surveys of Consumers from the University of Michigan showed yet another increase for both short-term and long-term inflation expectations. There is already a definite upward trend in long-run expectations and short-run expectations soared. From the University of Michigan:

“Year-ahead inflation expectations jumped up from 4.3% last month to 4.9% this month, the highest reading since November 2022 and marking three consecutive months of unusually large increases of 0.5 percentage points or more. This month’s rise was seen across all three political affiliations. Long-run inflation expectations surged from 3.5% in February to 3.9% in March. This is the largest month-over-month increase seen since 1993, stemming from a sizable rise among Independents, and followed an already-large increase in February.”

In parallel with the troubling trends on inflation expectations, consumer’s expectations for more unemployment are soaring. Take together, consumers are increasingly fearing a stagflationary economic environment.

Thus, the Fed faces maximum pressure. No matter what the Fed decides or says in next week’s decision on monetary policy, major disappointment and/or jitters are bound to rise from some significant portion of observers. In turn, elevated volatility could remain elevated and translate into more pressure on stock prices. Either the Fed will be taken to task for changing a re-ignition of realized inflationary pressures, or the Fed will be criticized moving too slowly to stave off a recession.

For now volatility is calming down as fears of a government shutdown subside…

…even as one of my favorite investments and trades, SPDR Gold Trust (GLD), breaks out to fresh all-time highs.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long VXX put options, long GLD shares and call spread

The post Maximum Pressure for the Federal Reserve appeared first on Inflation Watch.

The chart below from the Surveys of Consumers – University of Michigan shows another interesting element of the inflation story. Long-term consumer expectations for inflation have remained elevated since the pandemic. The surge in short-term expectations may be strong enough to push longer-term expectations into breakout territory.

Source for Data: the Surveys of Consumers – University of Michigan

The latest spike in inflation expectations may soon cool off like the previous ones, but I do not expect the downtrend to resume from there given the current macroeconomic and policy environment. For example, as tariff talk translates into action which in turn translates into higher prices, I fully expect inflation expectations, at least short-term, to rise above current levels.

A Tired and Topping Dollar?

Interestingly, for all the talk about how tariffs will boost the U.S. dollar, the greenback is now down for the year and looks like it will continue trending downward. The Yale Budget Lab explains how the dollar strengthens from tariffs when there is no retaliation. When countries retaliate, their domestic demand for U.S. goods may decline and as a result demand for U.S. dollars declines. Could it be that the currency market is starting to wrestle with a net impact on the dollar from tariff wars just as consumers are starting to fear inflationary impacts from tariffs?

The U.S. dollar index (DXY) topped out in mid-January and is now down 1.7% for the year. (Source: Tradingview.com)

Canadian Resistance

Perhaps the volatile action against the Canadian dollar is instructive. When I last wrote, I explained why I decided to take profits on a long USD/CAD position. That exit turned out to be timely. Just two days later, USD/CAD surged right to resistance from the double-top formed across 2016 and 2020 highs and quickly reversed. President Trump created wild currency volatility by announcing tariffs on Saturday, February 1, and then reversing two days later with a 30-day “pause” following concessions from Canada. During this episode and in its wake, an active “Buy Canadian” movement has taken hold. If tariffs are re-enacted I expect vigorous retaliation from Canada. In other words, the dollar’s rally against the Canadian dollar may have indeed peaked on February 3rd with the blow-off top.

USD/CAD broke down below support at its 50-day moving average (DMA) (the red line above) and could be on track to eventually reverse all its gains from November’s big breakout. Source: TradingView.com

Having said that, I am not yet ready to short USD/CAD. I am actually long again preparing for the possibility of one more rally (to the 50DMA or maybe even challenge the high?) before USD/CAD confirms its top. My long USD/CAD is also a small hedge against other bets against the dollar.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long USD/CAD, long SPY put spread

The post Inflation Expectations Surge As the U.S. Dollar Tops Out appeared first on Inflation Watch.

