The CPI components suggest that inflation’s glide path through the “final mile” will remain sticky. Services less energy services rose 0.4% in January and are up 2.9% year-over-year. Shelter increased 0.2% on the month and 3.0% over the past year. Medical care services rose 0.3% in January and are up 3.9% year-over-year. These service categories continue to keep core inflation above the Fed’s target.

Progress is real. The chart below shows core CPI has finally taken an incremental step to a lower inflationary regime. Yet the path lower remains gradual and sticky.

The Tariff Effect on Core Goods

The CPI for commodities less food and energy commodities increased 1.1% year-over-year and remains a key contributor to overall disinflation. This category could contribute to even lower inflation this year if the U.S. avoids enacting new tariffs.

In Liberty Street Economics, the New York Federal Reserve published a quick study that demonstrates a tariff incidence of roughly “94 percent” in the first eight months of 2025 and “86 percent” by November, meaning the vast majority of tariff costs showed up in import prices paid by U.S. consumers. The average tariff rate rose to about 13 percent, and tariffed goods experienced price increases of roughly 11 percent relative to comparable untariffed goods. Fed Chair Jerome Powell noted at the January press conference on monetary policy that inflation could be closer to target absent tariff effects. This study provides supporting data.

However, from a policy of economic warfare, tariffs have likely achieved a primary aim: a significant reduction in imports from China. The study pointed out that “in the first eleven months of 2025, China’s share of U.S. imports fell by another 5 percentage points, slipping below 10 percent”. Chinese imports accounted for nearly 25% of U.S. imports in 2017 and declined to around 15% in 2024 following the tariff increases implemented in 2018 and 2019.

The inflationary consequences of tariffs could be secondary to this strategic goal. Importers have shifted supply chains to blunt the otherwise inflationary impact of the higher tariffs. The general disinflationary environment during the first round of tariffs also likely helped embolden today’s heightened tariff regimes.

The strategic objective may be clear. The inflationary implications are less so.

Are Tariffs an Enduring Inflationary Force?

The New York Fed study does not argue that tariffs create a self-sustaining inflation spiral. It documents substantial pass-through into prices during 2025. If no new tariffs are enacted, year-over-year comparisons will eventually absorb this price shock. Base effects alone would allow the tariff impulse to fade.

However, continued or expanded tariffs would introduce new price-level increases. Repeated rounds would transform a one-time adjustment into recurring upward pressure on core goods. Ongoing uncertainty around tariff policy remains a significant wildcard. Persistent uncertainty could encourage firms to raise prices preemptively in anticipation of future cost increases.

Reluctant Disinflation

Disinflation is underway, but the path for the final mile to 2% remains sticky. This phase can best be described as reluctant disinflation, the mirror image of sticky inflation.

The bond market remains broadly unconcerned about renewed inflationary pressure. Bond prices rose following the CPI release. After gaining 1.3% ahead of the report amid rising equity volatility, the iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF (TLT) added another 0.5% after the data. With TLT trading well above its upper Bollinger Band – a signal of short-term extension – I took profits on a large TLT position.

In recent weeks, I have shifted toward buying dips and selling rallies in TLT rather than fading strength. As long as the bond market remains confident that inflation will continue moderating, my inflation hedge remains concentrated in commodities as the U.S. in particular positions itself to run the economy hot with lower interest rates, high investment, and fiscal stimulus.

Be careful out there!

The post Core Inflation Softens, but the Final Mile to 2% Remains Sticky appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Still, after the dust settles on this meeting, I fully expect the Fed to stay the course with a rate cut in December. Powell’s statements belie a Fed that is both gradually (some reluctantly?) accepting the case for looking through inflationary pressures and getting incrementally more worried about the labor market.

Division Translates Into Balking

Powell acknowledged strong disagreements among the Committee members. He teased a reveal in the upcoming minutes from the meeting, but the Fed vote says plenty. Recent appointee Stephen Miran unsurprisingly wanted a 50 basis point cut in a repeat of his dissent in the September meeting. Kansas City Fed governor Jeffrey R. Schmid delivered a dissent at the other end with a vote for leaving rates unchanged. Thus, it is easy to imagine the Fed currently holds a broad enough range of opinions on the direction for monetary policy to cause a pause in December.

In response to a reporter’s question about division in the Fed, Powell pointed out that Committee members have different forecasts and different levels of risk tolerances which come through in their speeches. Most importantly, Powell revealed that “there is a feeling in some we should wait.” Since there was just one vote for waiting during the latest meeting, I assume Powell referred to waiting instead of cutting in December – a not so subtle hint that the Fed as a group may already prefer not to cut in December.

The Case for A December Cut Still Looms

However, the hesitancy to cut in December directly contradicts Powell’s assessment of the economic situation. Powell noted that the current rate is above the neutral rate (“wherever it is”). Thus, policy is technically restrictive. Importantly, Powell ascribed the cooling in the labor market and the economy to restrictive policy. So if the Fed has truly adopted the mission to focus on addressing the downside risks in the economy, the Fed must stay biased to cut rates. At this point, the Fed will have a very difficult time explaining how it can “stand by” and watch a weakening economy and labor market.

While there remains upside risk to the Fed’s inflation mandate, Powell makes a weaker and weaker case every meeting that the Fed is truly concerned about that risk. He said plenty to indicate that the prospects for inflation are contained and even tame. Here were his main points on inflation:

• Most measures of long-run inflation expectations remain consistent with the Fed’s 2% inflation target.
• Services inflation is coming down
• Higher tariffs are pushing up inflation as one-time increase in the price level (the base case)
• The core PCE (personal consumption expenditures, the Fed’s preferred measure of inflation) without tariffs would be 2.3% or 2.4% without tariffs, not far from the 2% target.
• The tariff-driven increase in goods prices is happening within the longer-term context of goods deflation.

Thus, once the base case of a one-time effect laps the inflation readings, the Fed should be comfortably close to its target.

While Powell reiterated that the Fed is determined to make sure that the inflationary impact of tariffs is indeed a one-time increase in the price level, the overall picture painted by Powell makes inflation look well-contained. The implied upside risk from the uncertainties in tariff policy hardly seem noteworthy in Powell’s updated narrative.

On the other hand, Powell claims there is “no significant deterioration” in the economic data. While Powell pointed out that the downside risks to employment have risen, he did not express any concern for the highly publicized mass layoffs from big companies like Amazon.com (AMZN) and United Parcel Services (UPS). In response to a question about these layoffs, Powell only said that the Fed is watching these developments, and the layoffs do not yet show up in the initial claims data (of course not – these layoffs are recent announcements).

