Federal Reserve Chair Kevin Warsh started his fight against inflation with jawboning during June’s decision on monetary policy. The performance was all words, many task forces, and no action. Warsh doubled down on the jawboning for July’s decision. The Chair expressed even more resolve for hitting the 2% inflation target while making the measuring stick provisional. PCE remains the benchmark for now, but Warsh suggested the task forces could change that strategy after January and declined to identify the broader set of inflation data informing his judgment.

Warsh doubled down on jawboning by describing a contentious policy meeting while also sidestepping a request to explain the decision to hold rates unchanged. Warsh also refused to provide any insight on the dissent from the three of twelve voting FOMC members who each voted for a quarter-point rate hike (Beth M. Hammack, Neel Kashkari, and Lorie K. Logan). He even declared as a counterpoint that there was “a lot of agreement on the hard questions.” He also heard a lot of “commonality” on the key questions he mentioned at the top of the press conference; the answers just had different “leans.”

Finally, Warsh further extended his brand of opaque Fedspeak by countering the image of a Fed fighting over rate hikes with the unanimity on a metaphorical vote for a period of “watchful thinking not watchful waiting.” In either sense of watchfulness, Warsh did not provide specifics about what the Fed is actually prepared to do to finally bring inflation back to target.

The statement itself made the decision to hold rates steady even harder to explain. The FOMC described economic activity as expanding at a solid pace, productivity and capital investment as strong, job gains as keeping pace with the workforce, and unemployment as little changed. At the same time, inflation remained elevated. Yet, the Committee offered no explanation for why this combination of solid growth, stable employment, and above-target inflation justified leaving rates unchanged. Instead, the statement jumped from attributing some price increases to supply shocks straight into more jawboning: “The Committee will deliver price stability.”

Warsh’s declarations about inflation were all the more awkward given he continued to imply that the Fed before his tenure was not serious enough about its inflation target. For context, Warsh consistently describes inflation as a choice, a claim predating his appointment to the Chair. However, he has yet to specify the choices the Fed needs to make beyond the potential recommendations from his various task forces. Instead, he is keen to point out distinctions between the current FOMC and prior ones: “we have begun a new chapter, and we understand that the five-plus years of inflation above target cannot be cured in nine weeks—or by a single month of modest price decreases.”

Warsh introduced one more potential choice without making it specific: the balance sheet. He asked how much accommodation it is still providing even if interest-rate policy remains the Fed’s primary instrument. As with the inflation framework, Warsh posed the question without providing an answer, an intended adjustment, or a timetable.

Passing the Inflation Fight to the Bond Market

One emergent choice could be passing the inflation-fighting baton to financial markets. In his opening statement, Warsh anticipated questions about what the Fed did to fight inflation between the June and July meetings. He pointed out that the Fed’s retreat from the business of forecasting and forward guidance allowed financial markets to react to data instead of the Fed. The result? Higher bond yields that have tightened financial conditions. He used a sports metaphor to emphasize the change in the game: “market participants are learning to play the ball, not the referee—and market prices will continue to respond in the direction and magnitude they see fit.”

While Warsh insisted that “where necessary and appropriate, we will not hesitate to act,” he declined to clarify the conditions under which the FOMC would actually do something about inflation. Still, toward the end of the press conference, Warsh acknowledged that the bond market’s tightening of financial conditions provides “some comfort that we’ve got the ability and capability to deliver.” The coded language suggests that the Fed is willing to let the bond market do part of the inflation-fighting work while the FOMC waits for results.

One perplexed reporter pointed out that the bond market’s higher rates suggested the Fed was falling behind on hiking its own rates. Another befuddled reporter bluntly asked, “Why should rates not be higher today?” Warsh deftly avoided referencing the Fed funds rate and instead chose to point out the “market’s judgement” to take nominal rates higher along the Treasury curve. While the Fed will not allow the market to dictate its actions, the Fed is “observing” markets.

Warsh next pointed out that both the Fed and markets have upcoming decisions to make about interest rates. He tried to make it plain: “Monetary policy matters not just by what we say, or even what we do. Monetary policy matters by how it affects the real economy.” Of all the Warshspeak on the day, that statement stood out to me as the clearest declaration of the Fed’s modality for action in the Warsh era. If the Fed concludes that market is tightening financial conditions in response to inflationary pressures, the Fed will be content to wait for inflation to respond accordingly.

The Bond Market Hears Warsh Loud and Clear

The bond market seemed to get the point. Long-duration Treasury bonds sold off sharply as soon as the Fed’s statement hit the wires and barely stopped to catch a breath for the rest of the regular trading day.

The reaction function for stocks was much more volatile. The S&P 500 (SPY) rallied into and through the statement until someone tapped stocks on the proverbial shoulder and turned attention to the bond sell-off. The S&P 500 sold off sharply in the last hour of trading, falling from a marginal 0.4% gain intraday to a 1.5% loss at the close.