I faded the move in bonds as nothing about the December CPI print changed the fundamental narrative of sticky inflation and a cautious Fed or even the prospect of soaring U.S. budget deficits. I speculated on weekly SPY put options as a hedge. I fully acknowledge that the stock market has spent a year and a half or more adjusting to every hiccup and bout of angst over the inflation narrative.

The chart below demonstrates that the eye must strain hard to see a change in the profile of core CPI. We will have to wait until later this month to see whether the softer than expected core CPI also bends core PCE off its uptrend from its last trough.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy (Chain-Type Price Index) [PCEPILFE], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food and Energy in U.S. City Average [CPILFESL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; January 15, 2025.

The volatility index (VIX) well represented the stock market’s huge sigh of relief over inflation. The VIX plunged 13.9% and brought an end to the most recent uptrend.

Shelter Inflation Continues Trending Down

Shelter inflation, along with services inflation, has been a key culprit in stubbornly sticky inflation. The National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) pointed out that “the year-over-year change in the shelter index remained below 5% for a fourth straight month and posted its lowest annual gain since January 2022, suggesting a continued moderation in housing inflation.” Shelter inflation has even been on a definitive downtrend since peaking in March, 2023. Unfortunately, the current trajectory may be too slow for comfort in terms of its impact on aggregate core CPI.

Shelter inflation dropped from 7.5% in December, 2022 to 6.2% in December, 2023 and now 4.6% last December. If this nearly linear pace continues, shelter inflation will be around 3.2% next December, right around where core CPI currently sits. Thus, other components will still need to do some heavy-lifting in coming months to meaningfully push core CPI, and presumably core PCE, closer to the Fed’s 2.0% target.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Shelter in U.S. City Average [CUSR0000SAH1], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; January 16, 2025

An Oil Breakout

Oil prices are not part of the core CPI, but its recent breakout has caught my attention. A continued, persistent rise in oil prices could bleed into higher inflation expectations for consumers. Such a dynamic may further motivate the Federal Reserve to sit on its hands with monetary policy. A 3.3% gain in the United States Oil Fund (USO) sent the ETF to a 2 1/2 year high.

A Spike In Short-Term Inflation Expectations?

Every month, the New York Federal Reserve publishes a survey of consumer expectations. This survey includes various measures of inflation expectations. The 1-year median expected inflation rate for consumers stayed around 3.0% for all of 2024, consistent with the narrative of sticky inflation. However, a potentially interesting blip happened in December where the median point prediction jumped from 3.0% to 3.8%. The median point predictions are typically higher than the median expected inflation rate, but they rarely diverge and almost never by such a wide margin. The accompanying press release does not refer to this surprising 1-month behavior, but I cannot help speculating on its significance. I will be watching to see whether this point projection manages to lead the median expected inflation rate higher or whether it snaps back to the typical relationship. Either way, such a jump is surely not positive for inflation in the near-term.

The Trade

I continue to maintain a strategy of fading rallies in TLT. Going into the CPI I owned a single February TLT $85 put option “just in case” CPI produced a fresh upside surprise in inflation. Now I can accumulate TLT put options at more attractive prices. TLT’s rally stopped just short of resistance at the 20-day moving average (DMA) (the dotted line below). A breakout from there will set up even more attractive prices on a test of converging resistance between the downtrending 50DMA (the red line) and the bottom of the former trading range (the thick black line).

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long TLT put options, long SPY put options

The post A Fresh Opportunity to Fade Bonds As A Marginal Change in Inflation Ignites A Near Oversold Market appeared first on Inflation Watch.

I break down the key components of Powell’s observations (using the transcript from the CNBC TV recoding of the live event) and then juxtapose them with the prospects for inflation going forward.

The S&P 500 (SPY) since the October lows overlayed with my past short-term trading calls. (Source: Tradingview.com)

Is Policy Really Restrictive?