Overall, Powell sums up the labor issue as low hiring and low firing in the context of immigration policies shrinking the labor supply and a cyclical drop in the participation rate in the workforce. When asked how then will rate cuts help the job market, Powell responded that cuts will make sure the “labor market doesn’t get worse.” Upon hearing that explanation, I felt tingles of recessionary risks.

Inflation Warnings from Overseas?

While Americans are mostly focused on the inflation risks from tariffs, inflation is also proving stubbornly sticky in other major economies who are not at war with the global economy. For example, with inflation at 3.8% in the United Kingdom, the Bank of England is further away from its 2% inflation target than the Federal Reserve is from its target. In its last letter explaining the on-going inability to hit the target, the BoE reported:

“The recent increase in CPI inflation has owed largely to food prices and administered prices, including water bills and Vehicle Excise Duty. A reduction in total labour cost growth also appears to have been delayed by the increase in employer National Insurance Contributions (NICs) and pay growth in sectors with a large share of employees at or close to the National Living Wage (NLW).”

Yet, the BoE expects this year’s inflation increase to peak in September. The combination of a weakening labor market and restrictive policy is expected to help push inflation toward the 2% target next year. This is the UK version of hopeful monetary policy. The BoE just made its last rate cut in August, going from 4.25% to 4.0%. The policy rate was left unchanged in the last meeting.

Earlier this week, inflation in Australia hit its highest point in over a year. With inflation now above the Reserve Bank of Australia’s target band of 2-3%, the RBA will likely need to put a pause on its easing cycle. The Australian Bureau of Statistics identified housing, recreation and culture, and transport as the main drivers of inflationary pressures. A likely pause in easing further strengthened my case to stay long the Australian dollar (FXA).

I am now on heightened alert for sticky inflation becoming a global problem that justifies an extended run for the debasement trade.

A Pause in the Debasement Trade

As the Fed expresses hesitancy about cutting rates again in December, the debasement trade took a major pause going into the Fed meeting, perhaps in anticipation of a less dovish Fed. Given I think the Fed will feel compelled to proceed with cuts in December, I consider the pause in the debasement trade to be even more temporary than the inflationary pressure from tariffs. I have treated this sharp pullback as the buying opportunity I have (mostly) patiently waited for. When parabolic rallies finally lose steam, the pullbacks are often swift and steep. I am looking for support to hold for the SPDR Gold Shares (GLD) by the $350 level where the 50-day moving average (DMA) (the red line in the chart below) awaits testing.

Bond yields understandably spiked higher in response to the Fed’s balk on rate cuts. However, I am no longer interested in trying to fade rallies in the iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF as I now accept that the bond market’s overall trajectory is to worry much more about imminent economic weakness than lingering inflationary pressures.

The bond market is giving the Fed a green light for rate cuts. Thus, today’s balking should gradually transition to acceptance in the coming weeks.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: short GLD put, long GLD calendar call spread, long UPS, long AMZN put spread

The post Powell Balks At the Next Step of Hopeful Monetary Policy appeared first on Inflation Watch.

In his latest press conference on monetary policy, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell reaffirmed the central bank’s dominant message: tariff-driven inflation must not evolve into persistent price pressure. The Fed must ensure tariffs result in no more than a one-time price shock, as has so often been advertised. The Fed is maintaining a restrictive policy stance, “modest” in Powell’s opinion, not to suppress growth unnecessarily, but to guard against the risk that a one-time shock becomes embedded in inflation expectations.

Powell described a uniquely difficult moment for the Fed and monetary policy. “This is a special situation with risks to both of the goals,” he said, referring to the Fed’s dual mandate of maximum employment (currently met) and price stability (inflation remains above target). The policy response: stay in position, gather more data, and avoid premature action. “We see our current policy stance as appropriate to guard against inflation risks,” as Powell stated in his prepared remarks.

These stances form “Powell’s promises.”

Tariff Inflation: Short-Lived or Sticky?

During the press conference, Powell made clear that the central bank does not see inflation from tariffs as systemic, but it must remain vigilant. “Higher tariffs have begun to show through more clearly to prices of some goods,” he acknowledged. While the base case remains a one-time price level shift, Powell acknowledged, “it is also possible that the inflationary effects could instead be more persistent, and that is a risk to be assessed and managed.”

That task—managing a potentially durable inflationary impulse from trade policy—is Powell’s focus, along with the majority of the Fed. The Fed is collecting evidence as companies pass costs to consumers, raising the risk that inflation expectations begin to drift. “Near-term measures of inflation expectations have moved up… on news about tariffs,” Powell noted, though longer-term expectations remain anchored for now.

In the press conference Q&A, Powell was more direct:

“A pretty reasonable base case is that this is a one-time price increase. We will make sure that’s the case.”

Policy Outlook: Restrictive, Yet Watchful

In support of its goals, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) left the federal funds rate unchanged at 4¼ to 4½ percent, and continued its balance sheet reduction plans. Powell emphasized that this positioning is intended to give the Fed space to observe, not react hastily, a message consistent with past meetings:

“For the time being, we are well positioned to learn more about the likely course of the economy and the evolving balance of risks before adjusting our policy stance.”

Although the Committee’s policy rate remains in “modestly restrictive” territory, Powell flagged a disconnect by observing that “financial conditions are accommodative.” In other words, the economy is not acting as if monetary policy is holding the economy back. (I wish Powell spent more time unpacking this apparent paradox). When a reporter pointed out weakness in the housing market, Powell reminded the audience that the Fed looks at the economy’s performance as a whole, in its totality. However, his claim that the Fed cannot impact housing supply is only partially true. High loan costs can undermine the economics of some housing projects. These loan costs usually follow the Fed funds rate.

A Measured Mandate: No Rush to Cut

Despite the slowing of inflation from its mid-2022 peak, Powell emphasized that it “remains somewhat elevated.” Core PCE inflation rose 2.7 percent over the 12 months ending in June—nearly unchanged since the start of the year. While services inflation continues to ease, goods prices are rising under tariff pressure, motivating the majority of the Fed to hold rates steady.

In response to dissenting votes from two members (Bowman and Waller, who preferred a rate cut), Powell praised the clarity of the debate:

“What you hope is that people explain their positions clearly and that’s what we had. We had one of our better meetings…This was a good meeting today.”

Powell offered high praise for this meeting—likely an effort to stave off media speculation about Fed acrimony or debilitating disagreements. Powell emphasized that “the majority of the committee is of the view inflation is above target and employment at target, so policy should be more restrictive.” He reiterated this simple formula to make the case plain. He deferred to the dissenters to make their cases in coming days.