The subtle frustration from the press intensified with every unanswered question. One reporter almost pleaded with Warsh. The reporter pointed out his repeated claims about intolerance for above target inflation while his Fed has yet to take action. In response to the reporter’s request to clarify what he means by “no tolerance for inflation” and the plans to act, Warsh responded by acknowledging the impatience he had heard about this situation. Yet, he still only offered the same menu of jawboning by declaring this Fed is “on the job. We will deliver.” First, the Fed needs to answer a series of hard questions in order to deliver on its remit.

The press’s frustration symbolically boiled over in the last question: “You said you’d be open to having press conferences when there’s news to make. Today, no change in rates. No forward guidance. For the average household, what was the news today?” Warsh’s final non-answer was telling. Warsh first reiterated his commitment to the existing press conference schedule for 2026. He went on to assure the audience that the Fed is “on the case”, and his confidence in the Fed’s ability to deliver on its inflation target was even stronger than when he took the Chair position. He concluded the session by leaving the audience with “the optimism of a new central banker that we’re committed as ever to deliver and to offer an assurance we will.” And with that doubling down, the jawboning came to an end.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long TLT

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In his first press conference as Fed Chair, Kevin Warsh found another way to talk up and reaffirm the Fed’s credibility on inflation. He shortened the policy statement to focus on what he called the ”facts,” removed forward guidance, repeatedly invoked the Fed’s commitment to “price stability,” and launched task forces designed to produce strategic and operational reforms for some time in the future.

Fighting Inflation With Jawboning

In his opening remarks, Warsh insisted that “members of the FOMC are unambiguous and unanimous. This Committee will deliver price stability.” He returned to the same jawboning when asked about inflation and the Fed’s ability to bring inflation back to target: “Today, I am announcing that this Committee has unambiguously and unanimously decided that we are going to deliver on that.”

Given the lack of forward guidance, Warsh’s repetition and reemphasis came without defining what the commitment means for the next rate decision. This approach is classic central-bank jawboning. The posturing gives Warsh room to maintain hawkish credibility without committing the FOMC to a near-term rate hike.

The most revealing moments came when Warsh responded to questions about the restrictiveness of current policy. He described monetary policy’s restrictiveness as “uneven.”

“If I look at the housing market as one example,” Warsh said, “Fed policy is not the single determinant of the state of the housing market, but broadly, I would say Fed policy appears to be somewhat restrictive there.” Warsh contrasted housing with financial markets. “I would have a hard time saying those words if I were looking at what is happening in financial markets.” That observation alone could have been sufficient to knock the S&P 500 (SPY) down 1.2% on the day and position it for another test of its uptrending 50-day moving average (DMA) support (the red line below).

Warsh made a similar point later in the press conference: “I do see some restrictiveness in things like housing. It is hard to use those same words anywhere else.” In other words, there is little to no case for cutting rates when the majority of the economy and financial markets are not behaving as if monetary policy is restrictive.

And for Further Emphasis…

In response to a question about underlying inflation pressures in the economy, Warsh pointedly emphasized the message from the statement on monetary policy: “…to be clear, the Fed will deliver price stability.” He again described the Fed’s commitment to price stability as “strong, unanimous, and unambiguous.” Warsh called this commitment “an important message we have missed for five years” and promised, “we are going to fix that.”

Warsh’s insistence and emphasis build the credibility behind the jawboning. The end of forward guidance avoids pre-committing to a rate path that at this time would have to point to higher rates. Warsh wants to pre-commit to an outcome. The outcome is 2% inflation. The path is deliberately unspecified except through the work of task forces.

There’s A Task Force for That

The task forces were a pillar of Warsh’s first press conference. He announced the launch of five task forces: Fed communications, the Fed’s balance sheet, data sources, productivity and jobs in an era of technological transformation, and inflation frameworks. Warsh said the groups will “start with first principles, ask hard questions, examine current practice, consider alternatives, and ultimately propose next steps for policymaker consideration.”

The inflation task force bolstered the jawboning on inflation. Warsh said, “The last task force, the one on inflation frameworks, will examine the drivers of inflation, first principles, and weigh the full range of ideas for delivering price stability in a changing economy.” Since the Fed already wields substantial inflation expertise in the Cleveland Fed’s Center for Inflation Research, I am keenly interested in the makeup of this task force and the institutional response to its work. I also wonder whether Warsh will advocate for delays in changing monetary policy until this task force completes its work.

Warsh even deferred to the task force when asked whether he still believes AI-driven productivity gains pave the way to rate cuts. When asked whether productivity could justify lower rates, he shifted the issue to the new productivity and jobs task force. He said the task force will examine “timing, scale, speed, implications for output and employment.”

Confidence In Price Stability, Not the Path to Get There

Ironically, Warsh sounded most confident when discussing the things he believes the Fed can control, and least confident when discussing forecasts. He repeatedly showed confidence in the Fed’s ability to deliver price stability. He expressed little confidence in the effectiveness of the Fed’s rate projections.

That contrast may define his chairmanship. Forecasts are uncertain. Dots can be erased. Forward guidance can mislead. But inflation, in Warsh’s telling, is ultimately a monetary-policy choice.

“You bet it is,” he said when discussing the idea that inflation is primarily determined by monetary policy. “I’ve said for years, inflation is a choice. You bet it is.”