Powell observed that “the labor market is about as tight as it was before the pandemic in 2019, and that’s good. Real wages are now positive, and unemployment has been below 4% for 27 consecutive months, something that hasn’t happened in half a century. So, the labor market is very strong, with signs of gradual cooling and rebalancing, so that the supply and demand for workers are coming back into balance, just as we would want.” The logic did not make sense at first. Powell provided the evidence of balance in the labor market later on in the discussion. He noted that “the ratio of vacancies to unemployed people, for example, has gone from more than 2 to 1 to now 1.3 to 1, and it was 1.2 before…You also see wages coming down, and you see quits coming down.” Most importantly, Powell used these observations as evidence that “policy is probably restrictive.”

Powell went on to add that restrictive policy is weighing on rate-sensitive spending. However, the conventional indicators of financial conditions still show they are just as loose as they were before the Fed started hiking, January 28, 2022 to be exact. In other words, either the market has done some serious advanced front-running of rate cuts or current policy is not nearly as restrictive as the Fed thinks. Even the stock market’s all-time highs suggest monetary conditions are not tight. From the Federal Reserve Board of Chicago’s National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) (follow the black line for ANFCI):

Even the hand-wringing this year from the Federal Reserve about resilient inflation implies that policy may not be restrictive enough (whether that means rate hikes, or, more likely, extending the time horizon for current rates).

Resilient Inflation

Powell repeated a familiar refrain about inflation not falling as fast as expected given presumed restrictive policy. Thus, Powell had to show deference to the possibility that today’s high rates will need to stay in place longer than expected:

“The first quarter in the United States was notable for its lack of further progress on inflation. We had higher readings in the first quarter, higher than we expected. We did not expect this to be a smooth road, but these were higher than I think anybody expected. So, what that has told us is that we’ll need to be patient and let restrictive policy do its work.”

This comment tells me rate cuts are nowhere on the horizon. Moreover, Powell noted “we have the highest interest rates in some time. It may be that it takes longer than expected to do its work and bring inflation down.”

Most telling were Powell’s words when a question offered the opportunity to reassure the market that rate cuts were still on the way. Emphasis mine:

“So, as I just mentioned, I do think it’s really a question of keeping policy at the current rate for a longer time than had been thought. By many measures, the policy rate is restrictive. The question is, is it sufficiently restrictive? And I think that’s going to be a question that time will have to tell. Entertain the possibility? That could be a very small probability, but I have said that I don’t think it’s likely based on the data that we have that the next move we make would be a rate hike. I think it’s more likely that we’ll be at a place where we hold the policy rate where it is.”

Note what Powell did NOT say: it’s more likely that rates will be lower by the end of the year (or even next year).

So, nowhere in the discussion did Powell provide a line for the market expect rate cuts anytime soon. Thus, he has primed the market to get excited about any soft data that could provide the seeds of an excuse for the Fed to cut rates. Powell’s positioning is made even more potent by the stock market’s ability to trade at all-time highs despite all the hand-wringing about inflation this year.

Inflation Forecast

Powell expressed a lot of uncertainty about the path for inflation despite his confidence that “we will do that, that we will get inflation down to 2%.” I am not sure how rate cuts help bring down inflation (Turkey sure learned a central bank cannot cut rates to lower inflation), so I have to assume Powell has an image of “higher for longer” monetary policy rates.

Responding to a question on whether inflation could end up being more persistent than expected, Powell said: “I think we need more than a quarter’s worth of data to really make a judgment on that.” It’s like the perpetual data delay. It will be interesting to hear whether April’s inflation data finally gives the Fed more confidence that inflation is coming down sustainably. Time is running out for the Fed to start telegraphing the first rate cut, so the pressure is on the Fed to spin a story about April and May inflation that points to the 2% target.

When I look a the core CPI graph (year-over-year percentage change in the price index), it looks like inflation will soon resume a steep descent. To apply a modicum of extra rigor, I ran a simplistic forecast through ChatPGT’s Data Analyst. I let the model pick its forecasting method. This is a very simplistic forecast because it only uses the aggregate CPI time series. A more accurate forecast would consist of aggregating the forecasts of individual components of core CPI.

I provided the model core CPI (measured year-over-year) data back to 2016. I wanted the model to surmise that “equilibrium” consists of a tight range for inflation. I did not provide any more data because I figured the further away history gets from the pandemic era, the less likely the model has any value (another downside of using a single, aggregated time series for the forecast).