To further underscore the majority’s case, Powell suggested that the Fed is already “looking through” goods inflation simply by not raising rates. I am sure that commentary raised at least a few eyebrows given how hawkish it sounds at a time when everyone is looking for the date rate cuts resume. Ultimately, Powell insisted that tariffs “will not turn into inflation, as we will make sure it won’t.” He also cautioned that the Fed must act “efficiently”. If the Fed cuts too soon, a resurgence of inflation would sent the Fed scrambling to raise rates again (a scenario that does not concern dissenter Waller). If the Fed waits too long, then it will allow unnecessary damage to the labor market (this is the scenario that concerns Waller most).

The Renovation Sideshow

The press of course had a questions about the tensions with President Trump and a gathering cacophony of his administration. Powell, as always, was quite dignified in his responses. However, his description of Trump’s recent (and awkward) visit the suddenly controversial renovations contained some backhanded commentary. Powell called the visit a good one, an honor. He added that it is not often a President comes by the Fed for a visit, especially to see a building. In other words, not only was Trump’s visit unusual, but also it was a bit comical. I wish the occasion allowed Powell to smile and crack more direct jokes.

A week and a half ago, the Federal Reserve posted a short video explaining the renovations. A lot of the work involves upgrades to meet government safety and security standards (like blast proof windows) and to preserve historic features. Who knew such work could create such a stir and build a case for firing a Fed Chair?

Conclusion: One Shot at Containing Price Pressure

Powell’s framing of the Fed’s challenge is both strategic and cautionary. Tariff inflation must remain a one-time shock, not a repeat offense. At the same time, the Fed cannot overlook the labor market’s fragility.

“Our obligation is to keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored and to prevent a one-time increase in the price level from becoming an ongoing inflation problem.”

With risks pressing on both sides of the mandate, the Fed’s current posture is one of active restraint—willing to move, but unwilling to guess.

The post Powell’s Promises: Containing Tariff-Driven Inflation and Risks to Dual Mandate appeared first on Inflation Watch.

In a recent interview, Fundstrat Co-founder and Head of Research Tom Lee made a convincing but incomplete argument for team non-inflationary when describing the economic impacts of tariffs. From Lee’s perspective, a tariff is a tax that simply reallocates money in the economy. Money transfers from companies and/or consumers in the supply chain to the government. That money goes right back into the economy through government spending. Thus, money just flows from one set of hands to another. This argument seems to rely on a monetary theory of inflation, where an increase in the money supply is the main driver of inflation; tariffs do not increase the money supply.

The Limits of Monetarism in Today’s Economy

Milton Friedman made monetary theory, or monetarism, famous through quotes like: “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” Monetarism seemed to work well to explain the economy of the 1970s and 1980s but waned over time according to the IMF. Still, given the fluid and dynamic nature of today’s economies, I am fully willing to accept that monetarism can and will become relevant under the right circumstances. Today’s tariff regime is not creating the right circumstances.

Tariffs, Wages, and Supply Chain Reactions

Because Lee thinks of tariffs as a transfer of money from people and companies to the government, he implied that instead of hiking rates to counteract inflationary effects, the Fed should cut rates in order to counteract a drop in demand from higher prices. However, Lee does not explicitly account for the potential responses to tariffs across the supply chain. As prices rise, consumers may ask for higher wages to cover increased costs in the economy. These higher wages are in turn paid for with higher prices. And so on. Federal Reserve Governor Christopher Waller countered this fear by insisting that today’s economy does not grant workers such economic power, certainly not like they had in the immediate wake of the pandemic. However, as strict immigration policy tightens the U.S. workforce, remaining workers in significant portions of the economy could find themselves with renewed economic power to demand higher wages to offset any real or perceived tariff-driven cost increases. The final or net impacts are hard to predict.

Demand Destruction and Fed Caution

Consumers will find little comfort or relief knowing that their higher costs boost government coffers. For example, the recent budget bill held as a premise that money is better left in consumer pockets and corporate treasuries than in government accounts. Thus, a tariff-induced price hike will induce responses from the payers of that tax in order to offset real economic impacts. In the interview, Lee appears to lean toward demand destruction as the deflationary counterbalance that can relieve pressure on consumers. Yet, with the looming uncertainty about the path of tariff policy and its eventual impacts, the Federal Reserve is well-served to proceed with caution. For example, cutting rates to offset demand destruction could entrench the inflationary impulse that pressured demand. In the optimistic scenario, the Fed could do well to wait on businesses and suppliers to work out efficiencies to avoid passing on tariff costs into the rest of the economy.

The Inflationary Impact Is Real and Already Here

In the middle of all the swirl on inflationary impacts from tariffs comes a recent Federal Reserve study that has already detected inflationary impacts from the current tariff regime and has concluded that the first trade war with China from 2018–2019 also boosted inflation. From “Detecting Tariff Effects on Consumer Prices in Real Time“:

“…we find that US import tariffs led to a statistically significant increase in consumer goods prices. For the 2018–19 tariffs, our local-projections approach reveals that tariff changes were passed through fully and quickly—within two months of tariff implementation—to consumer goods prices. For the February and March 2025 tariffs implemented on imports from China, we find that tariffs have already passed through partially to the consumer goods prices that we can observe through March. Our results indicate that the 2025 tariffs have so far led to a 0.3 percent increase in core goods PCE prices, contributing to a 0.1 percent increase in core PCE prices (goods and services prices, excluding food and energy) as a whole.”

An illustrative research paper from the San Francisco Federal Reserve, “The Effects of Tariffs on Inflation and Production Costs” by Bart Hobijn and Fernanda Nechio, makes an even more stark case for the inflationary impacts of tariffs:

“Estimates suggest that the impact on prices for investment goods is likely to be much larger than for consumption goods. For example, if an across-the-board 25% tariff is fully passed through to finished goods, near-term price increases are estimated to be about 9.5% for investment goods and 2.2% for consumption goods.”

Hobijn and Nechio further explain that “the import content is much larger for investment goods than for consumption goods. This is because domestic markups tend to be smaller for investment goods than for consumer goods, making the import content of their costs much larger.”

Thus, even if aggregate inflation somehow sustains minimal impact because of fortuitous offsets, significant parts of the economy could suffer. Without tariffs, the inflation rates in both periods could have been lower. With inflation still above the Fed’s 2.0% target, a cut in rates in the middle of so much uncertainty carries all types of risks.