Once again, Warsh postured as hawkish without overtly committing to rate hikes. If inflation is a choice, and inflation remains above target, then the Fed is responsible for choosing differently. Rate cuts do not bring inflation down (just ask the Turkish Central Bank).

Reporters tried repeatedly to nudge Warsh into acknowledging rates must go higher. He steadfastly refused each time. For example, when asked why the Fed did not raise rates given the inflation risks, he answered curtly: “I’ve got nothing more to say than the statement itself.”

Still, when asked whether there was any discussion of a rate cut, Warsh dismissed the idea quickly: “There was one proposal on the table. There was no discussion of any other proposals. The discussion on that proposal was, I would say, quite limited. The group was unanimous and unambiguous on it.” Any lingering hopes for a rate-cut narrative officially died at that point. Perhaps the new narrative is possible now that the FOMC does not include a voting member who requests rate cuts no matter what the data say.

Conclusion

Warsh is targeting inflation credibility through communication before leaning on the interest-rate weapon. He seems to be buying time for inflation to cool on its own accord (transitory without calling it transitory). However, given inflation has remained sticky for years and is now creeping higher, time is not on his or the Fed’s side.

Yet, the latest Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) projects a Fed-standard glide path to the Fed’s target in another two years…

Regardless, toward the end of the press conference Warsh proclaimed a credibility argument underlined the jawboning: “When we deliver on our price-stability objectives, which we will, the American people will feel as though the hardships they have been living through, in part because of inflation over the last five years, are in the rearview mirror. That credibility will have dividends across what we do.”

The market question is whether Warsh can make this promise credible without first proving he and the FOMC are willing to raise rates. I am betting they continue to find ways to avoid rate hikes for the rest of the year absent a calamitous turn of monetary events.

Warsh’s war on inflation started with jawboning and the new Fed Chair used his first press conference to establish inflation-fighting seriousness without directly threatening tighter policy.

The post Warsh’s War On Inflation Starts With Jawboning appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Inflation Drivers

Inflation remains above target and is being driven by identifiable, but still unresolved, forces. Tariffs account for a significant share of core inflation and are taking longer than expected to pass through the economy. According to Powell, goods inflation has shifted from being flat or negative before tariffs to running around 2%, with tariffs contributing approximately 0.5 to 0.75 percentage points to the ongoing inflation overshoot.

Inflation has now run above target for five years, increasing concern as a new price shock from war has pushed oil prices higher. Powell acknowledged that the war against Iran has pushed up near-term inflation expectations. He also cautioned that the size and duration of oil’s impact on inflation is uncertain.

Powell expressed frustration with the stickiness of core non-housing services inflation. The labor market is no longer generating inflationary pressure yet services inflation has not declined accordingly.

The added uncertainty from war and oil reduces confidence in any forecasts. Powell acknowledged the lack of confidence behind them, noting that participants are effectively making estimates without strong conviction. He quipped that “you gotta write something down.” He even shared that someone on the FOMC joked that “This is one of those SEPs [Summary of Economic Projections], where if we were ever to skip an SEP, this would be a good one.”

Powell summarized the situation plainly: “the thing I really want to emphasize is that nobody knows.”

(Uncertain) Economic Backdrop

Still, Powell insisted that the broader economy remains resilient, with steady growth and stable unemployment. Longer-term inflation expectations remain anchored near 2%, which continues to provide an important foundation for policy.

The current SEP reflects low conviction and high uncertainty. Inflation’s trajectory will depend on how tariff effects resolve, how energy prices evolve, and whether services inflation begins to improve.

In the meantime, the Fed as a group still has core PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditure) inflation gliding comfortably to the Fed’s target of 2% by 2028 despite the recent updrift in the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge. Thus, the Fed remains confident in the path for the economy despite the lack of conviction in the forecasts.

The post Powell: Inflation Is Uncertain and the Forecasts Lack Conviction appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Lessons from the 1990s

Daly reached back to the 1990s to demonstrate that the Federal Reserve is well-equipped to manage monetary policy through the coming transformation, whatever shape it takes. Daly noted that Alan Greenspan, Fed chair at the time, used disaggregated micro data to argue that “the burgeoning computer revolution would spur sustained productivity growth, allowing the economy to grow faster without putting upward pressure on prices”. Thus, the Fed could remain patient with monetary policy even as the economy boomed. Daly did not reference or contextualize the financial chaos that engulfed the late 1990s. The global economy had to survive Russian financial crisis, the Asian financial crisis, the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, and the ballooning of the tech and dot-com bubble which burst in 2000. Depending on your perspective, monetary policy played alternating roles as savior and villain in these economic calamities.

Going forward, Daly promised that the lessons of the 1990s would inform the foundation of monetary policy’s approach to AI’s impacts on the economy. “The willingness to listen to businesses, hear their ideas, use data and evidence to test them, and invite others to do the same,” Daly recounted as ways to maintain a pulse on AI-driven dynamics.

Daly pointed out that AI can deliver one-time efficiency gains by automating parts of a process. However, that productivity boost does not recur on its own. Sustained productivity growth requires broader reorganization and diffusion across industries. Thus, it is difficult to attribute recent productivity strength to AI or to assume its persistence.