The chart below combines the actual core CPI data with the forecast. The “funnel” around the forecast shows the confidence interval within which inflation will fall in the future at 95% certainty. The wide swath of possibilities is consistent with Powell’s uncertainty about the path ahead. The flat average forecast is a typical behavior of time series forecasting where there are no definitive seasonal effects detected or modeled future episodic events. (For you ChatGPT and statistics wonks, I provide an Appendix below where ChatGPT explains the model and justifies its approach).

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food and Energy in U.S. City Average [CPILFESL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; May 15, 2024.

The Bond Market Rules

Putting aside vain attempts to forecast future inflation, the bond market is the ultimate arbiter of inflation expectations and/or how inflation may impact interest rates. The bond market in the form of the iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF is at a very critical (technical) juncture. The downtrend in TLT (uptrend in rates) was the ultimate guide in pushing the market into its April correction. The rebound in stocks for May perfectly correlates with the rebound in TLT (lower rates). The “soft” April CPI report sent TLT up 1.4% and right up against the top of the downtrend channel.

iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF (Source: TradingView.com)

A confirmed breakout with a higher close should open the floodgates of bullishness for the stock market. A failure at resistance from the upper part of the channel could trigger a false breakout for the indices. Thus, given this year’s correlation with stocks, I reloaded on TLT puts as a hedge on my long trading positions.

Overall, the lesson in all these dynamics is that inflation combined with the interest rate response should continue to dominate the market’s underlying narrative. With rates on hold, even the Fed is just along for the ride for now.

Be careful out there!

Appendix (ChatGPT explains and justifies the CPI forecast)

{the following is verbatim including ChatGPT’s musings on data types and fixing its own processing problems}

The data consists of monthly core CPI year-over-year percentage changes starting from January 2016. To project the CPI for the next 24 months, I will use the ARIMA (AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average) model, which is well-suited for time series forecasting.

Justification for ARIMA Model:

1. Handling Trends and Seasonality: ARIMA can model both trend and seasonality in the data, which is crucial for accurate CPI forecasting.
2. Flexibility: The model can be adjusted to different time series characteristics through its parameters.
3. Proven Effectiveness: ARIMA has been widely used and tested in economic and financial forecasting, making it a reliable choice.

Steps for the Analysis:

1. Data Preparation: Convert the date column to a datetime format and set it as the index.
2. Stationarity Check: Perform tests to check if the time series is stationary. If not, apply differencing.
3. Model Identification: Use autocorrelation (ACF) and partial autocorrelation (PACF) plots to identify the order of the ARIMA model.
4. Model Estimation: Fit the ARIMA model to the data.
5. Forecasting: Generate forecasts for the next 24 months.
6. Confidence Intervals: Calculate confidence intervals for the forecasts.
7. Visualization: Plot the actual data, the forecasted values, and the confidence intervals.

Let’s start with the data preparation and initial analysis. ​​

The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test results are as follows:

• ADF Statistic: -0.988
• p-value: 0.758
• Critical Values:
  • 1%: -3.508
  • 5%: -2.895
  • 10%: -2.585

Since the p-value is greater than 0.05, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the time series is non-stationary. This indicates that the series needs to be differenced to make it stationary.

Let’s apply first-order differencing and recheck for stationarity. ​​

The ADF test results after first-order differencing are as follows:

• ADF Statistic: -2.447
• p-value: 0.129
• Critical Values:
  • 1%: -3.509
  • 5%: -2.896
  • 10%: -2.585

The p-value is still greater than 0.05, indicating the time series is not yet stationary. Let’s apply second-order differencing. ​​

The ADF test results after second-order differencing are as follows:

• ADF Statistic: -2.843
• p-value: 0.052
• Critical Values:
  • 1%: -3.509
  • 5%: -2.896
  • 10%: -2.585

The p-value is now close to 0.05, indicating the time series is approaching stationarity. Since it’s marginally above the threshold, we will proceed with ARIMA modeling with second-order differencing.