Bostic Speaks for Team Inflation

In commentary hearkening back to the warning signs from the last Beige Book, Raphael Bostic, President of the Atlanta Federal Reserve, cautioned in a CNBC International interview that the Fed’s business contacts have clearly signaled their willingness and readiness to raise prices in response to tariffs. In commentary that could be referencing the recent Fed study, Bostic also claimed that inflation is already showing up in current tariffs. Most interesting to me in this inflationary story is Bostic’s counter to the theory posed by Waller and others that tariffs create a one-time price shock and then inflation just goes back to normal (emphasis mine):

“The textbook story for economics is if you do tariffs, it’s a one-time shift. It happens quickly. Everyone understands what’s going on and then the world goes back to how it was before. So you should look through that. What we are seeing today though is not just a one-time shift. It’s actually something that’s being stretched out over a much longer period of time. I think that runs the risk that people start to feel like inflation is always with them. This elevated level of inflation is always with them. And that then runs the risk that there might be some structural changes that businesses and consumers, for that matter, make in terms of how they respond and how they engage in the marketplace.”

Bostic sums up very well why the Fed must proceed with caution. Without clarity on the shape, timing, or magnitude of tariff policy, predictions and models are precarious. Rushing to cut rates risks worsening any upcoming inflation surprises.

Bostic also has support in other economic research. The following quote from an NBER working paper, “Tariffs As Cost-Push Shocks: Implications for Optimal Monetary Policy” by Iván Werning, Guido Lorenzoni, and Veronica Guerrieri, suggests that calls to “see through” tariff shocks represent more economic bravery than some may admit (emphasis mine):

“A widely held tenet in the practice of central banking is that a shock like a tariff shock, that entails a mechanical increase in some prices, is a shock that requires the central bank to “see through it”, in other words, to let the mechanical effect of the tariff in prices to affect the overall price level, but avoid
larger increase in prices. To be fair, this is a rule of thumb which, as far as we know, does not correspond to any result in economic theory.”

Conclusion: Stagflation at the Center

Ultimately, all this back and forth on the potential inflationary impact of tariffs tells me that stagflation remains front and center in the economic window. The Fed is right to remain cautious, but as time drags on, economic risks increase for both inflation from tariffs and for an economic slowdown from demand destruction or even ongoing cyclical factors. Today’s predictions will turn out wrong in surprising ways. The Federal Reserve is caught in a tough position where it needs to wait but may find the rising risks and costs of waiting increasingly difficult to absorb.

The staglfationary risks and dilemmas come through in the following quote from the NBER working paper:

“Is a tariff expansionary or contractionary? The answer depends on how monetary policy responds… Based on our equivalence result, a tariff is best understood as a supply-side disturbance—not a demand-side disturbance—that introduces a trade-off for monetary policy. If the central bank prioritizes price stability, the tariff will lead to a sharp short-run contraction. Alternatively, the central bank can offset this contraction by pursuing an expansionary response. In sum, the notion of a “neutral” monetary policy is not well defined.”

In the meantime, I remain committed to Goldman Sachs Access Inflation Protected USD Bond ETF (GTIP) as my hedge on the Fed’s increasingly precarious stagflationary bind. For now, the ETF has bounced around at the whims of long-term Treasury bonds, vacillating from nervousness over the U.S.’s ballooning debt to reassurances over the economy to mild flight-to-safety flows.

Source: Tradingview.com

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long GTIP

Tom Lee’s inflation commentary comes at the 7:25 mark in the video below…

The post Tom Lee Dismisses Tariff Inflation — But Data, Theory, and Research Say Otherwise appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Waller’s Case: Tariff-Driven Inflation Is Transitory

Just two days after Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell insisted that meaningful inflation is coming, Fed Governor Christopher J. Waller shared a nearly polar opposite narrative. Of course, given Waller may be on the short list of the President’s next pick to head the Federal Reserve, he has a built-in motivation to speak with authority in support of the administration’s claims that tariffs are not a threat to inflation. During a CNBC interview, Waller made the case for transitory and immaterial inflationary impacts from tariffs that would allow the Fed to start cutting rates as early as the July meeting. Waller explained that the Fed had paused for six months fearing inflationary impacts from tariffs that have yet to materialize. He chose to look through the ongoing uncertainty on tariff levels, timing, and frequency of change, as well as the recent Beige Book, which was full of accounts of businesses preparing for or already responding to tariff risks. Moreover, Waller claimed that only about 10% of the price index comes from imports (which made me wonder why there is any fuss over tariffs!). Instead, Waller expressed greater concern about the potential economic weakness caused by tariffs and stated he does not want to wait to cut until “we see a crash.”

Waller also referred to a speech he gave in South Korea in early June that laid out the detailed economic case for looking through tariffs as a one-time price shock. In “The Effects of Tariffs on the Three I’s: Inflation, Inflation Persistence, and Inflation Expectations,” Waller concluded that “the economics behind a tariff increase implies it should have a transitory effect on prices—tariffs raise prices once, but those prices don’t keep going up.” This conclusion holds if tariffs are hiked all at once in a one-and-done fashion. Otherwise, this reassurance reinforces the same argument Treasury Secretary Bessent made at the beginning of the tariff drama, trauma, and noise. Assuming that long-term inflation expectations remain anchored (as they are in market-based measures and professional forecasters, not in consumer-level surveys), Waller concluded “the tariff-induced inflation will be transitory and [the Fed] should look through it when setting policy.”

Powell’s Caution: Don’t Rush the Cuts

When Powell appeared on June 24th in front of the House committee to deliver the semiannual monetary policy report before the House Financial Services Committee, he was, of course, peppered with questions about tariffs and inflation. At one juncture, Powell took the opportunity to agree with Waller with an important condition (emphasis mine): “I do agree that basically if things are a one-time increase, then you don’t respond to them. That’s the whole idea if there’s a shock to prices… generally speaking you don’t respond if you are highly confident that it will just be a one-time shock.” Powell went on to caution that this particular situation is “a complicated one,” and said the Fed must make this decision about the timing of rate cuts “with some care.” He added that the Fed has not yet reached a point of price stability, and these large tariffs “raise kind of more concern” given the economy is just a few years out from a highly inflationary environment.

Powell’s caution appears warranted. Attempts to pattern-match to past history are challenging because of the scale and magnitude of the potential tariffs. The volatile implementation of economic policy means the Fed cannot be sure that tariff hikes will be a one-time episode. So, while a coming price shock may move inflation away from target, there remains some uncertainty about whether the Fed will be able to watch inflation settle back to target.