I am particularly intrigued by the notion that the Fed may be slow to respond to a heating economy because of AI-driven productivity enhancements. One of my premises for ongoing sticky inflation includes an economy running hot due to fiscal stimulus and substantial investments in infrastructure and manufacturing. Daly implies that the Fed could be cautious about reacting to inflation that may prove temporary if productivity gains materialize.

Daly noted that AI investment can be inflationary in the near term with the investment required to build out capacity, while the disinflationary channel from productivity may arrive later. Accordingly, timing is central to how the Fed interprets sticky inflation alongside AI.

Thus, developments in AI increase the complexity of interpreting the Fed’s objectives and actions.

Augmentation Not Destruction

While AI could inject disinflationary (or even deflationary) forces into the economy, potential job destruction is top of mind for most workers. Job destruction would present the kind of structural economic force that the Fed typically has minimal ability to influence with monetary policy. Thus, Daly’s optimistic outlook on AI as job augmentation and creation would significantly relieve the Fed of a deeply challenging burden.

Daly’s evidence comes from employers in the San Francisco district. During the fireside chat following the introductory remarks, Daly described her team’s latest findings: “what we’re really seeing is AI replacing tasks, augmenting workers.” Daly and her team are collecting data and anecdotes directly from businesses. According to Daly, “most of those firms are saying, ‘I’m augmenting my workforce’.”

Earlier in the fireside chat, Daly made another call to history to support her optimism: “No technology ever reduces net employment. Not in the history of technologies, but it does change what that employment looks like.” Accordingly, Daly suggested that the same relationships should hold for AI. AI is changing the shape of employment first by replacing tasks within a job and next by augmenting the job itself. For Daly, the next phase for AI and the economy is not wholesale employment destruction but job creation. AI will create new jobs that we cannot imagine in this moment.

Keep Up If You Can

Daly delivered one cautionary message for workers. She warned that workers will need to engage with AI and focus on continuous (and rapid) learning. She referred to the leader of a company who had fired workers who were not able to keep pace. Fortunately, that same leader discovered the need to hire more workers because of the opportunities created by AI.

Daly also used prompt engineering as an example of a job type that emerged and faded quickly because of the changing needs and capability of AI. As a result, Daly advised workers to run as fast as they can:

“work forces need to skill in durable skills…be AI ready, be able to use AI to lift yourself in the educational space. You know, use the technologies that are out there to build your skills up because you can learn a lot fast if you train yourself to look at AI…”

In other words, translate AI into a learning advantage instead of treating AI as a threat.

Conclusion

Overall, Daly struck a positive tone on the current “AI Moment”. While the path forward is uncertain, Daly made the case for a kind of resilience informed by direct experience with AI. Workers need to engage with AI using a growth mindset, looking for opportunities while avoiding threats. In the meantime, the Federal Reserve will remain forward-looking and evidence-driven, monitoring whether AI’s anticipated effects are materializing in productivity, prices, and employment before adjusting policy.

The post San Francisco Fed’s Daly: AI’s Future Is Job Augmentation and Creation, Not Destruction appeared first on Inflation Watch.

FXA rode the economic tailwinds to a breakout for a 15-month high.

Data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) suggests that the unemployment rate has likely peaked at October’s 4.4% with December’s reading at 4.1%.

Even more important for monetary policy, the consumer price index (CPI) in Australia is above the RBA’s target 2-3% range. After dropping as low as 1.9% last year, the CPI suddenly rebounded above the RBA’s target range. Improving economic numbers will thus threaten to keep inflation higher than target if the RBA does not pivot to a tighter policy stance.

And then there are commodities, the core of Australia’s economy. Companies like iron ore producer Rio Tinto have enjoyed strong rallies to start the year as investors wake up to the economic realities of massive infrastructure and energy investments to support the AI boom along with the increasing attractiveness of physical assets as major countries pile on more and more debt. I started accumulating RIO in October and included the stock on my shopping list for 2026. So far, the price action has yet to deliver any kind of buyable dip. The strength of these commodity plays suggests that commodity-rich economies are going to experience upward pressure on their currencies. The breakout in RIO aligns well with the breakout in the Australian dollar.

Conclusion

All signs point to continued strength in the Australian dollar. A pivot in monetary policy will all but confirm a bias higher for the currency. Moreover, Australia looks relatively more attractive as a country versus major economies like Japan and the U.S. where policy and political turmoil along with mounting debt levels could keep those respective currencies under constant pressure. My main question now is how and when will fresh buying opportunities come.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long FXA

The post Australian Dollar Breaks Out As Economic Winds Blow Toward Rate Hikes appeared first on Inflation Watch.

Thus, Goolsbee has “put concerns about the job market aside”. His focus is on inflation.

As President of the Chicago District, Goolsbee is reacting to the observations and concerns of his Midwest constituents across Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin. He cited concerns about costs and affordability. However, the January Beige Book entry for Chicago did not describe any notable levels of concern as follows:

“Prices rose moderately on balance in late November and December and contacts expected a similar pace of growth over the next 12 months. Producer prices rose moderately. Nonlabor input costs rose moderately, with contacts highlighting higher costs for energy (particularly electricity) and raw materials. Manufacturing contacts continued to attribute some increases in raw materials prices to tariffs, while a few construction contacts reported little effect of tariffs on their operating costs. Consumer prices rose moderately, and one retail industry analyst said that to date about half of tariff-related cost increases had been passed through to consumers.”