Model Identification

Next, we’ll use ACF and PACF plots to identify the appropriate orders (p, d, q) for the ARIMA model. ​​

The ACF and PACF plots provide insights into the appropriate orders for the ARIMA model:

• ACF (Autocorrelation Function): The ACF plot shows significant lags at various points, suggesting that an MA component (q) might be needed.
• PACF (Partial Autocorrelation Function): The PACF plot shows significant lags at the beginning, suggesting that an AR component (p) might be necessary.

Given the plots, an ARIMA model with orders (p, d, q) will be selected. Based on visual inspection, we can start with ARIMA(2, 2, 2) since both ACF and PACF show significance up to lag 2.

Model Estimation

Let’s fit the ARIMA(2, 2, 2) model to the data and generate forecasts for the next 24 months. ​​

It seems there’s an issue with the data types in the forecast confidence intervals, which might be causing the error. Let’s inspect the forecasted values and the confidence intervals to identify the problem. ​​

The forecasted values and confidence intervals appear to be valid. The issue might be due to incorrect data handling during the plotting process.

To resolve this, let’s explicitly convert the confidence intervals to a numeric type before plotting. ​​

It appears the error persists despite converting the confidence intervals to float. This might be due to a mismatch in the indices of the forecast intervals and the forecasted mean.

To resolve this, I’ll ensure the indices of the confidence intervals match those of the forecasted mean before plotting. ​​

The issue may be due to an incompatibility between the data types of the forecast index and the confidence intervals. To resolve this, I will ensure all data is in the correct numeric format and use the correct plotting function.

I’ll convert all relevant data to the same data type and then re-plot. ​​

The plot now correctly displays the actual data, the forecast, and the confidence intervals.

Summary of Analysis and Forecast:

• Data Preparation: The time series data was checked for stationarity and transformed using differencing to achieve stationarity.
• Model Selection: Based on the ACF and PACF plots, an ARIMA(2, 2, 2) model was chosen.
• Model Fitting and Forecasting: The ARIMA model was fit to the data, and forecasts for the next 24 months were generated.
• Visualization: The actual data, forecasted values, and confidence intervals were plotted to provide a comprehensive view of the projected CPI.

This approach provides a robust forecast by incorporating both autoregressive and moving average components, accounting for trends and seasonality in the core CPI data. The confidence intervals offer a range of possible future values, helping to understand the uncertainty associated with the predictions.

Full disclosure: long SPY calendar call spread, long TLT puts

The post Fed’s Powell Avoids Rate Cut Talk While April CPI Keeps Hope Alive appeared first on Inflation Watch.

• The Federal Reserve had driven monetary policy to historic heights of accommodation: a 9 trillion dollar balance sheet combined with a return to zero interest rates: an easy money paradigm that itself needed to be transitory.
• The Federal Reserve instituted a risk management framework that targeted tail risks instead of an “expected” path of inflation and its resulting impact on the economy.

Moreover, Stiglitz offered two examples from the economy, autos and shelter, that do not conclusively demonstrate the Fed had no impact on inflation. Even Stiglitz’s discourse on inflation expectations is open to varying interpretations. I will tackle each of these issues one-by-one starting with auto inflation.

Auto Inflation: A Counterfactual

Stiglitz makes a big deal out of the obvious fact that the Fed could not solve chip supply problems in the auto industry by hiking interest rates. While the Fed never staked a claim to such powers, and even acknowledge its lack of such powers, this complaint is common among Fed critics who apparently wanted the Fed to leave monetary policy accommodative and lower for longer. Stiglitz pulls the rug from under the Fed by insisting “Given that its interest-rate hikes did not help resolve the chip shortages, it cannot take any credit for the disinflation in car prices.”

So now with auto prices inevitably lower, critics like Stiglitz are declaring victory on the prediction that car prices would eventually come down. Fine. How about a counterfactual? If the Fed had left rates lower for longer is it credible to believe that the path for prices would have stayed exactly the same (or improve)? I claim the answer is no. Assuming lower loan rates encourage and incentivize more borrowing (indeed this is a fundamental premise for accommodative monetary policy), then rock bottom rates would have fueled on-going and even increasing demand for cars and deepened pressures against short supply. In other words, I am claiming auto inflation would have been even worse and could have caused other cascading problems in the economy.