Bowman and Daly Lend Conditional Support

Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle W. Bowman added commentary on monetary policy in a speech the day before Powell’s testimony: “Assessing the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy During and After the COVID-19 Pandemic,” at a research conference sponsored by the International Journal of Central Banking and the Czech National Bank in Prague, Czech Republic. Bowman positioned herself as supportive of imminent rate cuts, although she did not specifically target July. Instead, she outlined broad conditions supportive of rate cuts: “If inflation remains near its current level or continues to move closer to our target, or if the data show signs of weakening in labor market conditions, it would be appropriate to consider lowering the policy rate, moving it closer to a neutral setting.” Bowman shared Waller’s concerns for the economy and stated that inflation appears on a sustained downward path to the 2% target:

“As we think about the path forward, it is time to consider adjusting the policy rate… we should recognize that inflation appears to be on a sustained path toward 2 percent and that there will likely be only minimal impacts on overall core PCE inflation from changes to trade policy. We should also recognize that downside risks to our employment mandate could soon become more salient, given recent softness in spending and signs of fragility in the labor market.”

Bowman expressed reassurance in the lack of inflationary impact from tariffs to date: “It appears that any upward pressure from higher tariffs on goods prices is being offset by other factors and that the underlying trend in core PCE inflation is moving much closer to our 2 percent target than is currently apparent in the data.” While acknowledging some upside risks for inflation, Bowman emphasized that she is “not yet seeing a major concern, as some retailers seem unwilling to raise prices for essentials due to high price sensitivity among low-income consumers and as supply chains appear to be largely unaffected so far.”

On Bloomberg Surveillance, June 26, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco President Mary Daly capped the dovish commentary by leaning toward the third of three timing scenarios for inflation:

1. Delayed, tariffs will have some impact and will be more persistent.
2. Delayed but will be one-off.
3. Does not deliver the punch history suggests will come as businesses absorb costs.

Daly stated that her “modal expectation” had been for some time that the Fed would be ready to cut rates in the fall. Thus her current dovishness is consistent with prior stances. Daly acknowledged tariffs “will potentially raise inflation.” However, since the impact should dissipate over time, it should not build into inflation expectations.

Rate Cuts, Politics, and the Fed’s Legacy

As the Fed’s debate about the impact of tariffs on inflation plays out, I am reminded that there is a larger context that influences how the Fed positions itself. The Federal Reserve was slow to respond to inflation in the throes of the pandemic, assuming that the price shock would be “transitory.” Even though he brought back the term “transitory,” even Waller revealed, “I am willing to admit that, at the time, I underappreciated how the large and sustained fiscal response would combine with highly accommodative monetary policy to overstimulate aggregate demand in an economy that quickly recovered from the early effects of the pandemic.” Waller is full steam ahead on team transitory again, while Powell continues to act like someone who still feels the scars. Powell’s caution makes even more sense in this context.

While Powell insists he is ignoring the political noise about his competence, his unwillingness to follow Presidential orders, and public ruminations about his firing or the looming presence of a shadow Fed Chair, Powell’s adamant stance sure has the appearance of someone trying to prove a point of toughness and independence. Thus, I fully expect Powell to be the “last one” to reluctantly move forward with rate cuts. I even expect his messaging at the time of the first rate cut to place responsibility squarely on the broader Fed… and to include some residual hawkishness of his own.

Overall, I lean toward Powell’s caution for all the reasons he gave to Congress. The environment remains highly uncertain, and the Fed has not yet reached its price target, even as a large price shock looms. Cutting rates in the midst of this swirling dynamic would signal a high degree of confidence in the post-shock equilibrium. Moreover, the Fed may have fundamentally different reads on the economy. For example, Daly insisted that “there are no warning signs that the economy is weakening, although progressing more slowly than before.” So if the Fed is both hampered by lower-quality data (due to federal budget cuts) and divided on the economy’s health, proceeding with rate cuts sooner rather than later seems doubly risky.

Conclusion

I will be highly surprised by a July price cut. Indeed, the CME FedWatch tool shows just a 21% chance of a cut, while September’s meeting has a 96% chance. These high odds essentially lock the Fed into cutting rates at the September meeting in order to avoid shocking the market. The messaging around that rate cut will be critical. Moreover, will the bond market get spooked and send long-term rates higher, just as it did both times the Fed cut rates last year?

The volatility index (VIX) sure looks incredibly low given the potential fireworks ahead. After breaking support from the dawn of the tariff drama, trauma, and noise, the VIX started this week right on top of that line.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: no positions

The post Powell vs. Waller: Divided Fed Faces Tariff-Driven Inflation Uncertainty appeared first on Inflation Watch.

While it is far from clear how tariff-driven price hikes will eventually shake out, the Fed districts offered sufficient evidence of businesses who have price hikes waiting in the wings.

In Boston, a clothing retailer retagged products for sale this summer with higher prices than planned before tariffs.

In New York, manufacturers claimed they plan to pass along most or all of tariff-driven price increases. Moreover, “businesses continued to expect substantial increases in input prices in the months ahead.”

In Philadelphia, “more than two-thirds of the surveyed firms anticipated increased costs and expected their competitors to increase prices in as little as two months.” Yet, about half of Philadelphia respondents reported increased price sensitivity amongst its customers.

In Cleveland, businesses expect a “strong pace” of growth in costs”, particularly with nonlabor input costs rising “at a robust pace in recent weeks.”

Firms in Richmond expect prices to rise faster in the coming 6 months.

In Atlanta, some firms pushed through price increases despite softening demand, a troubling prospect of potential stagflation. Most interesting are the firms using “a multi-pronged approach to managing tariffs, including pushing costs back to suppliers, reconfiguring supply chains, absorbing costs in margins, and passing costs through to customers.”

In Chicago, businesses expect higher inflation over the next 12 months.

In St. Louis, “most contacts expecting nonlabor costs to increase next quarter reported that they would pass along the costs to customers within three months.”

In Minneapolis, more than half of surveyed business claimed they plan to increase prices in the coming future.

Kansas City businesses “generally [anticipate] higher input and output prices in the coming months.” Cost increases from the surge in demand for shipping products ahead of tariffs will be passed on to customers in the next 12 months.

Oilfield services firms in Dallas are having trouble passing along higher costs to customers. Of the Texas businesses who feel able to pass along tariff-related costs, “about 60 percent are doing so within a month of the tariff taking effect, and 90 percent are doing so within three months.”

San Francisco did not provide anecdotes or data on planned price hikes. However, one alarming anecdote came from a business which noted that tariff-related price hikes were not rolled back along with the related rescinded tariff. This inflation “stickiness” is a worrying indicator of how tariff-driven price hikes can cause lasting, cascading price pressures in the economy.