These “moderate” observations from January are almost identical to the descriptions from the November Beige Book.

The Fed’s contacts in the Chicago district appear to support Goolsbee’s lack of concern for the labor market. They expect a slight increase in employment in the next 12 months. So far, gains in hospitality employment have compensated for further contraction in manufacturing employment. Employers are focused on replacing retirees and citing overall sufficient worker availability. In the CNBC interview, Goolsbee pointed squarely at the uncertainty driven by government policies as the source of employment weakness. The Fed cannot address this kind of uncertainty with lower interest rates; monetary policy acts in an economically cyclical way

The Fed is unable to address non-cyclical issues. Goolsbee suggests as much when he points out that “low hiring and slow firing is not what the business cycle looks like”. Instead, a business cycle features high layoffs along with low hiring.

Goolsbee’s observations and assessments clearly plant him firmly against rate cuts for the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

Goolsbee sounds about as entrenched in his position as are the most dovish members of the Fed who believe rate cuts are necessary to support the labor market. Thus, the stage remains set for growing acrimony as monetary policy moves cautiously ahead of the arrival of a new Fed Chair who presumably will be under orders to get rates much lower as a condition for the nomination. The jobs picture as outlined by Goolsbee will make such a dovish push quite difficult to explain.

So while it seems unlikely the Fed will deliver the surprise rate cut this January, I think the overall trajectory of a dovish bias for the Fed keeps expectations solid for an economy running on the hot side with policy combined with a surplus of fiscal stimulus. Thus, I continue to like the commodities portion of my shopping list for 2026.

The post The Fed’s Labor Market Divide Is Hardening Against Rate Cuts appeared first on Inflation Watch.

With so much dissension and disagreement in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the minutes of recent meetings have become more revealing. The minutes from the December Fed meeting shed more light on the character of those disagreements than Powell was willing or able to share at the press conference. During that press conference, Powell emphasized consensus amid uncertainty and portrayed disagreement within the Fed as a natural consequence of a multidimensional policy environment. Read alongside those remarks, the minutes reveal a more fractious narrative, one marked by deep and structural differences that are likely to shape monetary policy well into 2026. Powell framed disagreement as technical. The minutes suggest it is structural.

A Committee Without An Anchor

As a reminder, the FOMC members displayed striking dispersion with their votes. While the nine votes in favor of a 1/4 percentage rate cut were sufficient to carry the decision, the minutes indicated that a few of the yes votes came from FOMC members who “indicated that the decision was finely balanced or that they could have supported keeping the target range unchanged”. Two votes opposed the rate cut outright and wanted to leave rates unchanged. The third opposing vote wanted a 1/2 percentage point cut. Specifically, in favor were Jerome H. Powell, Chair; John C. Williams, Vice Chair; Michael S. Barr; Michelle W. Bowman; Susan M. Collins; Lisa D. Cook; Philip N. Jefferson; Alberto G. Musalem; and Christopher J. Waller. Stephen I. Miran wanted the deeper cut. Austan D. Goolsbee and Jeffrey R. Schmid wanted no change.

Powell’s Consensus Narrative vs. the Reality in the Minutes

Powell framed the lack of unanimity as a question of risk-weighting rather than disagreement over fundamentals. “Everyone around the table agrees that inflation is too high and that we want it to come down,” he said, adding that officials also agree the labor market has softened. Where views diverge, Powell claimed, is “how do you weight those risks and what does your forecast look like,” describing the decision as a “close call” driven by the “complicated, unusual, difficult situation” tugging on the Fed’s dual mandates. Powell’s claim about inflation attitudes is particularly important given the Fed will likely spend a lot of time talking up its inflation-fighting credibility even as it cuts rates this year due to political and economic pressures.

The minutes suggest that the tension is forcing the Fed to confront a confluence of opposing economic views that resists clean consensus and raises the odds of persistent dissension. Importantly, a tension between inflation rhetoric and employment risk runs through the minutes.

Inflation: Confidence in Theory, Unease in Practice

Powell expressed confidence that inflation will continue to move lower over time. In aggregate, the minutes reflect that view. However, “a majority of participants remarked that overall inflation had been above target for some time and had not moved closer to the 2 percent objective over the past year”. The Fed’s staff reinforced these concerns by concluding that the upside risk to inflation has become more precarious given that inflation has remained above the Fed’s 2% target for four straight years. Still, some participants claimed that those upside risks have declined.

In a likely reference to the Fed’s Beige Book (which in 2025 was full of vivid descriptions of inflation pressures), the minutes reported that “some participants stated that their business contacts had reported persistent input cost pressures unrelated to tariffs”. Several of these participants in turn reported that “weaker demand limited the ability of some firms to raise prices or that business productivity gains might enable some firms to manage these cost pressures”. 