Even throwing away abstract counterfactual arguments, the actual data is not conclusive enough to suggest the Fed had zero (or even little) impact. The chart below juxtaposes new and used car prices with the auto inventory/sales ratio (cars and light trucks). This ratio puts demand and supply into context. While the the ratio bottomed out in late 2021, it is still nowhere close to pre-pandemic levels. Deflation/disinflation should not be this dramatic with the inventory/sales ratio still at historically low levels. I would have expected a price plunge to accompany a much faster recovery in the inventory/sales ratio. In fact, I would have expected the pendulum to at least swing above 1 again.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Used Cars and Trucks in U.S. City Average [CUSR0000SETA02], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 14, 2023. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: New Vehicles in U.S. City Average [CUUR0000SETA01], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 14, 2023. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Auto Inventory/Sales Ratio [AISRSA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 14, 2023.

In other words, while supply has been slowly normalizing, demand still outstrips supply. This is a condition for higher prices. Yet, resurgent inflation in autos is not likely specifically because high interest rates are constraining and reducing the ability and willingness to pay higher and higher prices. The rate on the 48-month auto loan was last this high in 2002.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Finance Rate on Consumer Installment Loans at Commercial Banks, New Autos 48 Month Loan [TERMCBAUTO48NS], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 14, 2023.

Finally, domestic banks have also tightened lending standards, likely further constraining the ability to pay higher prices. Lending standards tighten with tighter monetary policy as banks become more risk averse and have a higher cost of funds. This is a Fed effect. From the October, 2023 “Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices“:

“In a set of special questions, banks were asked to assess the likelihood of approving credit card and auto loan applications by borrower FICO score (or equivalent) in comparison with the beginning of the year. Significant net shares of banks reported that they were less likely to approve both credit card and auto loan applications from borrowers with FICO scores of 620. Moderate and significant net shares of banks reported that they were less likely to approve credit card loan applications and auto loan applications, respectively, from borrowers with FICO scores of 680. In contrast, a modest net share of banks reported being more likely to approve credit card applications from borrowers with FICO scores of 720, while the likelihood of approving auto loan applications to borrowers with FICO scores of 720 was basically unchanged in comparison with the beginning of the year.”

Thus, I claim the Fed deserves at least partial credit for helping to tap the brakes on demand, in the form of ability to pay, in the face of relatively tight inventories. In other words, I find it compelling to create a narrative around a Fed impact that is at least as plausible as the narrative that completely discredits the Fed.

Shelter Inflation

The dynamics of shelter inflation are complex. I grant Stiglitz the point that higher interest rates can exacerbate inflationary pressures by reducing the availability of construction loans needed to increase supply. Interestingly, Stiglitz does not reference the complementary constrain t on supply from existing home owners who refuse to move and incur the cost of mortgages more expensive than their current ones.

Anyway, I will still point out that it was soaring shelter inflation that provided the signal to the Fed that rates were overly accommodative; the episode was a rare moment in Fed history where it acknowledge an inflationary problem from shelter costs. Historically low mortgage rates stoked demand and led to a mini-mania in the housing market. Prices soared practically uncontrollably for homes. Rent soared alongside home prices. I discussed the “housing trigger” for the Fed in “The Federal Reserve Fears On-Going Inflationary Pressures from Rents” and provided more detail in “Inflationary or A Bubble – Housing Prices Help Push A Fed Driving Recession-Pricing for Home Builders.”

I also provided evidence from a home builder about the impact of the Fed on cooling housing prices in “Lennar Corporation: How the Fed Is Cooling Inflation In the Housing Market.”

In other words, the mere fact that one-year leases on rents cause a lag in disinflation is insufficient to dismiss the various ways in which rent inflation forced the Fed to hike and to maintain its hiking campaign. A counterfactual on post-pandemic housing demand and prices in the face of prolonged accommodative policy should not be controversial: we have lived it three times in the span of just one generation.