Given these consistent and confirming anecdotes and data points, the CPI looks set to bottom out in coming months if not in the very next report. With Beige Book in hand, the Fed is unlikely to cut rates ahead of more certainty on tariff policy. These reports from the Federal Reserve’s districts underline Jerome Powell’s core desire to see the economic warfare, primarily through tariffs, come to an end.

The Downtrending CPI Is Also Colliding With A Weakening U.S. Dollar

While May’s CPI came in softer than “expected”, its descent still slowed since March’s big drop. The reports from the Beige book suggest that this downtrend could continue if not for tariff-driven price pressures. Instead, fresh inflation agitation likely awaits.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy (Chain-Type Price Index) [PCEPILFE], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food and Energy in U.S. City Average [CPILFESL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. June 12, 2025.

In the meantime, the U.S. dollar continues to weaken. At the time of writing, the U.S. dollar index (DXY0) briefly broke down below its 3-year low set back in April. A weaker dollar means imported goods become more expensive, all else being equal. Thus, the weaker currency will translate into higher inflation in the U.S. except to the extent demand for imported goods falls along with the dollar.

Source: TradingView

Be careful out there!

The post A Calm Before Fresh Inflation Agitation? appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Tariffs Create Inflation Risk

While the administration goes back and forth on whether tariffs will create price increases, Powell is quite clear: “If the large increases in tariffs that have been announced are sustained, they are likely to generate a rise in inflation”. Powell further warned that these large tariffs will also likely lead to “a slowdown in economic growth, and an increase in unemployment”. This cocktail is the very definition of stagflation. Powell reinforced his implicit plea to end the tariff war by repeating his warnings during the Q&A session. For example, he emphasized that “given the scope and scale of the tariffs…certainly the risk to higher inflation, higher unemployment have increased.” As a result, the Fed “won’t see further progress toward our goals, but we might see a delay in that.”

To add credibility to the concerns, Powell referenced the consensus (emphasis mine): “If you look at where forecasters are, they’re all forecasting an increase in inflation.” Without admitting he fears the potential of a recession, Powell followed up by referencing “forecasts of weakening in the economy and some have recession forecast.”

Thus, if Powell was in charge of trade policy, he would not go down the current path of large tariff increases. The risks to inflation and of a weaker economy – aka stagflation – are too great.

These admonishments are made more remarkable given the on-going (and one-way) spat that President Trump has with Powell. Trump now calls the Fed Chair “too late Powell”. Trump piled on by calling Powell a fool after the latest stall on rate cuts. I suspect Trump sees the hidden messages in Powell’s commentary.

Waiting As Leverage

Given the standoff in risks, the Fed has no choice but to sit on the sidelines of policy. Firstly, the trade policies are uncertain and in flux. During the current 90-day pause, anything can happen, including a sudden collapse in the ceasefire or another 90-day pause to avoid all-out economic warfare. Once these uncertainties clear up, the Fed next must wait to see impact from the policies before it can venture to take action.

Yet, I think the Fed would be cutting rates if not for the tariff risks. During the Q&A, Powell let slip that the Fed could have been late in cutting rates last year: “I wouldn’t say that what we did last fall was at all preemptive. If anything, it was a little late.” Ironically, the tariff risks will definitely make the Fed late again. By the time the dust settles enough for the Fed to be confident in more rate cuts, the economy could be deep in the throes of weakness.

Still, there is an interesting angle in the Fed’s insistence on waiting. The U.S.’s massive budget deficits need to be financed at lower rates. This more favorable financing likely needs the assistance of the Fed, whether by coaxing the long-end of the bond market to come down with “follow the leader” federal fund rate cuts or something more direct like “Operation Twist.” The longer higher rates persist, the harder it will be for the U.S. to take major fiscal action like extending the massive tax cuts from 2017. Powell has insisted since the first pause on rate cuts that the Fed can afford to wait. In the latest meeting, Powell further emphasized the Fed can afford to wait. I counted 21 times Powell used the word “wait” or “await”, 3 times Powell referenced no need to “hurry”, and another 4 times Powell insisted on exercising patience. I see a Fed in stagflation planning mode when Powell insists “for the time being, we are well positioned to wait for greater clarity before considering any adjustments to our policy stance.”

The message to the White House? Provide clarity post haste. All this waiting is the Federal Reserve’s way of exercising leverage while disavowing interest in advising on policy.

Markets React: The Dollar, Gold, and Bond Yields

After the Federal Reserve’s statement, the U.S. dollar strengthened, gold weakened, and long-term bond yields went higher for the rest of the week.

The U.S. dollar index (DXY) is still rebounding off a 3-year low. So for now I am assuming that the dollar’s strength for the rest of the week was a residual from this bounce from “oversold conditions”. Currency traders are likely waiting for the next dramatic tariff headlines to resume selling the dollar. (I currently hold a mix of long and short dollar bets). The weekly chart below shows that at the peak of the tariff trauma and drama that the dollar index reached a level last seen in March, 2022.

Gold is even more intriguing. The SPDR Gold Trust (GLD) went on a near parabolic run for a week and a half in April. Such runs usually come to climactic ends. In GLD’s case, a bearish engulfing topping pattern signaled the end of the run. GLD attempted a rebound from support at its 20-day moving average (DMA) (the dotted line below), but it stopped cold right at its all-time high. Fed day brought GLD right back down to its 20DMA support. I suspect this support will eventually give way as the Fed’s latest insistence on patience translates into a slightly lower enthusiasm in buying gold as a hedge against a Fed forced to cut rates right into the teeth of tariff-driven inflationary pressures. Waning enthusiasm is likely only worth a test of uptrending 50DMA support (the red line).

Long-term rates have chopped around since December. However, based on the “heavy” technicals for iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF (TLT), rates look poised to head higher at some point. TLT is just one more bout of economic chaos away from a fresh swoosh downward. The lows of the year coincided with levels last seen in November, 2023.

Stuck Until Further Notice

By the time of the next Fed meeting in June, we should have a better idea about the success or lack thereof for the 90-day tariff pause. The pressure will only increase on Powell to speak clarity into monetary policy. If more economic and sentiment indicators are flagging increasing stagflationary pressures while trade policy remains uncertain, I expect Powell to get more strident in his warnings (in Powell’s mild-mannered way of course). In the meantime, the stock market looks poised to join the Federal Reserve in getting stuck. The S&P 500 (SPY) is in a cliffhanger trading right below 200DMA resistance for the month of May.

Be careful out there!