The minutes reported that “some participants highlighted the risk that elevated inflation might prove more persistent than expected”. These fears likely stem from the lingering and uncomfortable uncertainty about the ultimate impact of a fluid tariff regime. The minutes reported that a majority of participants expected disinflation in housing services to continue while a few participants also saw ongoing disinflation in core nonhousing services. As usual, this suggests the Fed finds plenty of comfort in the relatively tame long-term expectations for inflation based on survey and market data. As usual, these assessments suggest the Fed finds plenty of comfort in relatively tame long-term inflation expectations based on survey and market data.

If inflation will actually making a soft landing to the Fed’s 2% target in 2027 and 2028 as the current central tendency in the projections insists, the journey will likely continue to feature sticky inflation… and plenty of jawboning to convince financial markets the Fed will not allow tariffs, for example, to cascade into persistently high inflation. According to the minutes, “some participants noted concerns that a more prolonged period of above-target inflation could risk an increase in longer-run expectations”. Four years already seems like a prolonged period, so I am not convinced that a few more years above 2% will dissuade the Fed from continuing to cut rates to try to address weakness in the labor market.

Taken together, the minutes show a Fed that is far more concerned about labor-market fragility than its public messaging suggests. By incorporating that calculus, the bar for another rate cut looks lower than current market pricing implies”.

Labor Markets: Where the Fed’s Anxiety Really Shows

The FOMC sounded more unified about the employment picture. As a result, I expect in due time the Fed will give sway to cutting rates again sooner than later, as soon as January. According to the CME’s FedWatch tool, the current odds for a rate cut sit at a paltry 15% for the January 28th meeting, so I realize my perspective is an outlier. However, in a coming year that should deliver its share of outlier events, I think a January rate cut will be the least of the economic and financial surprises.

In December’s press conference, Powell acknowledged labor market softening. Powell said the Committee agreed that “the labor market has softened” and emphasized that employment faced “further risk”. However, he downplayed the urgency of the perceived deterioration. By contrast, the minutes uncovered some deeper anxieties about the employment picture and now give me further reason to believe in the high possibility for a January rate cut. For example, the minutes reported that several participants presented a case of potential signals of “greater fragility in the labor market”.

Why I am Expecting a January Rate Cut

The minutes reported that “participants generally assessed that, under appropriate monetary policy, the labor market likely would stabilize next year.” This conditional framing supports my expectation for more rate cuts than the market currently assumes. Notably, the central tendency of the Fed’s projections pegs 2025 as the peak year for unemployment. Any negative divergence from that assumption would strengthen the case for additional rate cuts.

Conclusion

The Fed as a group positions its statements for downside risks to employment and upside risks to inflation. However, the balance of its attention suggests the Fed is prepared to act as though inflation is well under control and employment is the more fragile component of the economic picture. I assume the stock market’s complete comfort with the current tensions comes from an abiding belief in the lower trajectory for interest rates. The market has already been gifted three rate cuts with the indices at or near all-time highs. The central tendency for rates in 2026 is 2.9% to 3.6%. The non-zero possibility that the Fed does not cut rates at all this year looks to me like window dressing meant to preserve the Fed’s inflation-fighting credibility.

I am betting on rate cuts to continue in January and an still positioned in the Goldman Sachs Access Inflation Protected USD Bond ETF (GTIP) as a main hedge against the stagflationary potential for more rate cuts in the face of sticky inflation. GTIP currently yields 4.2% and gained 1.9% in 2025. GTIP is down about 17% from its 2021 all-time high.

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long GTIP

The post Lessons from the Fed Minutes: Why Division and Dissension Are Likely to Dominate Monetary Policy in 2026 appeared first on Inflation Watch.

In his latest press conference on monetary policy, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell reaffirmed the central bank’s dominant message: tariff-driven inflation must not evolve into persistent price pressure. The Fed must ensure tariffs result in no more than a one-time price shock, as has so often been advertised. The Fed is maintaining a restrictive policy stance, “modest” in Powell’s opinion, not to suppress growth unnecessarily, but to guard against the risk that a one-time shock becomes embedded in inflation expectations.

Powell described a uniquely difficult moment for the Fed and monetary policy. “This is a special situation with risks to both of the goals,” he said, referring to the Fed’s dual mandate of maximum employment (currently met) and price stability (inflation remains above target). The policy response: stay in position, gather more data, and avoid premature action. “We see our current policy stance as appropriate to guard against inflation risks,” as Powell stated in his prepared remarks.

These stances form “Powell’s promises.”

Tariff Inflation: Short-Lived or Sticky?

During the press conference, Powell made clear that the central bank does not see inflation from tariffs as systemic, but it must remain vigilant. “Higher tariffs have begun to show through more clearly to prices of some goods,” he acknowledged. While the base case remains a one-time price level shift, Powell acknowledged, “it is also possible that the inflationary effects could instead be more persistent, and that is a risk to be assessed and managed.”

That task—managing a potentially durable inflationary impulse from trade policy—is Powell’s focus, along with the majority of the Fed. The Fed is collecting evidence as companies pass costs to consumers, raising the risk that inflation expectations begin to drift. “Near-term measures of inflation expectations have moved up… on news about tariffs,” Powell noted, though longer-term expectations remain anchored for now.