Core Inflation

Stiglitz noted the following about headline inflation:

“The pandemic-induced inflation was exacerbated further by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which caused a spike in energy and food prices. But, again, it was clear that prices could not continue to rise at such a rate, and many of us predicted that there would be disinflation — or even deflation (a decline in prices) in the case of oil. We were right. Inflation has indeed fallen dramatically in the United States and Europe.”

This was a surprising sidebar when the Fed does not set monetary policy by what happens to food and energy. Adding to the distraction, Stiglitz does not label the inflation numbers her uses to compare to the Fed’s target. For the purposes of this discussion I will assume he is referring to core PCE (personal consumption expenditure, excluding food and energy) since it matches the number he uses for September. Yet, I cannot be 100% sure since the 3.7% change in the PCE in September matches the 3.7% headline change in the CPI (consumer price index) for September. This confusion is technically important because the median PCE sits at 4.4%. Core CPI was 4.1% in September, and the October report delivered the tiniest of cooling at 4.0%.

No matter the lens, these levels and incremental declines are hardly an occasion for final victory. While the Fed has every reason to stop hiking rates and watch what happens from here, these numbers do not tell me the Fed can pack up its toys and go home. Stiglitz takes care of that concern by calling the 2% inflation target arbitrary: “There is no evidence that countries with 2% inflation do better than those with 3% inflation; what matters is that inflation is under control. That is clearly the case today.” On the surface, the logic makes sense except that the period of “Great Moderation”, where deflation was the Fed’s biggest concern, was a period where PCE stayed below 2%. We do not have experience in THIS economy with a Fed that overtly allows inflation to stay well above 3%…and the Fed is clearly in no mood to push its luck.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy (Chain-Type Price Index) [PCEPILFE], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 14, 2023.

Inflation Expectations

Stiglitz claims that the Fed also had nothing to do with controlling inflation expectations. Unlike the Fed, markets knew that inflation would naturally correct itself. Stiglitz even challenges the protest that inflation expectations remained calm specifically because of trust in the Fed: “…inflationary expectations remained tame. While some central-bank economists claim that this was due to their own forceful response, the data tell a different story. Inflation expectations were muted from early on, because markets understood that the supply-side disruptions were temporary.” Stiglitz took a debatable point and breathed unfounded certainty into it. Stiglitz focuses on the 5-year forward inflation expectation rate:

“Only after central bankers repeated over and over their fears that inflation and inflationary expectations were setting in, and that this would necessitate a long slog entailing high interest rates and unemployment, did inflationary expectations rise. (But, even then, they barely budged, reaching 2.67% for the average of the next five years in April 2021, before falling back to 2.3% a year later.)”

Yet, a different interpretation is plausible and valid regarding the stability in the 5-year forward expectation. It appears the market has a bias to expect disinflation (especially in response to shocks). Starting between 2015 and 2017, the market finally believed the Fed could hold inflation closer to 2.0%. This milestone came after persistent messaging, in different forms, from the Fed on the 2% target. It seems odd to blame the Fed for a brief spike in inflation expectations at the time the Fed started hiking rates. I find it more plausible to interpret the rapid return to previous levels as evidence the market was once again mollified over long-term prospects with a Fed clearly serious about constraining inflationary pressures.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 5-Year, 5-Year Forward Inflation Expectation Rate [T5YIFR], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 14, 2023.

Given it appears to take a lot to convince markets the Fed cannot control inflation over the “long-term”, I turned to shorter-term expectations as a more responsive indicator. It turns out that the 3-year consumer expectations peaked right as the Fed finally dropped the notion of transitory inflation in November, 2021. One-year expectations kept rising alongside inflation readings and peaked with a peak in inflation. Thus, it is very possible that the 3-year expectation more accurately reflects sensitivity to the Fed’s actions where it counts: consumers.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Survey of Consumer Expectations

I go into more detail about the mechanics of inflation expectations in “Inflation Expectations and Inflationary Psychology.”