The post Powell’s (Not So) Hidden Plea to End the U.S.’s Tariff War appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Source: April 2025 Manufacturing Business Outlook Survey, Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia

At the same time economic activity fell off a cliff, prices paid accelerated higher. A steady uptrend in prices paid was in place since last year, but in April they jumped to levels last seen in July, 2022. After spiking in January, the prices received flattened out. So the good news, for now, is that firms in aggregate are not passing along the surge in prices paid. Either firms are facing the reality of a loss in pricing power in a softening economic environment, and/or they are trying to wait out the current economic chaos. Either way, the underlying stagflationary pressures are roiling just under the surface for the manufacturing sector.

Note that since these measures are diffusion indices (see definition in the above chart), the magnitude of these effects is not visible. Still, given policymakers closely watch these economic surveys to inform policy, the stagflationary signals are sure to bleed out into monetary policy.

The Fed Trap

Based on the speeches from members of the Federal Reserve, the stagflationary signals are already bleeding into monetary policy. For example, concerns about stagflation appeared in Fed Chair Jerome Powell’s answers to questions in an interview at the Economic Club of Chicago last week.

“the administration…is implementing significant policy changes and particularly trade now is the focus and the effects of that are likely to move us away from our goals. So unemployment is likely to go up as the economy slows in all likelihood and inflation is likely to go up as tariffs find their way and some part of those tariffs come to be paid by the public. So that’s the strong likelihood…”

This economic bind has the Fed trapped between inflation and economic weakness. For now, all the Fed can do is hope for the best. Hope as monetary policy came through as Powell continued: “…my hope is that we’ll get through this and get back…we’ll be moving away from those goals [of maximum employment and price stability] probably for the balance of this year and then or at least not making any progress and then we’ll resume that progress as we can.”

The Fed is clearly not thinking about responding to the current economic chaos with price cuts. Powell insisted that “our role is to make sure that this will be a one-time increase in prices and not something that turns into an ongoing inflation process.” The Fed cannot contain higher prices and higher inflation expectations with rate cuts. Thus, the Fed will likely sit on its hands as long as possible in the face of weakening employment. I expect the Fed to resort to creative “Fedspeak” in lieu of action in the hopes stagflationary pressures will wind down on their own.

A GTIP Dip

Three weeks ago I made the case for buying the Goldman Sachs Access Inflation Protected USD Bond ETF (GTIP) as one way of meeting the investing challenge of a stagflationary environment. GTIP fell soon after that as long-term bond yields suddenly soared with waning confidence in the U.S. economy and the U.S. dollar. I used this period to accumulate GTIP at lower prices since I do not foresee long-term yields going much higher absent an extreme crisis of confidence. GTIP will get its next big test when April’s CPI rolls out next month. Will it demonstrate businesses restraining from passing along tariffs to end consumers? Will it warn of resurgent inflationary pressures? The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s April 2025 Manufacturing Business Outlook Survey suggests GTIP has tailwinds.

The Goldman Sachs Access Inflation Protected USD Bond ETF (GTIP) briefly dropped toward the bottom of its recent range.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long GTIP

The post An Early Look At Stagflationary Pressures appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Shmid warned that “while in theory, tariffs may have only temporary effects on inflation (although persistent effects on the level of prices) I would be hesitant to take too much solace from theory in this environment”. He tied recent tariff announcements to broader signs of economic stress, including “a decline in consumer sentiment and increases in near-term inflation expectations.” Schmid acknowledged that the current policy environment has become “considerably more complicated,” citing feedback from business contacts who see growing risks on both sides of the Fed’s dual mandate of maximum employment and stable prices.

Schmid’s skepticism around transitory inflation contrasts with recent remarks from Fed Chair Jerome Powell, who has leaned into a more reassuring message about the persistence of tariff-driven price pressures. In “Jerome Powell’s Fed Deftly Maneuvers Through a Stagflationary Minefield“, I admired Powell’s effectiveness in navigating a difficult policy landscape, but I also pointed out the problematic use of “transitory” to describe inflationary effects. Powell argued that “it can be the case that it’s appropriate sometimes to look through inflation if it’s going to go away quickly without action by us… and that can be the case in the case of tariff inflation.”

That assertion paralleled Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s line that tariffs are a “one-time price adjustment.” But as I wrote in “The Sleight of Hand Behind the ‘One-Time Adjustment’ and ‘Transitory’ Tariff Inflation Narrative“, for inflation to be transitory, expectations for price levels would need to revert after the initial tariff shock. Yet, “tariffs make price reversion unlikely by locking in a permanently higher cost base.” In that piece, I also pointed out how structural effects – such as wage responses, supply chain disruptions, and embedded cost pass-through behavior – make inflationary pressures from tariffs more persistent. Outcomes are also hard to anticipate as inflationary pressures cascade through the economy.

Schmid appears attuned to these systemic effects. He described “a marked increase in the upside risks around inflation along with elevated downside risks to the outlook for employment and growth,” and openly questioned the prudence of discounting these risks as fleeting. Unlike Powell, who focused on optionality and emphasized that longer-term inflation expectations remain anchored, Schmid directly acknowledged that business sentiment and price expectations are shifting in ways that could prove difficult to reverse.

Powell’s message was strategically designed to preserve policy flexibility and calm markets in the face of stagflationary fears, and in that moment, Powell succeeded. However, I remain concerned that Powell’s framing underestimates the lasting damage that tariff-related cost increases can impose on the economy. As I wrote in my critique, the idea of a “one-time adjustment” may be statistically correct but economically misleading. A new, higher price level, once established, may not simply fade away. The higher price level could reshape business behavior and household expectations for years to come.

Schmid seems to understand these risks. His closing words underscore the seriousness of the moment (emphasis mine): “With renewed price pressures likely, I am not willing to take any chances when it comes to maintaining the Fed’s credibility on inflation.” That statement signals a shift away from the complacency that defines the transitory inflation narrative on tariffs.

The Last Friendly Report on Inflation?

As the Fed slowly accepts increased inflationary risks in the future, the past provides fleeting reasons for optimism on inflation. While I have stuck by the persistent and sticky narrative on inflation, March’s CPI (Consumer Price Index) report signaled the potential start of the next leg down for core inflation…just in time for tariffs to pressure inflation upward again. From the report:

“The index for all items less food and energy rose 0.1 percent in March, following a 0.2-percent increase in February. Indexes that increased over the month include personal care, medical care, education, apparel, and new vehicles. The indexes for airline fares, motor vehicle insurance, used cars and trucks, and recreation were among the major indexes that decreased in March…

The all items less food and energy index rose 2.8 percent over the last 12 months, the smallest
12-month increase since March 2021.”

Notably, the shelter index was up 4.0% year-over-year.