In the press conference Q&A, Powell was more direct:

“A pretty reasonable base case is that this is a one-time price increase. We will make sure that’s the case.”

Policy Outlook: Restrictive, Yet Watchful

In support of its goals, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) left the federal funds rate unchanged at 4¼ to 4½ percent, and continued its balance sheet reduction plans. Powell emphasized that this positioning is intended to give the Fed space to observe, not react hastily, a message consistent with past meetings:

“For the time being, we are well positioned to learn more about the likely course of the economy and the evolving balance of risks before adjusting our policy stance.”

Although the Committee’s policy rate remains in “modestly restrictive” territory, Powell flagged a disconnect by observing that “financial conditions are accommodative.” In other words, the economy is not acting as if monetary policy is holding the economy back. (I wish Powell spent more time unpacking this apparent paradox). When a reporter pointed out weakness in the housing market, Powell reminded the audience that the Fed looks at the economy’s performance as a whole, in its totality. However, his claim that the Fed cannot impact housing supply is only partially true. High loan costs can undermine the economics of some housing projects. These loan costs usually follow the Fed funds rate.

A Measured Mandate: No Rush to Cut

Despite the slowing of inflation from its mid-2022 peak, Powell emphasized that it “remains somewhat elevated.” Core PCE inflation rose 2.7 percent over the 12 months ending in June—nearly unchanged since the start of the year. While services inflation continues to ease, goods prices are rising under tariff pressure, motivating the majority of the Fed to hold rates steady.

In response to dissenting votes from two members (Bowman and Waller, who preferred a rate cut), Powell praised the clarity of the debate:

“What you hope is that people explain their positions clearly and that’s what we had. We had one of our better meetings…This was a good meeting today.”

Powell offered high praise for this meeting—likely an effort to stave off media speculation about Fed acrimony or debilitating disagreements. Powell emphasized that “the majority of the committee is of the view inflation is above target and employment at target, so policy should be more restrictive.” He reiterated this simple formula to make the case plain. He deferred to the dissenters to make their cases in coming days.

To further underscore the majority’s case, Powell suggested that the Fed is already “looking through” goods inflation simply by not raising rates. I am sure that commentary raised at least a few eyebrows given how hawkish it sounds at a time when everyone is looking for the date rate cuts resume. Ultimately, Powell insisted that tariffs “will not turn into inflation, as we will make sure it won’t.” He also cautioned that the Fed must act “efficiently”. If the Fed cuts too soon, a resurgence of inflation would sent the Fed scrambling to raise rates again (a scenario that does not concern dissenter Waller). If the Fed waits too long, then it will allow unnecessary damage to the labor market (this is the scenario that concerns Waller most).

The Renovation Sideshow

The press of course had a questions about the tensions with President Trump and a gathering cacophony of his administration. Powell, as always, was quite dignified in his responses. However, his description of Trump’s recent (and awkward) visit the suddenly controversial renovations contained some backhanded commentary. Powell called the visit a good one, an honor. He added that it is not often a President comes by the Fed for a visit, especially to see a building. In other words, not only was Trump’s visit unusual, but also it was a bit comical. I wish the occasion allowed Powell to smile and crack more direct jokes.

A week and a half ago, the Federal Reserve posted a short video explaining the renovations. A lot of the work involves upgrades to meet government safety and security standards (like blast proof windows) and to preserve historic features. Who knew such work could create such a stir and build a case for firing a Fed Chair?

Conclusion: One Shot at Containing Price Pressure

Powell’s framing of the Fed’s challenge is both strategic and cautionary. Tariff inflation must remain a one-time shock, not a repeat offense. At the same time, the Fed cannot overlook the labor market’s fragility.

“Our obligation is to keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored and to prevent a one-time increase in the price level from becoming an ongoing inflation problem.”

With risks pressing on both sides of the mandate, the Fed’s current posture is one of active restraint—willing to move, but unwilling to guess.

The post Powell’s Promises: Containing Tariff-Driven Inflation and Risks to Dual Mandate appeared first on Inflation Watch.

I faded the move in bonds as nothing about the December CPI print changed the fundamental narrative of sticky inflation and a cautious Fed or even the prospect of soaring U.S. budget deficits. I speculated on weekly SPY put options as a hedge. I fully acknowledge that the stock market has spent a year and a half or more adjusting to every hiccup and bout of angst over the inflation narrative.

The chart below demonstrates that the eye must strain hard to see a change in the profile of core CPI. We will have to wait until later this month to see whether the softer than expected core CPI also bends core PCE off its uptrend from its last trough.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy (Chain-Type Price Index) [PCEPILFE], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food and Energy in U.S. City Average [CPILFESL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; January 15, 2025.

The volatility index (VIX) well represented the stock market’s huge sigh of relief over inflation. The VIX plunged 13.9% and brought an end to the most recent uptrend.

Shelter Inflation Continues Trending Down

Shelter inflation, along with services inflation, has been a key culprit in stubbornly sticky inflation. The National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) pointed out that “the year-over-year change in the shelter index remained below 5% for a fourth straight month and posted its lowest annual gain since January 2022, suggesting a continued moderation in housing inflation.” Shelter inflation has even been on a definitive downtrend since peaking in March, 2023. Unfortunately, the current trajectory may be too slow for comfort in terms of its impact on aggregate core CPI.