Since short-term expectations can start to bleed into longer-term expectations for inflation, the Fed took a risk management approach when it finally got serious about inflation. Tamp down short-term expectations and remove the risk of perturbing longer-term expectations which could prove harder to control above recent historical ranges.

The Risk Management Approach to Monetary Policy

The question is not whether or not the Federal Reserve should have acted to normalize monetary policy (by picking a non-zero target). The question is how far does/did the Fed need to go. Powell made it abundantly clear that the uncertain (and unprecedented) economic environment put the Fed in a risk management framework. The Fed decided it could not manage policy to the average or expected outcomes in the economy.

For example, a year ago, during the Q&A at a Brookings Institution conference, Powell claimed that monetary policy must take into consideration tail risks and their costs. The Fed collectively had decided that the costs of high inflation outweighed the potential risks of expeditiously hiking rates. The economy has proven so resilient that economists have spent over a year and half pushing out forecasts for a recession, a recession that could have been the main transmission mechanism for monetary policy to tank prices. Now, with the market celebrating the end of rate hikes and declaring victory over inflation, the runway is clear for the soft-landing narrative. I suppose those folks who think the Fed had no influence over inflation will have to conclude that monetary policy is totally meaningless if a recession is not forthcoming!

Conclusion

The inflation debate will never end because participants often bring to the table strong assumptions about the Fed’s capabilities and over-confidence in understanding the intricacies of the post-pandemic economy.

Ultimately, I stand by my long-standing claim that the Federal Reserve acted too slowly as supported by later economic research that I covered last June in “Why Monetary Policy Was Late In Responding to the Pandemic-Era Inflation Surge.” I stake no claim on the ultimate target; I just claim that the Fed needed to start normalizing sooner given what could be known at the time about economic conditions and the massive monetary and fiscal stimulus in the economy. Stiglitz did not explicitly say that he would have preferred the Fed do nothing, but his stance implies as much and feeds the narratives that inflation was never a problem in the first place. Thus, the Fed cannot satisfy anyone, not the inflationistas like myself nor the disinflationistas like Stiglitz….and certainly not the deflationists who held sway for so long going into the pandemic.

Be careful out there!

The post Despite the Inflation Celebrations, the Case Against Team Transitory Still Stands appeared first on Inflation Watch.

The above graph shows that services inflation is the main culprit keeping core CPIH in an uptrend. Core CPIH dropped from 6.5% in May to 6.4% in June. Since May was a 30-year high, I am particularly unimpressed by the “pullback” in the core inflation rate. The Core CPI (Consumer Prices Index) dropped from 7.1% in May, a 31-year high, to 6.9% in June.

Food and energy inflation is coming off extreme levels. Food inflation is coming off a peak 19.2% in March, 2023. Fuel prices are outright plummeting, falling 13.1% in May and 22.7% in June.

The British Pound Cools with Inflation

The cooling overall inflation numbers cooled the heels of the British pound which has been on quite a streak since the bond and currency crisis 10 months ago. GBP/USD, also Invesco CurrencyShares British Pound Sterling Trust (FXB), was falling off a near 16-month high coming into the inflation print. The inflation report greased the skids on the way to an important test of the uptrending 20-day moving average (DMA). That line has held as support since the beginning of June and has been important support since early March.

Source: TradingView.com

For now, I am trading for a bounce from the 20DMA and prepared to to accumulate a larger position for a test of 50DMA support. The overall drivers of sterling strength seem intact as long as core inflation is uptrending or even just sticky. The Bank of England will have to remain as hawkish as ever.

Of course, the upcoming meeting of the U.S. Federal Reserve is a major wildcard. If the Fed manages to get hawkish enough to scare some fresh strength into the U.S. dollar, then I will have to drop my current trading strategy.

Regardless, the uptrend in the pound should at some point end in the coming months. This recent weakness in the currency could be the beginning of the end.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long GBP/USD

The post Is the British Pound Topping Despite Lingering Strength in UK Core Inflation? appeared first on Inflation Watch.