The chart below suggests that, absent tariff inflationary pressures, core CPI would finally be on its last leg lower toward the Fed’s 2.0% target.

Ironically, this positive development in core CPI could give more confidence to policymakers in pressing forward with inflationary tariffs.

Bostic Concurs

In an interview on Marketplace, president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Raphael Bostic, appeared to concur with Schmid’s concerns:

“I think the pressures that are out there are not the best for our mandates. All the models say that the introduction to tariffs is going to put upward pressure on prices, and I’ve seen more reports of recession fears in the media and from our business contacts than I’ve heard in a year and a half or two years. And so that’s also going to put pressure on our mandate, the employment mandate, in a way that is not positive.”

Bostic’s tiny source of solace is that “the current environment today might not be the current environment tomorrow.”

Currency Correction

Typically I conclude these inflation reviews by teasing out some implications and impacts in currency markets via the U.S. dollar. This time around, there are too many tariff-related cross-currents and too much economic chaos to directly connect dots. So, instead, I take this time to describe a “currency correction” I had to make on the Canadian dollar (USD/CAD) and the Mexican peso (USD/MXN).

A month ago I explained:

“I am short USD/MXN out of a belief that economic relations with Mexico are about as bad as they can get. I could of course get proven wrong in due time. On the other hand, I am long USD/CAD because I do not think the market fully appreciates how much weaker the Canadian economy will get as it tries to match the U.S. in this economic warfare.”

I was correct for almost two weeks, but in due time I have been proven wrong. I have now closed out both trades in order to reassess my next moves. Surprisingly, the Canadian dollar has proven quite strong against the Mexican peso. The exact opposite of my expectations. That chart below shows how CAD/MXN is breaking out from an approximate triangle or wedge type pattern.

Even more importantly, USD/CAD has broken below a key support level at the same time the U.S. dollar looks poised for a fresh, major breakout against the Mexican peso. In other words, in the last 2-3 weeks, I could not have been more wrong! (Note how the 25% tariff on Canada and Mexico defined a PEAK for USD/CAD, a classic contrarian move).

While USD/CAD broke support at its 200-day moving average (DMA) (the blue line), USD/MXN HELD 200DMA support. Thus, USD/MXN looks likelyly to head even higher while USD/CAD looks likely to head even lower.

This currency correction took me by surprise. The move likely reflects the effectiveness and the robustness of Canada’s current resistance to U.S. economic warfare. Mark Carney, the new Prime Minister of Canada, has been quite clear in laying out a framework of Canadian resistance. The Governor of the Bank of Canada, Tim Macklem, has been similarly forthright in laying out the implications for monetary policy and bracing Canadians for the economic warfare ahead. Apparently, both men have, so far, succeeded in bolstering Canada’s defenses (symbolically through the Canadian dollar). The implications for inflation both here and in Canada remain to be seen as trade slows down between the two North American neighbors and former allies.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: no positions

The post Inflation Concerns Rise at the Federal Reserve Amid Tariff Unease appeared first on Inflation Watch.

TIPS are Treasury Inflation Protected Securities. The name implies that purchasing these bonds provides a way to protect your money from inflation. Per the Treasury website: “As the name implies, TIPS are set up to protect you against inflation…The principal (called par value or face value) of a TIPS goes up with inflation and down with deflation.” A lot of people likely stopped reading there. However, TIPS are still bonds. So when interest rates go up, the value of the bond decreases. The crux of the failure in TIPS in 2022 was a double whammy: the inflation rate peaked along with an aggressive rate hike cycle by the U.S. Federal Reserve. Thus, the rate hikes eroded the bond value faster than inflation increased the value of the bond.

Is It Time to Buy GTIP?

The weekly chart below of the Goldman Sachs Access Inflation Protected USD Bond ETF (GTIP) shows how buying in anticipation of inflation made a lot of sense. Now, inflation is proving sticky, and in due time, with the backdrop of slowing growth, the Fed will be under increasing pressure to CUT rates. This stagflationary combination should provide a golden moment for TIPS.

With growth pressures ahead, the Fed is unlikely to hike rates anytime soon. This reality is an important backstop for GTIP. As soon as the Fed started to hike rates in 2022, GTIP topped out. GTIP plunged about 18% before it bottomed in 2022 and did not hit a final bottom until after the Fed’s last rate hike in July, 2023.

Note that GTIP has been on the rise in 2025. With a current yield of 3.5%, GTIP is “close enough” to many high yield savings accounts to make GTIP competitive alternative to cash for the conservative part of a portfolio. Even with tariffs creating a “one-time price adjustment higher” in prices, GTIP should get quite a boost in the coming year. Rate cuts from the Fed will provide an extra kicker. In other words, GTIP looks like a good investment option for the potential stagflationary environment to come. This TIPS instrument could even rival the return for stocks in the coming year or more.

Here Comes RBIL

The podcast “Talk Your Book” had an an excellent discussion on TIPS and potential alternatives to TIPS. In “A Better Money Market Fund“, F/m Investments explained why TIPS failed so spectacularly: “People ignored the fact that real yields can go up too…That real rate rise cannibalized any uptick you had in your inflation accrual…It was just typical bond risk.”

F/m Investments offered up the F/m Ultrashort Treasury Inflation-Protected Security (RBIL) as a an alternative to TIPS. Here is the case the company makes for RBIL (shown in graphical detail on the podcast site):

• A multiple bond portfolio consisting of TIPS maturing in a year which strips out rate duration risk and mainly leaves the principal appreciation from the inflation protection.
• Gives a modest coupon and the CPI appreciation
• Will protect purchasing power
• It is a better money market fund
• Avoids the tax complications of TIPS
• Provides the efficiency of an ETF

RBIL is definitely an interesting alternative to buy TIPS outright. But given RBIL just launched in late February, I prefer to buy GTIP for now, especially given my own inflation and rate expectations. In another year or so, I will check on the relative performance of GTIP vs RBIL and adjust as needed from there.

Tariffs Mean Inflation

F/m provided a simpleton’s guide to tariffs and inflation that serves as a summary to their short post on soaring inflation anxieties:

• When you hear tariffs, think inflation.
• When you hear tariffs are delayed or are coming sooner, you have to think more inflation.
• When someone tells you tariffs won’t cause inflation, you have to think Japan….or deep depression.
• We know all the outcomes from tariffs in the short-term will be inflationary – either because they’ve happened, or worse, the fear of coming tariffs drives the hoarding of goods and services which in turn drive short-term prices higher.

Case closed.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: no positions

The post Why TIPS Failed Spectacularly In 2022… And Is NOW the Time to Buy? appeared first on Inflation Watch.