Shelter inflation dropped from 7.5% in December, 2022 to 6.2% in December, 2023 and now 4.6% last December. If this nearly linear pace continues, shelter inflation will be around 3.2% next December, right around where core CPI currently sits. Thus, other components will still need to do some heavy-lifting in coming months to meaningfully push core CPI, and presumably core PCE, closer to the Fed’s 2.0% target.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Shelter in U.S. City Average [CUSR0000SAH1], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; January 16, 2025

An Oil Breakout

Oil prices are not part of the core CPI, but its recent breakout has caught my attention. A continued, persistent rise in oil prices could bleed into higher inflation expectations for consumers. Such a dynamic may further motivate the Federal Reserve to sit on its hands with monetary policy. A 3.3% gain in the United States Oil Fund (USO) sent the ETF to a 2 1/2 year high.

A Spike In Short-Term Inflation Expectations?

Every month, the New York Federal Reserve publishes a survey of consumer expectations. This survey includes various measures of inflation expectations. The 1-year median expected inflation rate for consumers stayed around 3.0% for all of 2024, consistent with the narrative of sticky inflation. However, a potentially interesting blip happened in December where the median point prediction jumped from 3.0% to 3.8%. The median point predictions are typically higher than the median expected inflation rate, but they rarely diverge and almost never by such a wide margin. The accompanying press release does not refer to this surprising 1-month behavior, but I cannot help speculating on its significance. I will be watching to see whether this point projection manages to lead the median expected inflation rate higher or whether it snaps back to the typical relationship. Either way, such a jump is surely not positive for inflation in the near-term.

The Trade

I continue to maintain a strategy of fading rallies in TLT. Going into the CPI I owned a single February TLT $85 put option “just in case” CPI produced a fresh upside surprise in inflation. Now I can accumulate TLT put options at more attractive prices. TLT’s rally stopped just short of resistance at the 20-day moving average (DMA) (the dotted line below). A breakout from there will set up even more attractive prices on a test of converging resistance between the downtrending 50DMA (the red line) and the bottom of the former trading range (the thick black line).

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long TLT put options, long SPY put options

The post A Fresh Opportunity to Fade Bonds As A Marginal Change in Inflation Ignites A Near Oversold Market appeared first on Inflation Watch.

The Carry Trade

Simply put, the carry trade is the act of borrowing in a currency with low interest rates and using those funds to buy assets with higher rates or anticipated returns (like stocks). The Japanese yen became an “easy” carry trade for big investors because the Japanese yen (FXY) had near zero interest rates. Once the Fed started hiking rates, traders could earn increasing returns by borrowing in yen and buying U.S. bonds. After equity markets bottomed in October, 2023, traders could earn increasing return borrowing yen to buy stocks (at least one analyst thinks the carry trade has been in effect since the rebound from the Great Financial Crisis!). Crypto currencies are even acting like they have been caught up in this massive delveraging. At the time of writing Bitcoin (BTC/USD) is down around 24% in just 8 days and looks like it could soon reverse all its gains since the SEC approved Bitcoin spot ETFs.

The strength in the yen and the presumed unwind of the carry trade has been breathtaking over the last two weeks. The Australian dollar versus the Japanese yen (AUD/JPY) has fallen around 17% in the three weeks since its last peak. AUD/JPY now sits at levels last seen in early June, 2023. AUD/JPY has long been my favorite currency market indicator of sentiment in the stock market. However, the current decline happened so rapidly, that I had no time to adjust my mind to appreciating that AUD/JPY suddenly mattered again in a significant way. After all, the Bank of Japan “only” hiked its target rate from 0% to 0.25%. The hawkish tone of the BoJ on normalizing policy must have traders scrambling to get completely out of the way of future rate hikes.

So what now?

Financial markets are essentially in panic mode. It is near impossible for the stampeding herds to see the other side of this major market disruption. As a contrarian of extremes in financial markets, I am compelled to lean the other way even though market breadth in the stock market still needs to fall significantly to hit oversold levels. Thus, I cannot buy as aggressively as I normally would…”nibbling” is my modus operandi for now (I am also re-accumulating cryptocurrency positions like BTC/USD).

In currency markets, I slipped on my well-crafted trading strategy on the Japanese yen. I gave up on the short GBP/JPY too early, and got overly confident in what looked like the obligatory rebound for USD/JPY side. So, in recent days, I have raced to keep up with new short GBP/JPY positions and have been simply astounded by how fast these positions hit profit targets. This clearing in turn forces me to reload at lower prices as the Japanese yen keeps racing away. Last week, I even dabbled in shares and call options in Invesco CurrencyShares® Japanese Yen Trust ETF (FXY). At SOME point, this non-stop slide in yen currency pairs will end and give way to a (potentially) abrupt and vicious countertrend relief rally. That time will offer a brief opportunity to bail on short yen positions and then step aside to catch a few breaths!

Be careful out there!

Full disclosure: long AUD/JPY, long USD/JPY, short GBP/JPY, long BTC/USD

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